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INTRODUCTION: THE ARTIFICIAL HEART

Early in March 1969, Haskell Karp, a forty-seven-year-old
printing estimator from Skokie, Illinois, was admitted to St.
Luke's Episcopal Hospital in Houston, Texas. Mr. Karp, who
had suffered from a progressively worsening heart condition
for ten years, came to Houston to be treated by Dr. Denton
Cooley, the world-renowned cardiac surgeon. Over the next
month, Mr. Karp received medical treatment and his condition
was studied by a number of physicians associated with the hospital. He was examined intermittently by Dr. Cooley. The
Houston physicians confirmed the diagnosis reached by Karp's
physicians in Illinois of moderate pulmonary hypertension and
fibrosis and decomposition in the left lateral wall of his left
ventricle. "Dr. Cooley suggested that Mr. Karp's desire for a
more active and productive life-style could best be achieved by
a heart transplant. Mr. Karp rejected this suggestion and preferred to undergo ventriculoplasty surgery (wedge procedure)
which Dr. Cooley had developed."'
Because the resection of the left ventricle might not succeed, Dr. Cooley was determined to rely on a heart transplant
as a backup alternative, which he persuaded Mr. Karp to accept. But the bloom was already off the rose of cardiac grafting;
many of the transplant teams which had been performing the
operation enthusiastically only a year before had ceased doing
them, and the remaining groups, like Dr. Cooley's, found that
public disaffection resulted in few people offering organs for
transplantation. This led Dr. Cooley to plan for a new step
I Karp
Cir. 1974).

v. Cooley, 349 F. Supp. 827, 829 (S.D. Tex. 1972), aff'd, 493 F.2d 408 (5th
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with Mr. Karp, never before tried with a human being-the
implantation of a completely artificial heart. Since there was
2
only a "70-30" chance of his surviving the ventriculoplasty,
Dr. Cooley explained to Mr. Karp, "if death appeared imminent . . .his heart would be removed and a mechanical heart
substitute (sometimes referred to as the Cooley-Liotta mechanical heart) inserted. '3 Controversy was later to develop
over whether Dr. Cooley assured the Karps that "there is a
donor heart that will be available and that we will use if there's
that need for it," with the artificial heart being employed for a
brief period only, 4 rather than telling them "at that time there
5
was no heart donor available, nor any prospect of one."
2 Mrs. Karp's recollection was "that Dr. Cooley had said that in his own personal
experience he had less than a five per cent chance of failure [with the wedge procedure] and that it 'seemed like it hardly ever failed.'" 493 F.2d at 413-14.
3349 F. Supp. at 830.
So Mrs. Karp was to testify. 493 F.2d at 413. She remembered Dr. Cooley telling
them that "the mechanical device would be used for only 30 minutes while the donor
was being prepared." Id.
' So the district court found, 349 F. Supp. at 830, drawing directly on Dr. Cooley's
testimony, which is also quoted in the court of appeals' opinion, 493 F.2d at 414. His
testimony continues: "I told [Mr. Karp] that I did not know whether [finding a suitable donor] would take a matter of hours or days, weeks, or maybe not at all, but
[the mechanical heart] would sustain his life and give us another possibility of salvaging him through heart transplantation." Id.
The court of appeals agreed with the trial judge's conclusion that Mrs. Karp's
testimony did not create a "conflict in substantial evidence," under Boeing Co. v.
Shipman, 411 F.2d 365, 374 (5th Cir. 1965) (en banc), on which both courts reliEd
for the standard for directing verdicts, because she had not been present when Dr.
Cooley spoke with Mr. Karp late on the evening of April 2, 1969. Her testimony
concerned a conversation that Dr. Cooley had with them about 6:30 or 7:00 p.m. on
April 3 when he came to have them sign the consent form for the three-step operation. After telling them about the urgency of the operation, Dr. Cooley reassured
her, "don't worry about the shock element to your husband because I told him
exactly what I told you now last night." Mrs. Karp recalled her husband replying,
"'Honey, he told me this last night.' He said, 'Go ahead. We'll sign the agreement.'"
493 F.2d at 413.
The appellate tribunal also found that the "consent form is consistent with Dr.
Cooley's testimony of what he told Mr. Karp," id. at 421, and that it provided the
best evidence of what was agreed to. The relevant portion of the form stated:
In the event cardiac function cannot be restored by excision of destroyed
heart muscle and plastic reconstruction of the ventricle and death seems
imminent, I authorize Dr. Cooley and his staff to remove my diseased heart
and insert a mechanical cardiac substitute. I understand that this mechanical
device will not be permanent and ultimately will require replacement by a
heart transplant.
Id. at 412 n.4. Yet on the two disputed issues-the availability of a donor heart and
the length of time the artificial heart would be used-the consent form appears to
shed little or no light. It says nothing about the first, and on the second merely states
that the device "will not be permanent" but will "ultimately" be replaced by a cadaver
heart.
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In Mrs. Karp's recollection, Dr. Cooley pressed her husband to go forward with the operation by telling him that an
aneurysm in his heart was "about to burst" and that the medical
team was uncertain "whether we can even wait [until] tomorrow."6 In Dr. Cooley's view it was Mr. Karp who grew impatient
with waiting for a donor,7 but there was no question that Mr.
Karp's condition took such a turn for the worse-his pacemaker
was no longer able to stimulate adequate cardiac functionthat he was near death as he was wheeled into the operating
theater. Anesthesia had to be administered at an accelerated
pace so that the surgery could begin quickly. 8 After Mr. Karp
had been hooked up to the heart-lung bypass machine, the repairs were performed on his left ventricle, in which Dr. Cooley
found much more scar tissue and much less viable muscle than
he had hoped. 9 When the doctors tried to start the heart up
again, it went into fibrillation; an electrical shock was used to
steady the rhythm, but the contraction was too weak to support life. Mr. Karp's heart was then removed and the mechanical one was inserted.
Dr. Cooley said that the mechanical heart functioned
very well and Mr. Karp responded to stimulation within 15 or 20 minutes after the incision was closed. His
blood pressure was well sustained according to Dr.
Cooley and he showed signs of cerebral activity. Dr.
Keats [the anesthesiologist] said that Mr. Karp was
6
Id. at 413. Dr. Cooley insisted at trial that he would never say an aneurysm could
burst, and that although he wrote an article in which "burst aneurysm" appeared,
the heart condition dealt with there was different than Mr. Karp's and the statement
was credited to another doctor. 349 F. Supp. at 836.
7493 F.2d at 414.
8 Dr. Arthur S. Keats, the anesthesiologist, testified that, having put Mr. Karp to
sleep and put a tube down his windpipe to assist his breathing, he sent word to Dr.
Cooley that they "'had better go ahead with the operation as expeditiously as possible,
otherwise the patient may not last long enough to have the operation.'" Dr. Cooley
hurried to complete the surgery in which he was then engaged; upon entering the
Karp operating room, he found the patient "'mottled and blue"' and concluded that
Karp was "'virtually moribund'" at that time. Id. at 416.
9 During the operation, Dr. Cooley, in his own words, "'discovered a situation
for which wedge resection could not be beneficial,'" but he went ahead anyway
because he "'felt a moral obligation to try.'" Id. n.6. Mrs. Karp contended that the
physicians had carried out the ventriculoplasty negligently and had abandoned it
improperly in order to undertake the procedure which really interested them, the
insertion of the mechanical heart device. The Fifth Circuit panel concluded that this
"theory has no evidentiary foundation." Id. at 417 n.8.
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amazingly well following the operation, that the records reflect that he was responding reasonably to commands within 20 minutes postoperatively. Dr. Keats
testified that the endotracheal tube was removed about
1:20 a.m. [approximately eleven hours after the operation], and that he saw Mr. Karp some time the next
morning at which time he was responsive and could
communicate.1 0
Mrs. Karp then joined Dr. Cooley in making appeals over the
news media for a heart donor, and some sixty-four hours after
the implantation of the mechanical heart, it was replaced by a
human one." Mr. Karp's condition nevertheless deteriorated
further. His production of urine, low after the first operation,
ceased completely after the transplant. He died of pneumonia
and kidney failure at 3:15 p.m. on April 8, about thirty-two
hours after receiving the cadaver organ and four days after his
initial surgery.
The extraordinary events that took place in Houston in
April 1969 obviously generate many critical issues. 12 Although
this initial attempt at mechanical replacement of the heart has
riot yet been repeated, 13 it may eventually be viewed as the first

'ld. at 417.
11The transplantation of a human heart into Mr. Karp is a controversial saga in
itself.
On 7 April Mrs. Barbara Ewan, a candidate-donor, was admitted to
Saint Luke's. She had been flown to Houston from Lawrence, Massachusetts,
by a chartered air ambulance. She had been in a coma at the Lawrence
General Hospital since 19 March. Forty-eight hours before her trip to Houston, after a period of anoxic arrest, tests had shown her to be suffering
from irreversible brain damage. After a telephone conference between physicians in Houston and Lawrence and a meeting of Mrs. Ewan's closest relatives, family consent had been given for her to be taken to Houston to donate
her heart to Mr. Karp. . . . Ninety minutes after her arrival in Houston,
Mrs. Ewan was formally pronounced dead from a stroke, by four doctors
who were not members of the prospective transplant team. Her heart was
immediately implanted into Mr. Karp.
R. Fox AND J. SWAZEY, THE COURAGE TO FAIL: A SOCIAL VIEW OF ORGAN TRANSPLANTS
AND DIALYSIS 152-53 (1974). The artificial heart was front page news across the
country, which helps to explain why Mrs. Karp's "plea" was answered by the donation
of a heart from two thousand miles away.
12See generally U.S. DEPT OF HEALTH, EDUCATION, AND WELFARE, NATIONAL
HEART AND LUNG INSTITUTE, ARTIFICIAL HEART ASSESSMENT PANEL, THE TOTALLY
IMPLANTABLE ARTIFICIAL HEART:

ECONOMIC, ETHICAL, LEGAL, MEDICAL,

PSYCHIATRIC

AND SOCIAL IMPLICATIONS (1973).

13 Attention has now shifted from the total-heart pump back to perfecting a left
ventricular assist device, a version of which underwent initial clinical trials in 1963-

-
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step in a biomedical development of greater importance than
human heart transplantation. 1 4 As such, it could contribute to
a redefinition of life and death and even of what it means to be
"human," to a renewed debate about the allocation of scarce
and very precious resources, and to a reconsideration of the
policies behind the direction in which health care is moving in
this country.
Even without looking to the future, Denton Cooley's implantation of the experimental device in place of Haskell Karp's
heart in itself dramatically illustrates the questions raised by
innovation in the treatment of life-threatening illness, and indeed by all modern, highly technological medicine. At what
point is it permissible to proceed with a radically new medical
intervention? What role do the hopes and fears of physicians
and their colleagues and competitors, patients and their
families, hospital administrators, and public officials play in
decisionmaking? How ought the risks of medical innovation be
assessed and distributed? Central to these is the allocation of
authority among the participants in the decisionmaking process-in particular, the extent to which persons who are the
patient-subjects of clinical research should become informed
decisionmakers.15
67. See, e.g., DeBakey & Hall, Ortholopic Cardiac Prosthesis, 7 CARDIOVASC. RESEARCH
CENTER BULL. 127 (1969). If basic problems are overcome, such devices will probably
be tested soon as a means of tiding patients over following major surgery that has
employed cardiopulmonary bypass; thereafter, their use for long-term assistance
is also contemplated. See R. HEGYELI & M. MACHESKO WITH ASSISTANCE OF L. RICHARDSON, THE LEFT VENTRICULAR ASSIST DEVICE-AssISTANCE TO FAILING CIRCULATION

53-56 (1974).
"4The first cardiac transplant in man was performed in January 1964, using a
chimpanzee heart when an expected human donor proved unavailable. See Hardy,
Chavez, Kurrus, Neely, Eraslan, Turner, Fabian & Labacki, Heart Transplantation
in Man, 188 J.A.M.A. 1132 (1964). Nearly four years elapsed before Dr. Christiaan
Barnard performed the next heart transplant, this time using a human donor; his
operation triggered the world-wide rush in 1968. See Surgeons Cheer Rising Transplant Score, MEDICAL WORLD NEWS, Sept. 27, 1968, at 26.
15 Of the many issues touched by the Karp case, only this one is treated in this
Article. The issue of human experimentation, never well defined by counsel or by
the judges, is of interest here only as it relates to the patient's decisionmaking; the
courts apparently believed that there was no basis for "the experimentation count"
in the complaint if the physicians, whatever their scientific curiosity, had also been
motivated by a therapeutic intent to save Mr. Karp's life. Nor is the Article concerned
with three other issues in the case to which the courts devoted much attention, all
relating to the exclusion of evidence: a film showing portions of the Karp operation;
records of a Baylor University Committee which investigated the operation; and the
testimony of Dr. Michael DeBakey, Dr. Cooley's academic superior and major com-
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In resolving this latter issue in the action for wrongful
death brought against Dr. Cooley and his colleagues,' 6 the courts
looked to Natanson v. Kline, 17 the seminal opinion in which the
Kansas supreme court announced that physicians would be liable for breaching their obligation
to disclose and explain to the patient in language as
simple as necessary the nature of the ailment, the
nature of the proposed treatment, the probability of
success or of alternatives, and perhaps the risks of unfortunate results and unforeseen conditions within the
18
body ..-..

The basic premise from which the Natanson court operated
-that everyone has the right to decide for himself what shall
be done to his person-is a fundamental tenet of English and
American common law. The importance of volition in the
medical context was forcefully stated sixty years ago by Judge
Cardozo in Schloendorff v. Society of New York Hospital:
Every human being of adult years and sound mind has
a right to determine what shall be done with his own
body; and a surgeon who performs an operation withpetitor as a thoracic surgeon, whom the plaintiffs tried to subpoena as an expert
witness but who declined, in the trial judge's chambers, to express any opinion about
the propriety of the operation. See notes 247-53 infra & accompanying text. All these
points were decided adversely to the plaintiffs by the trial and appellate courts.
16 Karp v. Cooley, 349 F. Supp. 827 (S.D. Tex. 1972), aff'd, 493 F.2d 408 (5th
Cir. .1974). After nine days of trial, the trial judge granted the defendant physicians'
motion for a directed verdict; the court of appeals affirmed.
17 186 Kan. 393, 350 P.2d 1093, clarified and rehearing denied, 187 Kan. 186, 354
P.2d 670 (1960). The Fifth Circuit noted that "[t]he modern development is generally
recognized as beginning with Natanson v. Kline ....
" 493 F.2d at 419 n.9 (citation
omitted). Since the courts were exercising diversity jurisdiction, they relied on Texas
law, as articulated primarily in Wilson v. Scott, 412 S.W.2d 299 (Tex. 1967), which
in turn relied on Natanson and principally on Aiken v. Clary, 396 S.W.2d 668 (Mo.
1965).
18 186 Kan. at 410, 350 P.2d at 1106. The last fifteen years have seen a flood of
"informed consent" cases pour forth across the country in the wake of Natanson. The
Kansas court's decision may have been so influential in part because it was so confused. Cf. 34 S. CAL. L. Rav. 217 (1961); note 20 infra. The case did not, of course,
create any wholly new legal concepts, nor was it without precedent, see, e.g., Theodore
v. Ellis, 141 La. '709, 75 So. 655 (1917); Hunter v. Burroughs, 123 Va. 113, 96 S.E.
360 (1918); and the Natanson court drew upon a number of prior opinions in other
jurisdictions, particularly Salgo v. Leland Stanford Jr. Univ. Bd. of Trustees, 154
Cal. App. 2d 560, 317 P.2d 170 (1957), which had brought the issue of consent to a
similar resolution.
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out his patient's consent commits an assault, for which
he is liable in damages.1 9
But the Kansas court did plow new ground. 20 It moved
the legal concept of consent beyond simple assault and battery
law; it recognized that for the right to self-determination to
have meaning for the patient, it must be conjoined with a right
to the information he or she would need to formulate an intelligent opinion. Natanson and its progeny thus carried the law
beyond merely giving body to "the wish on the part of the individual to be his own master . . . to be a subject, not an ob-

ject,"'' 2 to include the rational processes involved in the desire
to be moved by reasons, by conscious purposes which
are [his] own, not by causes which affect [him], as it
were, from outside, . . .above all, to be conscious of

[himself] as a thinking, willing, active being, bearing
responsibility for his choices and able to explain them

by reference to his own ideas and purposes ....22

19211 N.Y. 125, 129, 105 N.E. 92, 93 (1914). Accord, Pratt v. Davis, 224 Ill.
300,
79 N.E. 562 (1906); Mohr v. Williams, 95 Minn. 261, 104 N.W. 12 (1905); Rolater v.
Strain, 39 Okl. 572, 137 P. 96 (1913).
20 Immediately after Natanson was decided, the Supreme Court of Missouri
handed down Mitchell v. Robinson, 334 S.W.2d 11 (Mo. 1960), holding it to be a
jury question whether physicians had been negligent in failing to inform their patient of the dangers of shock therapy. The Mitchell court was very unclear about what
it was up to, and the Natanson opinion has proven more influential, although both
had to be clarified, Natanson on rehearing, 187 Kan. 186, 354 P.2d 670 (1960), and
in Williams v. Menehan, 191 Kan. 6, 379 P.2d 292 (1963), and Mitchell in Aiken v.
Clary, 396 S.W.2d 668 (Mo. 1965). Waltz and Scheuneman, Informed Consent to
Therapy, 64 Nw. U.L. REV. 628 (1970), observe that the doctrine "has achieved a status
in the law of medical malpractice unmatched both in speed of growth and bulk of
commentary," and cite nearly a score of articles dealing with the doctrine, id. n.1,
which have since been supplemented by countless others, see, e.g., Kessenick &
Mankin, Medical Malpractice: The Right to be Informed, 8 U.S.F.L. REV. 261 (1973);
Note, Informed Consent to Medical Treatment, 61 CALIF. L. REV. 634 (1973); Note,
Informed Consent-A Proposed Standard for Medical Disclosure, 48 N.Y.U.L. REV. 548
(1973); Note, The Patient-Physician Relationship: Present Law and Trends for the Future
Implied in Cobbs v. Grant, 8 U.S.F.L. REv. 320 (1973); Comment, Informed Consent as a
Theory of Medical Liability, i970 Wis. L. REV. 879; &ote, informed Consent and the
Dying Patient, 83 YALE L.J. 1632 (1974); Note, Restructuring Informed Consent: Legal
Therapy for the Doctor-PatientRelationship, 79 YALE L.J. 1533 (1970). Most of the cases
are collected in Cobbs v. Grant, 8 Cal. 3d 229, 239-40, 502 P.2d 1, 7, 104 Cal. Rptr.
505, 511-12 (1972), and Comment, Informed Consent in Medical Malpractice, 55 CALIF.
L. REv. 1396, 1397 n.5 (1967). See also note 198 infra.
21 I. BERLIN, Two CONCEPTS OF LIBERTY 16 (1958).
22Id.
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In the past decade, the courts have developed a number
of ways of applying the doctrine of informed consent. The legal
points still at issue-whether the wrong involved is properly
regarded as an assault and battery without consent (where full
disclosure is absent) or as malpractice (the failure to inform
being seen as a breach of professional duty),23 or whether the
extent of disclosure required ought to be judged by standards
set by a physician's fellow practitioners or by what lay jurors
would want to know in similar circumstances 2 4 -have been debated largely as formal rules rather than in terms of the purposes and function of the doctrine. It is not difficult to see why
this has occurred. It is to be expected that courts would focus
on the purposes of a legal rule if the major arguments about
the rule were teleological. A rule might be supported if, for
example, it reduced the number of accidents or favored a partic21 Traditionally, a physician was liable in an action for battery when he did something to a patient for which he had not obtained permission. See, e.g., Bang v. Charles
T. Miller Hosp., 251 Minn. 427, 88 N.W.2d 186 (1958) (as part of prostate operation
spermatic cords were tied off without patient's prior knowledge or consent); Moore
v. Webb, 345 S.W.2d 239 (Mo. App. 1961) (eight lower teeth extracted while patient,
who had agreed to removal of two, was under sodium pentathol); Corn v. French,
71 Nev. 280, 289 P.2d 173 (1955) (mastectomy performed when patient had limited
consent to a biopsy); Hively v. Higgs, 120 Ore. 588, 253 P. 363 (1927) (tonsils removed during course of minor operation on patient's nose). The battery theory has
been carried forward in some of the modern "informed consent" cases. See, e.g.,
Dow v. Kaiser Foundation, 12 Cal. App. 3d 488, 90 Cal. Rptr. 747 (1970) (held, physician's willful and unreasonable withholding of material information constitutes
battery). On the other hand, the majority of courts, following Natanson, have characterized failure to obtain "informed consent" as giving rise to a cause of action
based on negligence. See Plant, An Analysis of "Informed Consent", 36 FORDHAM L. REv.
639, 648-55 (1968). Occasionally, courts have permitted plaintiffs to proceed either
in battery or in negligence on a given set of facts, see, e.g., Belcher v. Carter, 13 Ohio
App. 2d 113, 234 N.E. 2d 311 (1967). Some courts have held that battery lies if there
is no informed consent at all, but that if the defendant obtained "informed consent" he or she may still be liable for malpractice for breaching the medical community's standard of disclosure. Shetter v. Rochelle, 2 Ariz. App. 358, 409 P.2d 74
(1965); cf. Cobbs v. Grant, 8 Cal. 3d 229, 237, 502 P.2d 1, 8, 104 Cal. Rptr. 505, 512
(1972).
24 In its clarification of its first opinion in Natanson the Kansas supreme court'
declared that "expert testimony of medical witnesses is required to establish whether
[the physician's] disclosures are in accordance with those which a reasonable medical
practitioner would make under the same or similar circumstances." 187 Kan. at 190,
354 P.2d at 673. Recently, that viewpoint has been squarely repudiated in three forceful decisions. Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1064
(1972); Cobbs v. Grant, 8 Cal. 3d 229, 502 P.2d 1, 104 Cal. Rptr. 505 (1972); Wilkinson v. Vesey, 110 R.I. 606, 295 A.2d 676 (1972). It seems likely that these opinions
will prove influential and attract further courts to this position. See also note 155
infra.
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ular group in society. Informed consent rules do not, however,
lead to any particular treatment decisions, and the rule cannot
be favored because of the possible therapeutic outcomes it will
produce. Indeed, the decisional outcomes are less predictable
than if the authority were put instead in the hands of other decisionmakers such as physician-investigators. This is an instance, then, of the purpose of a rule being to promote interests
rather than to lead to certain ends; in this case, they are the
interests of patient-subjects. An analysis of informed consent
that goes beyond the legal formulae themselves must inquire
into the functions served by the doctrine, not in bringing about
"better" results but in promoting choices made by persons for
themselves and for which they can take responsibility.
The catastrophic disease process provides a good crucible
in which to formulate and test a theory of informed consent
because it calls forth active and intense participation by all the
actors in the drama of modern, technological medicine: physician-investigators who invent and apply the new techniques
of treatment; patient-subjects in whom these techniques have
their ultimate (and sometimes highly beneficial) trial runs;
organized professional bodies which usually guide or support
and occasionally curtail the work of the pioneers in their fields;
and organs of the state which fund education and research
and increasingly intervene in the actual supervision of clinical
innovation. The analysis presented here leads to the conclusion that for both theoretical and practical reasons the treatment of the diseases in question is best undertaken when all
the participants can behave as collaborators, each with a vital
interest and an independent voice in the steps to be followed.
Central to this inquiry is an examination of the functions
and limitations of informed consent, from which it is possible
to evaluate particularly the authority which should be wielded
by patient-subjects in the catastrophic disease process. The
treatment of these conditions typically involves highly specialized and often experimental care, usually provided by persons
other than the patient's primary physician and frequently
carrying unknown risks. The "model" of decisionmaking developed here will also have much to say about the duties and
responsibilities which physicians and patients have toward one
another in other areas of health care. A functional analysis of
informed consent, with a clear recognition of the limitations
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inherent in the decisionmaking process, suggests that giving
patient-subjects a greater say in decisions relating to their treatment alternatives can be a powerful force for "'personalization' in technical decisions made in the modern medical context. ' 25 The doctrine of informed consent, though still in
evolution, ought not to be viewed narrowly through the lenses
of malpractice and battery, but should be recognized as a
ground for recovery with its own rules of conduct, causation,
and damages.
I.

CATASTROPHIC DISEASE RESEARCH AND TREATMENT

A. The Nature of CatastrophicDisease
In the past decade, the cost of medical care has risen substantially. Even relatively uncomplicated illnesses can involve
considerable expense and inconvenience, and an individual
who develops a condition serious enough to require repeated
medical attention, and perhaps hospitalization, faces the prospect of a heavy drain on his financial resources, even if part of
the bill is borne by private or government-funded health insurance. At the same time the range of therapy for most
diseases has been greatly increased by new drugs and other
medical devices, which place some previously incurable and
inevitably fatal conditions within the power of medicine to delay, if not control.
While all illness carries with it some threat to life and imposes some economic burdens, these factors are especially pronounced in certain diseases. These diseases, which are termed
"catastrophic," more often than not represent disaster for those
they strike. Fatal unless promptly treated, yet with a course of
therapy so financially burdensome as to be beyond the usual
resources of most persons, a catastrophic illness may radically
alter a person's existence and accustomed way of life, leaving
his private affairs and family life in disorder.26 Other factors,
25Note,

Restructuring Informed

Consent: Legal

Therapy for

the

Doctor-Patient

Relationship, 79 YALE L.J. 1533, 1534 (1970).
26 Thus, for a condition to be considered a catastrophic disease, as the term is
used here, some form of treatment must be available which at least will sustain life
for a period of time. Therefore, for example, fatal automobile accidents or other
sudden fatal traumas are not catastrophic diseases for the purposes of this Article,
although they may have a profound effect on a family if they deprive it of its primary wage-earner.
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such as the psychological and social impacts of such conditions
on patients and their families, though not necessary to a definition of the diseases, are the nearly universal consequences of
them.
Different catastrophic diseases may raise somewhat different issues for analysis, but for purposes of developing a
decisionmaking model, one group---those heart 27 and kid27 Nearly nine million Americans suffer from some form of heart disease, accounting for about 720,000 deaths annually, 200,000 of them among individuals
under 65 years old. Although leaders in the field hope that preventive measuresrestrictions in diet, curtailment of cigarette smoking, better detection and treatment of rheumatic fever and hypertension-will eventually reduce this staggering
toll, at present the only treatment for the patient facing imminent cardiac death is
the replacement of his damaged heart with a healthy heart from a person who has
just died of other causes. Work is also under way to develop a totally implantable artificial pump, but success still appears to be a number of years away. See notes 1-14
supra & 228-30 infra & accompanying text.
At present there are practical limits to cardiac transplantation. Among persons
with coronary heart disease (the largest category), the critical limitation is its sudden
onset, often without prior indications, and the occurrence of death before the patients
reach a hospital. Moreover, until an effective circulatory assist device is developed,
many patients for whom cardiac replacement might be indicated will die before the
necessary arrangements can be made. Even the availability of such a device will
not save all coronary victims. Based on intensive, longitudinal studies of 183 patients with coronary heart disease, and assuming the widespread availability of a
circulatory assist device, a National Heart Institute Task Force concluded that only
"30 were potential candidates for total cardiac replacement," a ratio of about one in

six. AD Hoc TASK FORCE ON CARDIAC REPLACEMENT, NATIONAL HEART INSTITUTE,
CARDIAC

REPLACEMENT:

MEDICAL,

ETHICAL,

PSYCHOLOGICAL

AND

ECONOMIC

IMPLI-

CATIONS 11 (1969).
For some time to come few of those who suffer from heart disease will be treated
by having their damaged organ replaced by a healthy one from another person or
an artificial substitute. The major roadblock remains the problem of rejection.
Once that problem is solved, the number of heart replacements could rise to a level
which would be an order of magnitude greater. The N.H.I. Task Force estimated
that at such a time transplantation would jump from the existing (1969) level of
100 operations per year to an annual figure of about 12,000. Id. 16. (The Task
Force's estimate was on the high side even when made. While 101 transplants were
performed in 1968 on a worldwide basis, only 54 were American. In 1972, the last
year for which published data is available, only 14 cardiac transplants were performed in the United States. ACS/NIH Organ Transplant Registry, Third Scientific
Report, 226J...M.A. 1211, 12f3 (1973).) The N.H.I. figure was based on an estimate
that 6% of the approxmately 200,000 persons under 65 who die from heart disease
would then become candidates for heart replacement. The Task Force increased
its estimate to 16%, or 32,000 candidates, if a satisfactory circulatory assist device
and an artificial heart were also available.
A heart transplant costs in excess of $20,000, the bulk of which goes' for postoperative care. At the moment most of this money is provided by N.H.I. research
funds, insurance, and private sources, including (in effect) contributibns by the
hospitals and physicians involved. The cost of an artificial pump, and its implantation,
would probably be about that of a transplant.
Heart disease is, therefore, likely to remain a catastrophic disease of major
proportions-killing or crippling the hundreds of thousands it strikes, imposing a
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ney2 8 conditions which are susceptible to treatment through
organ transplantation or support by artificial means-is especially illuminating. The lessons to be learned from an examination of the problems of informed consent in this context, which
heavy financial burden on those who can be treated, and creating the sometimes
even heavier psychological burden of uncertainty about offering and accepting treatment for all involved, be they patients, relatives and friends, physicians, or researchers.
2' As a catastrophic illness, chronic renal disease and the concomitant uremia
present a somewhat different picture than heart disease. For one thing, its incidence is much lower. On the basis of death certificates, it is estimated that 28,000
people die each year of primary kidney disease, including nephritis, nephrosis,
kidney infections, and polycystic diseases of the kidney. Additionally, approximately 20,000 die of hypertension with arteriolar nephrosclerosis and 50,000 die
of other forms of hypertension; a small portion of these can be counted as "kidney
deaths," in that they would benefit from hemodialysis (treatment on an "artificial
kidney").
On the other hand, a second and perhaps more striking aspect of kidney
disease is that the greater success rate of therapy (compared with heart replacement) creates a much larger pool of potential candidates for treatment at present.
Although transplantation of the kidney continues to be far from risk-free, due largely
to immunological difficulties, this procedure is the most frequently performed type
of transplantation; its frequency (currently about 2,500 per year) increases while
that of heart transplantation declines. One reason for its success is that since kidneys
come in pairs live donors can be used, which increases the probability of finding a
good immunologic "match" among a patient's immediate relatives. Moreover, hemodialysis permits patients to be maintained until they are adequately prepared for
transplantation or until a suitable organ can be found. By compensating for their
diseased kidney, this therapy also puts patients in a healthier state prior to their
surgery than in the case with cardiac recipients. Of course, some patients are main-

tained for long periods of time on hemodialysis, which is employed as a life-sustaining treatment in its own right.
Despite these differences, the treatments for end-stage kidney disease share
with cardiac replacement two important characteristics: they are costly and they

may provoke severe psychological tension for all concerned. The cost of transplanting a kidney is about the same as the cost of replacing a heart, better than $20,000

(this figure will be somewhat larger if a live donor is involved). Because of its continuous nature, dialysis is even more expensive. The cost for this procedure ranges
from about $35,000 per year for in-hospital dialysis to about $6,500 per year for

dialysis carried out in a patient's home, after an initial expenditure of $3,000 for
equipment as well as the expense of home alterations (plumbing and so on).
The psychological reverberations of kidney transplantation probably exceed
those of the heart operation because, in addition to a large element of uncertainty

or risk, in many cases the life-saving organ will have come from another living human being, rather than from a cadaver. And even the problems inherent in such a
two-way
patients
from six
Calland,

psychic debt are probably not as great as the difficulties encountered by
undergoing chronic dialysis, who two or three times a week must spend
to sixteen hours attached to a machine to "purify" their blood. See generally
Iatrogenic Problems in End-stage Renal Failure, 287 NEw ENG. J. MED. 334

(1972); Renal Failure: The Agony and the Ecstasy, 222 J.A.M.A. 829 (1972) (editorial).
Moreover, pre-existing psychopathology is often made more severe by the shifts in
the dialysand's metabolic state.
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has been the object of recent, dramatic medical attention,
should, nonetheless, be useful for the analysis of these problems in the setting of other catastrophic illnesses and ordinary
diseases as well.
B. Major ParticipantsBesides the Patient-Subject
The thrust of informed consent, as that doctrine is viewed
here, is to make the patient-subject an active and informed
participant in the decisions which must be made in research on,
and treatment of, catastrophic diseases. But the creation of a
model of informed consent also requires an understanding of
the authority exercised by the other major participants in the
catastrophic disease process: the physician-investigators, the
professions, and the state.2 9 The roles played by these actors
are relevant for their direct influence on the patient-subject's
capacity to make an informed judgment on some proposed
therapy.3 0 But their activities also attain an independent significance in that they largely control the nature and number of
choices put before the patient-subject.
Physician-investigators 3 ' probably constitute the most important of these external centers of power. It is they who bear
the responsibility for initiating the processes of biomedical advance that create new possibilities for the treatment of catastrophic illnesses.
The professional participants in the catastrophic disease
process come from a variety of professional backgrounds,
but two broad groupings can be identified: those with and those
26 In this section, the discussion centers on physician-investigators and their
peers; the role and authority of the state are treated more fully at text accompanying notes 127-49 infra.
"0 See text accompanying notes 103-09 infra (the impact of the physician-patient relationship on informed consent).
31 This designation is somewhat inaccurate. The group of participants encompassed in this label includes not only M.D.'s but also Ph.D.'s from a variety of disciplines as well as nurses, social workers, psychologists, and paramedical personnel.
Little attention has been paid to defining the authority and responsibility of the
various members of "the team" in the catastrophic disease decision-making process. The traditional assumption has been that, since all of them work in medical
settings, a physician or group of physicians should have ultimate authority. This
assumption requires re-examination. For example, with respect to decisions involving the weight to be given to tissue typing in the selection of recipients, the question must be explored whether greater, or even primary, authority should not rest
with an immunologist rather than a surgeon.
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without prior clinical training and experience, many of the
latter being graduates of basic science programs. Within both
groups the extent of prior experience varies considerably. 32 Beyond the attainment of a professional degree, no formal mechanisms have been established for certifying a person competent
to experiment or treat in areas which, like catastrophic disease,
are at the "frontiers of knowledge" with all the uncertainties,
33
responsibilities, and hard choices that such work implies.
Although professional bodies exercise some supervision
in this area through control of the educational process and
formal (awards, editorial control of professional journals) and
informal ('reputation") mechanisms, there are indications that
little training or supervision is addressed to the most problematic questions of medical innovation. If they are to play a
more active role, professional groups will have to examine
whether standards of training and certification should be
promulgated for the professionals working in innovative settings such as catastrophic diseases, and whether the extent of
their authority should not be circumscribed until such training
has been obtained. One necessary facet of education, training
for professional responsibility, has generally been neglected in
all professional education and is of particular importance for
34
those working at the frontiers of knowledge.
Improvement in ethical socialization is desirable
at every phase of medical training. In medical school,
for example, the teachers who now instill the value of
research as they talk about their own research projects
32 The senior persons, who head these programs, are generally professionals
of long clinical experience, while the rest of the participants range from recent
graduates, often of great promise, to seasoned veterans. For example, when Christiaan Barnard performed the first heart transplantation he was not considered to
be among the group of senior cardiac surgeons who were engaged in extensive preliminary work for the eventual performance of this operation.
33In theory, any person who wishes to work in this complex and highly specialized
field can do so, though, in practice, a number of informal mechanisms exist to brake
rash practices, such as restrictions on access to clinical settings (for which one must
first be recognized by peers and hospital boards), the fear of malpractice suits, the
need for referrals of patients (which again is based on prior recognition of one's
professional worth), and the like.
1 See Katz, The Education of the Physician-Investigator, 98 DAEDALUS 480 (1969).
Indoctrinating professionals as to what is "good" or "bad" ethical behavior would,
of course, not only be impossible but would also be offensive. But there are opportunities for the exploration of the complex problems posed by modern medicine to
increase awareness and, in turn, thoughtful analysis of these problems. At least
this could lead to physician-investigators saying less often than they do now-when
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ought to address themselves in proper measure to the
ethical problems that occur in such research. For it
is only when medical students see that their teachers
are taking research ethics as a continuing and serious
will themselves come to define it in
concern that they
35
the same way.

It is also necessary for educators, and physician-investigators
generally, to recognize the extent to which the questions they
face in the catastrophic disease treatment process force them
to look for answers beyond "medical ethics," as it is traditionally
conceived. The customary assumption is that the problems
presented are to be resolved by the conscience, educated or
otherwise, of the physician; but it is quickly apparent that more
than individual ethics are implicated in decisions about the
allocation of scarce resources or the definition of death.
Concern about the training for professional responsibility
has other roots as well. Investigative medicine confronts physician-investigators with numerous conflicting pressures and
clinical uncertainties. To the resolution of these complex problems they bring their own unexamined biases and value preferences, which always tend to exert a greater influence when
conflicting intentions cannot readily be 36reconciled or when
consequences cannot be easily ascertained.
An examination of the motivations of physician-investigators may begin to reveal the pressures under which they
operate and the reasons for the intensity as well as the variation
confronted with questions about why they had not considered alternative ways of
proceeding or why they assumed they could proceed as they did-"I never thought
of it."
35 B. BARBER, J. LALLY, J. MAKARUSHKA & D. SULLIVAN, RESEARCH ON HUMAN
SUBJECTS: PROBLEMS OF SOCIAL CONTROL IN MEDICAL EXPERIMENTATION 191 (1973)
[hereinafter cited as BARBER].
36 For example, some professionals have stated without documentation that

unrelated persons should not be used as organ donors because their psychological
motivations as volunteers are suspect. This is the policy adopted in the United
States. Hamburger, Protection of Donor Rights in Renal Transplantation, in BIOMEDICAL
SCIENCE AND THE DILEMMA OF HUMAN EXPERIMENTATION 44 (V. Fattorusso ed.,
1967). Others disagree. Fellner & Schwartz, Altruism in Dispute, 284 NEW ENG. J. MED.
582 (1971). One wonders to what extent unexplored personal feelings have entered into these pronouncements and, more generally, to what extent prior system-

atic education for professional responsibility can bring to the surface those personal and professional beliefs and values which distort and obscure finding appropriate answers to such questions as by what authority, under what circumstances,
and in the presence of what psychopathology offers by unrelated donors should

be refused.

UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 123:340

of their response to this challenge. Curiosity is often identified
as the major motivation behind the desire to contribute to
scientific knowledge which leads a person into innovative
medicine. From her studies of young children, Anna Freud
has concluded that in addition to curiosity-the drive to solve
"the riddles of their surroundings," which may motivate a child
to become a biomedical researcher-one finds also the intertwined impulses of maiming and curing, and the desire to
possess magical powers.
In every nursery school, the nursery school teacher is
prepared that . . . a hospital will be established, and

this hospital will be usually for insects, frogs or lizards
or any other small animals that can be found ....
Sometimes, especially when it is an insect, legs will be
pulled off beforehand so that a patient is produced,
and the patient is cured afterwards. Which means that
the child's wish to help and to cure is still very close
to the wish to hurt and to maim. .

.

.The older and

more socially adapted he becomes, the more this
aggressive wish can be submerged under a strong
urge to help ....

I remember very vividly when I was

a child, myself, of being impressed by those fairy tales
usually placed somewhere in the middle ages, where
an unusually trained or gifted medical man took up
straightforwardly the battle with death, and proved
that he could conquer death at any time and save his
patients. Death was his enemy. He was the savior and
the hero. And this image behind the medical profession that they are the heroes strong enough and
wise enough to conquer death or at least to put off
and postpone death is certainly an idea which is attrac37
tive to many people.

All of these drives-to search, to maim and cure, to be invincible-may guide a medical career; although natural feelings, they are not fully accepted, but are given other names.
George Sarton also assigns a central place to curiosity as a deep
and ancient human trait, inexorably tied with man's ascent
from the primitive world. But while it may be "the mother of
'7Freud,

The Doctor-Patient Relationship, in J.

CAPRON & E. GLASS, EXPERIMENTATION
inafter cited as KATZ].
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642-43 (1972) [here-

1974]

INFORMED CONSENT

science," just as necessity is the mother of invention, curiosity
is not, in Sarton's view, adequately described as a simple desire
for knowledge. "The motives of primitive scientists . . . were
perhaps not very different from those of our contemporaries;
they varied considerably from man to man and time to time
and then as now covered the whole gamut from complete selflessness, reckless curiosity, and spirit of adventure down to
38
personal ambition, vainglory and covetousness.
Rene Fox and Judith Swazey, who have studied one particular group of physician-investigators-transplant surgeonsextensively, give further indications of the interaction of personal and professional drives in motivating medical research.
The transplanters, fiercely competitive and highly motivated,
believe that "courage" or "guts" are the sine qua non of their
profession. They find joy not only in making medical discoveries but in combating death, which they attack with indefatigable zeal and a fervor which may be traced to the fundamentalist religious background which Fox and Swazey found was
shared by some of them. Thus, it is not surprising that a failure
of their interventions often leads to a terrible feeling of defeat.
Transplant surgeons see themselves . . . as "pioneers,"
"trail blazers" whose explorations carry them beyond
the safely reassuring boundaries of established medical knowledge and technique. . . . [T]hey are also
keenly aware of the risks they are incurring through
their willingness to work "in modern acute medicine
at its extreme" and to make "radical departures"
from what is conventionally accepted [in the field of
medicine]. 39
This "pioneer" complex characterizes physician-investigators engaged in the other innovative and adventuresome
aspects of catastrophic disease treatment as well. The same
driving ambition to conquer death is found among the developers of hemodialysis as among the transplanters. Since the
original work of Willem Kolff, the physicians involved in dialysis
have had to pursue their work against great odds-which involved not only seemingly inexorable natural forces but also
16 (1952).
"' See R. Fox & J. SWAZEY, supra note 11, at 111 (citations omitted).

38 G. SARTON, A HISTORY OF SCIENCE
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neglect or opposition from colleagues. 40 Those who eventually
established the success of dialysis treatment manifested great
faith in the ultimate value of the new therapy in the face of
great uncertainty. Their optimism was often reinforced by a
need for them to reassure and encourage their patient-subjects
to continue with the arduous treatment regimen.
The significance of the physician-investigator's personal
commitment to his work became starkly evident in the controversy surrounding long-term dialysis in the early 1960's.
The introduction of the new technique, based on the shunted
cannulas which obviated the need for repeated venepuncture,
was met with skepticism, especially in those kidney centers
which were dedicated to improving transplantation and which
viewed dialysis as merely a "holding" procedure to maintain
the patient until a donor could be found. Dr. Belding Scribner,
the shunts' inventor and major proponent, was almost alone
in reporting success with dialysis. Since his team in Seattle
regarded chronic dialysis as "our baby," they were untiring in
pushing on with the procedure despite the criticism of their
fellows. Indeed, competition played an important part in their
efforts. As Dr. Scribner very insightfully stated, in recalling the
Seattle group's driving ambition and motivation,
This factor was pin-pointed by [Dr. George] Schreiner
at a private meeting in about 1963 when he accused
me in front of my peers of making dialysis work just
to satisfy my ego. I was resentful and embarrassed at
the time, but probably I should have been pleased. 4 '
The pressures operating on and within physician-investigators arise from working in an area which constantly forces
them to confront death and their lack of knowledge and adequate resources to combat it effectively. The result is that
physician-investigators must cope with dual motivations-to
save lives and to accumulate knowledge. Though the two motivations may complement one another, they do not do so necessarily-for example, there may be conflict in the process of
selecting organ donors among healthy volunteers or of deter4

Fox, A

Sociological Perspective on Organ Transplantation and Hemodialysis, 169

ANN. N.Y. ACAD. Sci. 406, 410-11 (1970).

4' Personal communication, B. Scribner to J. Katz & A. Capron.
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mining when a donor is sufficiently close to death to justify the
removal of an organ.42
Although the motivation to safeguard life is central to the
physician's training and self image, 43 it may come up short
against the need to make choices among several recipients who
44
might benefit to varying extents from receiving a transplant.
Patient-subjects have been selected on the basis of the contributions they can make to science, in the hope that others will
eventually benefit. In the quest to pierce ignorance, procedures may also have to be tried which actually could shorten
life if complications cannot be controlled. On the other hand,
the desire to gain knowledge may be impaired by the traditional
posture of exposing
only moribund patients to new and un45
known procedures.

The strain of knowledge versus healing thus seems an
inescapable facet of the clinical researcher's role. While the
search for new knowledge and techniques is a part of all physicians' professed task, the physician-investigator may actually
be obliged to conduct research and advance medical science in
order to justify the privileges held by experimental medicine
and to reaffirm the primacy of human life as a cultural value.46
Personal as well as professional factors enter into the decisions of physician-investigators. Though increasingly stressed,
the conflictual implications of personal ambitions for success
and fame on physician-investigators' activities have not been
sufficiently acknowledged or explored. The myth of the dedicated and unselfish physician-scientist is still all too uncritically
asserted. While it is hard, if not impossible, to differentiate
among personal ambition, the striving for excellence, and the
42 Castelnuovo-Tedesco, Cardiac Surgeons Look at Transplantation-Interviews with
Drs. Cleveland, Cooley, DeBakey, Hellman and Rochelle, 3 SEMINARS IN PSYCH. 5, 13
(1971).
43 See Freud, supra note 37.

44 IST ANN. JOHN F. KENNEDY

SYMPOSIUM

ON

RECENT,

MENTS IN MEDICINE & SURGERY (1968) (quoted in Fox, supra note

SIGNIFICANT

DEVELOP-

40, at 419).

4. Such patients are not necessarily the best subjects for research, since the
failure of the intervention could in part rest on their already debilitated state rather
than on the procedure itself. And investigations with moribund patient-subjects
confront investigators with the dilemma of having "at once to prolong life, alleviate
suffering, and respect the right of patients to die mercifully and with dignity ....
Fox, supra note 40, at 406.
46 Swazey & Fox, The Clinical Moratorium: A Case Study of Mitral Value Surgery, in
EXPERIMENTATION WITH HUMAN SUBJECTS 315, 348 (P. Freund ed. 1969).
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quest for knowledge, it should at least be acknowledged that
personal motivations are an ever-present and inevitable concomitant of advances in science. 4 7 The absence of any recognized, legitimate place for such desires in the accepted model
of professional decisionmaking may lead physician-investigators
to underestimate the importance of self-interest in their decisions and to overvalue the significance they assign to more
socially acceptable, altruistic motivations. This only serves to
complicate the physician-investigator's "split personality, ' 48 by
raising anxiety over the true motivation for his choices.
To note that physician-investigators may not be ideally
suited to make decisions about catastrophic diseases alone is not
to suggest, however, that at present they have a free hand to
do so. There are a number of restraints, formal and informal,
on a physician's freedom to do as he chooses. A major limita49
tion is the scarcity of resources, both monetary and human.
Perhaps even more important, especially in a research area
such as the development of treatment for catastrophic diseases,
is the uncertainty of outcome of his choices. 50
Uncertainty reinforces the drive for knowledge, for only
knowledge and experience can defeat uncertainty. But uncertainty also brakes this motivation, for it engenders personal
anxieties about the impact of a new procedure on the patientsubject and social anxieties about the liabilities which physicianinvestigators and science might incur if a new intervention
proves more detrimental than non-intervention would have.
These forces came together dramatically in a highly unusual medical development, the heart transplant moratorium
that began in November 1968. That nearly complete cessation
of the new procedure came about when physician-investigators
11 See

BARBER,

supra note 35, at 59-60.

48 One physician, with long experience in clinical research, has identified in this

"split personality" a "wide cleavage" between the physician's primary concern for
"intimate, personal responsibility in caring for sick people" and the interests of the
investigator "goaded by divine discontent and impelled by curiosity as well as ambition for renown" which "sometimes suppresses the physician [in his personality]
altogether." Bean, A Testament of Duty-Some Strictures on Moral Responsibilities in
Clinical Research, 39J. LAB. CLIN. MED. 3, 4 (1952).
4
9See Fox, supra note 40, at 418.
50 This was initially recognized as a major problem for physicians by Talcott
Parsons, see T. PARSONS, THE SOCIAL SYSTEM 447-54 (1951), and Ren6e C. Fox has
written extensively on this theme. Fox, supra note 40, at 406-07.
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concluded that it was premature, that the risks to patients were
not matched by expected benefits, and that the danger of a
public disaffection with the entire process was great. 51 While
much of the impetus for the moratorium came from the investigators' peers and administrative superiors, it is still reassuring
that research medicine has some self-control. Yet this example
also illustrates that physician-investigators have been left almost
entirely to their own devices in coping with the problems posed
by such dramatic developments as organ transplantation; the
startling curtailment of the cardiac operations, like the equally
dramatic rush to perform transplants which preceded it, may
have represented a very bad allocation of resources.
In addition to the internal restraints flowing voluntarily
from physician-investigators, the major external restraints on
research are imposed by codes of ethics, peers, hospitals, institutional review committees, and the law generally. Beginning with
51 Swazey and Fox have recently called attention to the phenomenon of "the
clinical moratorium," which they consider "generic to the process of therapeutic innovation." See Swazey & Fox, supra note 46, at 315. They define it "to mean a suspension of the use of a still experimental procedure on patients, a suspension which may
last for weeks, months, or years depending on the particular case." Id. 316. It represents a period of "reflection, re-evaluation, and study for the research physicians
formerly conducting clinical trials. During this time, they often return to laboratory
experiments in an attempt to solve certain of the problems that led them temporarily
to cease human trials." Id. 345. Swazey and Fox also state that such moratoria can result by virtue of "internal" or "external" pressures. The internal pressures originate
within "the research physician who feels, that he ought to discontinue clinical trials,"
while the external pressures "are generated by the opinions of colleagues or lay persons that trials should not proceed, and by the actions they may take to implement
their judgment." Id. 346. Moreover, these pressures may be invoked formally (for
example, by withdrawing operating privileges from individual surgeons or halting a
procedure altogether) or informally (for example, by colleagues' pleas that the reputation of surgery would be damaged if trials were continued). The concept of clinical moratorium, as so defined, merely points to the variety of potential mechanisms
existing in clinical and investigative medicine to pause and reflect about the-current
state of a particular intervention.
From the vantage point of hindsight, the informal mechanisms reveal all their
capricious weaknesses. They allowed, in the case of mitral valve surgery in the 1920's
for example, the erroneous views of one of the world's most prominent cardiologists,
Sir James MacKenzie, to exert undue influence over the progress of cardiac surgery,
and the ingrained beliefs of referring physicians to halt the pioneering work initiated
by the English surgeon Souttar. They tend to function inconspicuously and thereby
to preclude a public review of the merits of maintaining a moratorium. Many of these
same weaknesses are also inherent in the more formal moratorium mechanisms.
Finally, Swazey and Fox's description of "moratoria" illustrates again a characteristic
of medical practice generally: the influence on decisionmaking of personal beliefs and
attitudes which have major consequences because of the absence of procedural mechanisms for challenging them.
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the "basic principles" set forth by the Nuremberg judges,
numerous attempts have recently been made to propose "improved" codes of ethics to guide medical research. 52 The proliferation of such codes testifies to the difficulty of promulgating
a set of rules which do not immediately raise more questions
than they answer. By necessity these codes have to be succinctly
worded and, being devoid of commentary, their meaning is
subject to a variety of interpretations. Moreover, since they
generally aspire to ideal practices, they invite judicious and
injudicious neglect. Consequently, as long as they remain unelaborated tablets of exhortation, codes will at best have limited
usefulness in guiding the daily behavior of investigators.
Law, though generally an important external restraint,
has had little to say about medical research except through
HEW regulations. Judges in malpractice settings have made
pronouncements about informed consent and the right to selfdetermination, and these doctrines will most likely be applied
to the research setting when such litigation comes before
courts. 5 3 However, the special problems of research medicine
may require a sustained dialogue between law and medicine
in order to define, independently of the existing law for malpractice situations, the ambit of the authority of physicianinvestigators in human research. 5 4 Finer tuning of the process
is needed than that which can be supplied by retrospective
damage awards (spread through insurance, in any case) or
criminal sanctions, or prospective funding cut-offs, based on
past missteps by the physician-investigators. Furthermore, researchers are understandably made particularly anxious by
shifting, and ever more complicated, legal requirements.
The cumulative effect of the restraints upon physicianinvestigators is to impede the drive for developing new treat52"The need to identify and to develop acceptable standards of care as an aid to
the courts ... began to receive limited but respectable support in the clinical research
community in the late 1950's and early 1960's." Curran, Governmental Regulation of the
Use of Human Subjects in Medical Research, 98 DAEDALUS 542, 545-46 (1969).
5'See, e.g., Karp v. Cooley, 493 F.2d 408 (5th Cir. 1974); Kaimowitz v. Michigan
Department of Mental Health, Civil No. 73-19434-AW (Cir. Ct. Wayne County, Mich.,
July 10, 1973); Halushka v. University of Sask., 52 W.W.R. (n.s.) 608 (Sask. Ct. App.
1965).
5Cf.- ational Research Act, 42 U.S.C.A. § 2891-1 note (1974) (establishing
National Commission for the Protection of Human Subjects of Biomedical and Behavioral Research).
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ment modalities for catastrophic disease for a variety of reasons. 5 5 Many, particularly some dedicated investigators, regard
this as an unfortunate state of affairs. Other commentators
have agreed with Hans Jonas that the advancement of knowledge should not be the primary objective:
Let us not forget that progress is an optional goal, not
an unconditional commitment, and that its tempo in
particular, compulsive as it may become, has nothing
sacred about it. Let us also remember that a slower
progress in the conquest of disease would not threaten
society, grievous as it is to those who have to deplore
that their particular disease be not yet conquered, but
that society would indeed be threatened by the erosion
of those moral values whose loss, possibly caused by
too ruthless a pursuit of scientific progress, would
56
make its most dazzling triumphs not worth having.
It does not appear that mechanisms have yet developed to
mediate, in a rational and understandable fashion, between
these polar viewpoints. One cannot be sure that the present
allocation of authority-with most of it lodged with physicianinvestigators, subject to sudden, ad hoc alterations-has worked
to the benefit of patient-subjects, science, society, or even investigators themselves. Hence it should be profitable to inquire whether such controls as sharing of authority with persons other than the transplant surgeon and his or her fellow
physician-investigators, through the participation of patients
in decisionmaking, 57 peer consultation and review, and regulation by the profession and state, could prove to be useful
safeguards.
55 This problem is dramatically illustrated by an example from a scientific field
unrelated to catastrophic diseases. A scientist interested in interspecies hybridization
believes that important knowledge may be gained from studying the genetic mix
resulting from breeding human beings and the higher apes. He is aware of the possible social, legal, and ethical problems arising from such investigations, yet wonders
whether they may not be outweighed by the resulting knowledge. Yet he can turn to
no one to learn whether society might not wish to approve his work. See Remington,
An Experimental Study of Man's Genetic Relationship to Great Apes, by Means of Interspecific
Hybridization, in KATZ, supra note 37, at 461.
56 Jonas, Philosophical Reflections on Experimenting with Human Subjects, 98 DAEDALUS
219, 245 (1969).
57 The rest of this Article centers on the decisionmaking authority of patientsubjects; the roles of the professions and the state come in for greater analysis in the
other parts of the book.
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FUNCTIONAL APPROACH TO INFORMED CONSENT

The "informed consent model" of decisionmaking developed here is intended to illustrate and explore the extent
and limits of patient-subjects' authority and capabilities as the
"beneficiaries" of the new treatments for catastrophic diseases
and at the same time as the "means" through which such new
treatments are developed. "Informed consent" is seen not as a
highly formalized event through which the physician-investigator insulates himself from liability, but as an ongoing process
through which the physician-investigator and patient-subject,
along with other relevant participants including the latter's
relatives, continually rededicate themselves to their joint endeavor or withdraw from it if they wish. The model attempts
to incorporate a realistic view of the limitations and constraints
that psychological forces and personal interrelationships place
on informed and voluntary decisionmaking.
A.

The Functions of Informed Consent

1. To Promote Individual Autonomy
The requirement of informed consent has two parts, both
of which must be met before a medical intervention is permissible: first, that sufficient information is disclosed to the
patient so that he can arrive at an intelligent opinion, and
second, that the patient agrees to the intervention being performed. The latter facet in particular reflects the concern,
traditional in western societies, that the autonomy of each person be respected. This principle is embodied in two great
branches of the law: contracts and torts. Protection of the patient's autonomy is accomplished by means of a treatment contract between the physician and patient. Even though the terms
of such a contract are usually not reduced to writing, its existence is a prerequisite for therapy. In addition to using the
flexibility of contract law (which supplies a basic relationship
for the parties while permitting them to vary its specifics according to their needs), the courts have also relied upon tort
law to regulate the doctor-patient relationship. In sum, as an
Illinois appellate court declared in Pratt v. Davis,
the free citizen's first and greatest right, which underlies all others-the right to the inviolability of his per-
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son, in other words, his right to himself-is the subject of universal acquiescence, and this right necessarily
forbids a physician or surgeon, however skillful or
eminent, who has been asked to examine, diagnose,
advise, and prescribe.., to violate without permission
the bodily integrity of his patient by a major or capital
operation, placing him under anaesthetics for that
purpose, and
operating on him without his consent or
58
knowledge.
The obvious connection between bodily independence
and independence of choice does not mean that autonomy
serves only to insulate people from each other. On the contrary, autonomy is a value which deserves to be promoted,
through a doctrine of informed consent and elsewhere in the
law as well, because it encourages better interactions between
the patient-subject and others. In protecting his autonomy of
choice, the doctrine assures the patient that in going to a physician he will not be trapped into decisions which he does not
want; the absence of such assurance would increase the inclination to delay seeking medical intervention even for serious
conditions. By promoting trust and confidence between patient
and physician, informed consent requirements may thus advance rational decisionmaking. 59 Furthermore, autonomy is
centrally associated with the notion of individual responsibility.
The freedom to make decisions for oneself carries with it the
obligation to answer for the consequences of those decisions.
The requirement of consent for medical interventions thus
serves to remind all the participants of their agreement concerning the procedure and their acceptance of those things
which arise from its proper execution.

58 Pratt v. Davis, 118 Ill. App. 161, 166 (1905), aff'd, 224 Ill. 300, 79 N.E. 562
(1906). The rights of autonomy and inviolability of which the Illinois court spoke
are creatures of private, not public, law. Although a similar statement might describe a person's rights vis-i-vis the state, what is usually at issue in the informed consent context are the rights which help define the relationship of patient to physician.
Constitutional law may, however, come into the picture when the assistance of the state
is sought by a physician in enforcing his wishes on a nonconsenting patient. See notes
134-49 infra & accompanying text.
" See text accompanying notes 81-85 infra. Cf. Comment, Valid Consent to Medical
Treatment: Need the Patient Know?, 4 DUQUESNE L. REV. 450, 458 (1966).
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2.

To Protect the Patient-Subject's
Status as a Human Being
The "inviolability of one's person," of which the Pratt
court spoke, goes beyond the philosophical notion of autonomy
and reflects a deep-seated feeling about what it means to be
"human." This concept is a complex but very important one,
60
which partakes of remarkably contradictory connotations.
Though part of the concern for human beings contained in our
culture relates to protecting people physically, 61 part also relates
to the respect which is deemed proper for "nonphysical" aspects
of humans, such as their power of thought. This mental component of the concept of "humanness" is expressed through the
first facet of the informed consent rule: the requirement that
the patient be informed. By emphasizing the importance of involving the patient in decisionmaking in a genuine fashion, this
facet of the rule gives further recognition to his or her status as
a human being. As Margaret Mead has perceptively commented,
To fail to acquaint a subject of observation or experiment with what is happening-as fully as is possible
within the limits of the communication system-is to
that extent to degenerate him as a full human being
and reduce him to the category of dependency
in
62
which he is not permitted to judge for himself.
Paul Ramsey has observed that informed consent is an
important example of the faithfulness among people that is
normative for all moral interaction. "The principle of an
informed consent is the cardinal canon of loyalty joining men to'63
gether in medical practice and investigation.
60 On the pejorative side, the human aspect is disapproved at both extremes: "To
err is human, to forgive divine," and "Untouched by human hands." Contrarily, the
term "human" is applied to suggest the sanctity of conduct, event, or rule, most particularly in the prohibitions against killing (which protect, in the normal course, humans
but not other animals or machines) and the condemnation of conduct such as that of
the Nazis in the concentration camps, who failed even to accord their prisoners "the
status of human beings."
61
But see Calabresi, Reflections on Medical Experimentation in Humans, 98 DAEDALUS

387 (1969).

62Mead, Research with Human Beings: A Model Derived from Anthropological Field

Practice, 98 DAEDALUS 361, 375 (1969).

63 P. RAMSEY, THE PATIENT AS PERSON 5 (1970). He goes on to explain:
Consent as a canon of loyalty can best be exhibited by a paraphrase of Rein-

1974)

INFORMED CONSENT

For informed consent to create a true 'joint enterprise,"
64
or what Talcott Parsons calls an "associational collectivity,"
between physician-investigator and patient-subject, the latter's
right to full information and to give or withhold assent must
be scrupulously respected. 65 The partnership of physicianinvestigator and patient-subject is based on the mutual recognition that the subject, as a human being, retains the authority to determine what will be done to himself and to receive
an explanation of all proposed procedures from his professional collaborator. The enterprise in which both are engaged
-whether
clinical research or ordinary therapy-requires
the cooperation of both for its success, or indeed for its very
existence. Thus, it is not for the physician, any more than for
the patient, to command the other's participation, whether
directly or by turning the consenting process into a charade, a
symbolic but contentless formality.
The danger always exists that a physician's belief in the
potential benefits of a new medical procedure, such as heart
transplantation, will subtly erode his willingness to regard his
patient as a full partner in the undertaking. This is especially
true as medical procedures become increasingly complicated
and a corps of specialists, rather than a lone physician, treats
hold Neibuhr's celebrated defense of democracy on both positive and negative grounds: "Man's capacity for justice makes democracy possible; man's
propensity to injustice makes democracy necessary." Man's capacity to become joint adventurers in a common cause makes the consensual relation
possible; man's propensity to overreach his joint adventurer even in a good
cause makes consent necessary. In medical experimentation the common
cause of the consensual relation is the advancement of medicine and benefit
to others. In therapy and in diagnostic or therapeutic investigations, the
common cause is some benefit to the patient himself; but this is still a joint
venture in which patient and physician can say and ideally should both say, "I
cure."
Id. 5-6 (footnote omitted).
64 Parsons sees the associational collectivity as something less than a true joint
enterprise since he doubts that research subjects can stand on an equal footing with
the investigators. Parsons, Research with Human Subjects and the "Professional Complex,"
98 DAEDALUS 325, 344 (1969). John Fletcher's empirical research on ethics in the consent situation at N.I.H.'s Clinical Center in Bethesda provides striking instances of
patient-subjects who saw their human status being affirmed through their decision to
collaborate in nontherapeutic research. See Fletcher, Realities of Patient Consent in
Medical Research, 1 HASTINGS CENTER STUDIES 39, 44-46 (1973).
65 This posture of course does not preclude a patient-subject explicitly instructing his physician not to tell him. He may do so for many reasons, including complete
faith in his physician's actions. See Putensen v. Clay Adams, Inc., 12 Cal. App. 3d 1062,
1083-84, 91 Cal. Rptr. 319, 333 (1970).
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a patient for a catastrophic disease. The physician, often a
surgeon, who is in charge of this veritable army6 6 undeniably
has the upper hand in the doctor-patient relationship. 6 7 Indeed, he may be the originator of a new technique which offers
a desperate patient a "chance for cure" which he cannot get
from any other practitioner.6" Yet if the patient's authority is
seen as being at an end once he takes the step of initiating the
relationship-if he is taken as having given a blanket consent
to all steps directed by the physician-investigator-not only
will his status as a human being be diminished, but rational
decisionmaking may be seriously undermined. Having the
patient place himself entirely within the physician's hands has
been an accepted part of medical ideology, justified by the physician's concern for the patient's well-being and his alleged
need for complete freedom to undertake whatever steps are
believed necessary to promote it. But the risk is great, especially
in experimental medicine, that the patient's abdication of his
decisionmaking authority will convert him from an end in
himself to a means that can be employed along with others at
the physician's command to serve the goal of the procedure,
as defined by the physician and his peers. One need not even
66 Military analogy is an apt description not merely of the size of the medical
team but of its hierarchical organization. The members of the team, particularly those
who are not physicians, are likely to defer to the primary physician-investigator, not
only on close matters of judgment but even when they are convinced he or she is doing
something scientifically or ethically wrong. Most of the engineers and technicians
who worked on the preparation for the implantation of the artificial heart into Mr.
Karp figured out that a human trial was being planned, but, with one exception,
they did not voice objections (although they believed animal testing to have been
inadequate) and did not notify Dr. DeBakey (although they concluded that Drs.
Cooley and Liotta were operating behind DeBakey's back and without his permission). R. Fox &J. SWAzEY, supra note 11, at 161-64, 197-200.
67 Among the members of the transplant team, only one or two-the surgeon and,
perhaps on a more sustained basis, the immunologist who must supervise the difficult postoperative period and administer the immunosuppressive drugs to fight
tissue rejection-will have personal contact with the patient; even this contact will
probably be more fleeting than that of the patient with his referring physician or
"family doctor."
68 This was dramatically illustrated in the only implantation of a mechanical
heart substitute to date. See Karp v. Cooley, 349 F. Supp. 827 (S.D. Tex. 1972), aff'd,
493 F.2d 408 (5th Cir. 1974). In that case, the patient had experienced severe heart
troubles for ten years and was near death when he went to Houston to be treated by
Dr. Denton Cooley, who was then the only surgeon willing to attempt an "artificial
heart" operation. The patient signed a consent for the temporary use of a mechanical
heart replacement in case an attempt to reconstruct his own heart (ventriculoplasty)
were unsuccessful. See note 5 supra.
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observe that in clinical research an experiment may succeed
without restoring the patient-subject to health, to conclude that
the requirement of an ongoing collaboration among the participants, expressed through a process of renewed "informed
consents," is needed to protect the human status of all.
3.

To Avoid Fraud and Duress

While these humanistic or philosophical aspects of informed consent clearly have practical aspects as well, the requirement serves additional practical functions. One consequence of truly informed consent is to remove, or at least to
diminish, the danger of fraud and duress. 6 9 The legal model
of the doctor-patient relationship should, of course, recognize
the very real limitations on rationality which serve to undermine the useful force of the informed consent rule; these are
discussed more fully later in this Article. Yet the model constructed by the law of informed consent still has validity: to
the extent that the physician-investigator engages the patientsubject in a comprehensive and comprehensible discussion of
the proposed treatment, he reduces the likelihood of misleading or overbearing the patient-subject. The danger that the
physician will neglect this duty is probably greater in the case
of standard therapy than it is for the major interventions which
are of concern here. Nevertheless, physician-investigators'
understandable desire to avoid discussing difficult and painful matters and incurring the risk of upsetting the patientsubject, as well as the pressures of time and economics which
operate in the catastrophic disease context, may tend to under70
mine careful adherence to the letter of the law.

Without legal intervention, 7 ' the idea that the treatment
contract would be bargained out between equals is somewhat
69 The first point in the judgment against the Nazi prison camp physicians, the
"Nuremberg Code," requires that research participants be enlisted "without the intervention of any element of force, fraud, deceit, duress, over-reaching or other
ulterior form of constraint or coercion." Edmond Cahn describes the use of necessitousness as the "engineering" of consent, Cahn, The Lauyer as Scientist and
Scoundrel: Reflections on Francis Bacon's Quadricentennial,36 N.Y.U.L. Rav. 1, 11 (1961);
consent can also be "engineered" through more subtle means, such as the exploitation of the physician-patient differential in knowledge.
70 The avoidance of discussion by physicians with patients, which may become
a tool of witting or unwitting deception, is discussed in Note, supra note 25, at 1541-55.
7, Physicians' self-regulation may also be designed to prevent fraud and overreaching; the Hippocratic Oath's admonition against "seduction" may encompass not
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naive; indeed, the patient usually finds himself faced with an
agreement which is a prendre ou a laisser.7 2 In such case, two
remedies present themselves: the law can either remove the
choice from the hands of the weaker party (in this instance, the
patient-subject) or it can attempt to buttress his ability to exercise choice by erecting certain formal requirements of disclosure. Since the former would represent an abandonment of the
basic principles of individual freedom, resort to it is usually
limited to situations in which a repeated pattern has demonstrated that "as a matter of law" agreements of the type in question are unconscionable, in that they do not result from the unfettered exercise of rational choice.7 3 In the doctor-patient
context, the trend seems to be toward the second alternative,
the establishment of rules of disclosure. While this process has
not become formalized in Miranda-style7 4 requirements as yet,
most medical centers have their own "informed consent" forms
for patients, and the federal government has issued a "guide"
for the protection of human subjects which sets forth the elements of informed consent:
1. A fair explanation of the procedures to be followed, and their purposes, including identification
of any procedures which are experimental;
2. A description of any attendant discomforts and
risks reasonably to be expected;
only sexual misconduct "but also, as the Oxford Universal Dictionary adds, 'acts of
seducing a person to err in conduct or belief' and 'the condition of being led astray.'"
Katz, The Regulation of Human Research-Reflections and Proposals, 21 GuN. RESEARCH
785 (1973).
" Cf Kessler, Contracts of Adhesion--Some Thought About Freedom of Contract, 43
COLUM. L. REv. 629 (1943).
"'See, e.g., Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., 350 F.2d 445 (D.C. Cir.
1965); 25 U.S.C. §§ 81-88 (1970) (limitations on Indians' right to contract); N.Y.
GEN. OBIGATIoNs LAW § 5-321 (McKinney 1964) (contract exempting lessor from
liability for negligence void as against public policy). The same provision may be
valid as to one group and invalid as to another; cognovit clauses (confession of judgment) have been upheld where a debtor effectively waived his rights, D.H. Overmyer
Co. v. Frick Co., 405 U.S. 174 (1972), but declared unconstitutional when applied to
debtors with incomes below $10,000, Swarb v. Lennox, 314 F. Supp. 1091 (E.D. Pa.
1970), aff'd, 405 U.S. 191 (1972).
11 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). This case established strict procedures for what has to be told to persons who are subjected to custodial police interrogation. Cf Note, supra note 25, at 1561-62 (suggesting "formal rules of disclosure").
Midway between these two approaches is one perhaps best exemplified by the
federal government's approach to cigarette smoking. Rather than banning it outright
in light of the practice's demonstrably deleterious effects on the user's health (which
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3. A description of any benefits reasonably to be expected;
4. A disclosure of any appropriate alternative that
might be advantageous for the subject;
5. An offer to answer any inquiries concerning the
procedures;
6. An instruction that the person is free to withdraw
his consent and to discontinue participation in the
project or activity at any time without prejudice to
the subject.
.. No such informed consent, oral or written,...
shall include any exculpatory language through which
the subject is made to waive, or to appear to waive, any
of his legal rights, including any release of the or7 5
ganization or its agents from liability for negligence.

Thus, by detailing the obligation of physician-investigators to
warn their patient-subjects fully about their rights, such statements increase the likelihood that the informed consent rule will
help to avoid intentional and unintentional fraud and duress.
4.

To Encourage Self-Scrutiny by the
Physician-Investigator
The requirement of disclosure contained in the informed
consent rule raises some perplexing problems for a physician
working on the frontiers of catastrophic disease treatment.
Perhaps foremost among these is the question: How can one
make known to patient-subjects the risks and benefits of new
and often untried techniques? A partial response to this query
is that one can at least be candid with the patient about the unknown nature and experimental status of the treatment offered
as well as about the existence of other established methods,
inadequate as they may be. Beyond this, however, the physiwould be deprivation of the right to contract) or requiring that certain information
be conveyed (which was the approach taken initially by the FCC in requiring "equal
time" for anti-smoking advertisements), Congress finally banned cigarette commercials
from the air waves, counting on the beneficial effects of a lack of "information"
(i.e., advertising) while also requiring a health warning to be placed on each cigarette
package.
75 U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH, EDUCATION & WELFARE, THE INSTITUTIONAL GUIDE TO
DHEW POLICY ON PROTECTION OF HUMAN SUBJECTS 7 (1971) (footnote omitted),
as amended by 39 Fed. Reg. 18914 (1974). Cf. 21 C.F.R. § 130.37 (1973) (F.D.A.
policy on informed consent).
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cian-investigator has the additional duty of discovering as much
as reasonably possible about the new techniques he proposes
to employ. At a minimum this would include making a
thorough inventory of the risks of such techniques which have
been described in the literature by other investigators. In most
situations it would also encompass the duty to explore this
aspect of the proposed procedure through animal experimentation and the like to uncover risks of any consequence; this
duty is reflected in the accepted principle of biomedical research, independent of the law of informed consent, that
human trials ought to be undertaken only after a medical innovation has been shown in animal tests to be relatively risk-free,
as compared with its potential benefits. Thus, knowledge sufficient to justify the use of an innovative procedure should
usually also suffice for the purpose of consent.
Although some risks will remain "unknown," a candid
physician-investigator can still involve his subjects in a valid
informed consent process. This would be encouraged if consent to "unknown risks" is taken to include only those "unknown
risks" of which the subject is made aware. Such a position does
not involve a contradiction in terms, for the patient-subject can
certainly be informed of the existence of certain risks whose
probability and degree cannot be precisely predicted. There
are others which the patient-subject cannot be said to have
accepted since the investigator did not anticipate them; it may
reasonably be assumed that in most cases the latter category
would be very small. The consent is nevertheless valid if the
person giving it has been alerted to this residual risk in all
clinical research; if the risks exceed this small category and
should have been anticipated by a prudent physician-investigator, he would be liable for not discovering and disclosing
them. A distinction also exists between risks to which it was
reasonable to expose a patient-subject and those which were
unreasonable. A physician-investigator who proceeded in the
latter instance would of course not be able to assert "consent"
as a defense to a claim of negligence.7 6 Nor does this impose an
unjustified limitation on the patient's right to contract as he
chooses-even for "unreasonable" procedures to be performed.
In a free, liberal society an individual may well have such a
"6 Accord,

Waltz & Scheuneman, supra note 20, at 632-35.
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right, but the doctrine of informed consent has a more limited
frame of reference, which is the physician-patient relationship.
The physician's authority is limited to doing those things which
professional opinion holds to be of potential benefit to the patient. This limitation thus inheres in the agreement between
the parties.

The need to obtain the patient-subject's informed consent thus tends to enhance the scientific validity and the safety
of the trials of new medical procedures in man. This derives
from the "reflexive effect [of the obligation to obtain consent]
on the management of the experiment itself," as Professor
77
Paul Freund has pointed out.
To analyze an experiment in terms of risks and benefits to particular groups by way of presentation for
consent is a salutary procedure for self-scrutiny by
the investigator-like the preparation of a registration
71
statement by a corporation issuing securities.
If, for example, the surgeons engaged in the initial heart
transplants had felt they had to give a full explanation of the
risks of graft rejection to the proposed cardiac recipients, they
might have proceeded more slowly in the light of the rather
disheartening results which had been reported in animal trials
and in human kidney transplants at that time when immunosuppressive techniques were still in their infancy.
As useful as the informed consent requirement may be in
encouraging professional self-scrutiny and thereby avoiding
thoughtless disrespect of patient-subjects, there is no reason
to believe that the end result is assured. Indeed, rather than
undertake this process, physician-investigators may instead
raise arguments over whether their subjects have the capacity
to understand what they are told. Yet this is "a displacement
from the real issue, which is the dread of an open and searching
dialogue between the investigator and his subject. This displacement is caused by the unacknowledged anxiety over
making the invitation in the first place. ' 79 The rules constructed
by the law for medical practice and research may thus force
77Freund, Legal Frameworksfor Human Experimentation, 98 DAEDALUS 314, 323 (1969).
78

Id.

79 Katz,

supra note 71, at 787.
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the profession to confront this underlying anxiety, 0 or they
may themselves be rendered ineffective by these undeniable
yet unspoken psychological forces.
5.

To Foster Rational Decisionmaking

Thus far emphasis has been placed on the role of informed
consent in protecting patients' autonomy from coercion or
disrespectful usage. The preceding section, however, has
begun to suggest that reliance on consent can also help physician-investigators to carry out their responsibilities more satisfactorily. The beneficial effects of informed consent in promoting rationality of decisionmaking about catastrophic disease
treatment and research go beyond influencing the investigator.
The requirement of informed consent symbolizes a commitment to making the process of developing new therapies a joint
enterprise. By actively encouraging the biomedical professionals to include the patient-subject in the decisional process, informed consent serves to place him on a plane with the
physician-investigator and to involve him as a person in the
work-not merely as an object on which it is being performed.
For the participants to remain on the same plane requires a
commitment that they view each other not only as equally
important individuals but also as joint participants in decisionmaking. Accomplishing this will require, beyond a change in
attitude, learning how to communicate to patient-subjects
those aspects of the proposed research which will allow them
to make decisions at least as rationally as they have made others
about their lives. 8 ' If the basic elements of information and
agreement (as suggested in this Article and in documents such
as the HEW guidelines8 2) are faithfully adhered to, patientsubjects can help to promote rational decisionmaking.
A rule of informed consent congenial to the model of
catastrophic disease decisionmaking elaborated here would
view patient-subjects as exercising a major influence on the
plans of physician-investigators. Thus, they can also become
guarantors of their own rights to autonomy and dignity, by
so See notes 53-54 supra & accompanying text.
81 The difficulties with which "rational decisionmaking" must contend are discussed in the text accompanying notes 87-123 infra.
82 See note 75 supra & accompanying text.
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exercising a check over the judgment of physicians who all too
often may be biased by their strong desire to "conquer disease."
Moreover, there is no objective, "medical" way to determine the proper treatment for an individual, since disease
itself is not an objective concept but depends upon the degree
of dysfunction experienced under given conditions by each
individual. Thus rationality in resource allocation is possible
only when the individuals who bear the costs and receive the
benefits from the allocation determine the value of the outcomes. The determination whether a particular project will
yield returns to science and society in excess of its costs is best
made by biomedical researchers and representatives of the
collectivity (to the extent that such an issue is capable of resolution at all). But who, other than the patient-subjects, can determine whether the benefits of a procedure, conventional or experimental, outweigh the burdens that will be imposed on
them? If responsibility follows choice in a system of voluntary
interactions, the costs of the system will be minimized when
the placement of responsibility (with the consequent incentive
to avoid harm) determines who shall have authority to exer83
cise choice.
Some physician-investigators have always been acutely
aware of the value of the old adage "two heads are better than
one." Their commitment to informing and consulting with
their patient-subjects has been based on a recognition of the
value of intelligent and dedicated partners, be they patients
or fellow scientists. A well-informed patient, after all, is more
alert to facts about his own condition that may be of great
significance to the investigator, and he also feels freer about
reporting what he experiences to his physician, without fear
3Cf. G. CALABRESI, THE COSTS OF ACCIDENTS (1969). Placing the power of
choice with the patient-subject, although necessary to an efficient resource allocation,
is not sufficient for it, since some patient-subjects may be "irrational" decisionmakers,
may be unaware of the potential costs of their decisions, or may be able to externalize
those costs onto others. Nevertheless, there are economic reasons (as well as the
other functions served by informed consent as discussed in the text) why patientbased decisionmaking, even if somewhat "irrational," may still represent the leading "second-best" allocation of authority, because the difficulty and expense of
giving decisional power to a proxy may easily outweigh any marginal increment in
rationality. Most attempts at substitute decisionmaking have been cumbersome and
costly. See, e.g., 39 Fed. Reg. 30648 (1974) (proposed amendments to HEW regulations
on research with subjects who have limited capacity to consent); notes 205-17 infra
& accompanying text.
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of upsetting him or losing his support. Similarly, a "patientpartner" is better able to endure the often arduous period of
recuperation. 84 Many physician-investigators recognize the
value of such dedication and take the opportunity of medical
publication or meetings to give credit and thanks to their
"coadventurers." 85
6.

To Involve the Public

A final function of informed consent in this model looks
outside the physician-patient setting to an involvement of the
larger society, since the obtaining of consent can be important
for a doctor's, or a medical center's, public relations.8 6 Informed consent may also function beyond the area of public
reputation and serve to increase society's awareness about
human research. This phenomenon is particularly noticeable
in the area of organ transplantation. The need to obtain consent from large numbers of potential donors for the removal
of their kidneys after death has led to an extensive program of
information about renal transplant programs. While the motivation for this information campaign was to recruit individual
donors, it also enlightened the public at large about a new
development in medicine. The general public thereby becomes
an informed decisionmaker, able through legislative actions
and the like to accelerate, halt, or alter transplant efforts according to its evaluation of the details disclosed.
B.

Problems of Effecting Informed Consent

Any doctrine of "informed consent" must take account
of the limitations on patient-subjects' capacity to make intelligent and insightful choices. Some of these constraints are inherent in the intellectual faculties, psychological forces, and
social pressures affecting the participants, while others result
from personal, professional, and societal judgments about the
scope of the authority which patient-subjects should be allowed

11 See notes
8"

111-23 infra & accompanying text.

See Fox, Some Social and Cultural Factors in American Society Conducive to Medi-

cal Research on Human Subjects, 1 CLIN. PHARM. & THERAP. 423, 432-41 (1960).
86 The reverse is certainly true: a physician who develops the reputation of using

his patients as guinea pigs for his studies or medical innovations without their informed consent will be avoided by those who know that reputation. See Kidd, Limits
of the Right of a Person to Consent to Experimentation on Himself, 117 SCIENCE 211, 212
(1953).
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to exercise. An awareness of these problems on the part of all
the participants should aid in overcoming the failures of communications, understanding, and intelligent decisionmaking
that now distort the process; furthermore, an understanding of
the limitations is crucial for the construction of a useful analytical model.
1. The Impact of the Inner World
In contemporary society the importance of unconscious
forces on personal conduct is increasingly acknowledged,
though the extensive scope and pervasive effect of these influences is often still resisted. To note the existence of such
unconscious forces does not, of course, deny the role in decisionmaking played by the conscious mind, which is likewise
the product of environmental influences and hereditary preconditions. Yet the impact of unconscious drives and feelings
is probably particularly great when it comes to the pressing
issues which are involved in catastrophic disease treatment:
life and death, giving and receiving, mutilation and restoration.
A revealing study by Drs. Carl H. Fellner and John R.
Marshall8 7 illustrates this point. Their work concerns kidney
transplantation, which is unusual among medical procedures
in turning a healthy person into a "patient," since a living person who donates a kidney is at some immediate risk (death or
disability through the operative procedure) and a much smaller
long-term risk (should his or her remaining kidney fail). Needless to say, this unique situation sets up special strains for
physicians as well as donors and donees. Fellner and Marshall
interviewed a group of live kidney donors after (and in a few
cases before) surgery, concerning the reasons for their decision
to donate a kidney to a close relative and the process by which
the decision was reached. They had assumed that the donors
would make up their minds at the end of the lengthy process
during which they were first told of the need for a kidney, then
subjected to medical examinations, and finally informed of
the transplant team's conclusions about their suitability and of
the risks of giving up a kidney. Fellner and Marshall were surprised to discover that the decisions of the donors were aps7 Fellner & Marshall, Kidney Donors-The Myth of Informed Consent, 126 AM.
PSYCHIAT. 1245 (1970).
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parently made long before there had been an opportunity for
adequate information-gathering and considered balancing of
pros and cons:
Not one of the donors weighed alternatives and rationally decided. Fourteen of the 20 donors and nine
of the ten donors waiting for surgery stated that they
had made their decision immediately when the subject of the kidney transplant was first mentioned over
the telephone, "in a split-second," "instantaneously,"
and "right away." Five said they just went along with
the tests hoping it would be someone else. They could
not recall ever really having made a clear decision,
yet they never considered refusing to go along either.
As it became clear to each of them toward the end of
the selection process that he was going to be the person most suited to be the donor, each had finally committed himself to the act. However, this decision too
occurred before the sessions with the team doctors
in which all the relevant information and statistics
were put before these individuals and they were
finally asked to decide.
Of all the subjects who made their initial decision
on the telephone upon first hearing of the possibility
of the kidney transplant, none had consulted his or her
spouse. When questioned about this particular circumstance each explained that the spouse later on had
either been neutral or reinforced the decision. To the
hypothetical question of "What would you have done
if your spouse had said no?" each answered, "I would
have gone ahead and done it anyway.18 8
Similarly, the few relatives who failed to show up for the initial
blood test (ABO compatibility was used as the preliminary
screening device) also had made their decision instantaneously
and only later developed the "necessary" reasons to support
their action.
The phenomenon observed by Fellner and Marshall may
not establish, as they believe, that the kidney donors failed to
decide "rationally." While it is possible to articulate all the elements and processes of formal, rational decisionmaking, 89 too
8

' 1d. 1247.
89

See, e.g., Nomos

THE DECISION PROCESS

VII-RATIONAL DECISION (C.

(1956).

Friedrich ed. 1964); H.

LASSWELL,
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little is known about actual human thought processes to preclude from the realm of the rational all decisions arrived at "instantaneously." Yet the fact that a decision, once reached, seems
not to be subject to reconsideration as additional, arguably
material information is supplied raises questions about whether
optimum choices are being made. At the least, the phenomenon
observed by Fellner and Marshall (which one may safely assume
is not restricted to decisionmaking about renal transplants)
would suggest that to be effective, the model of the informed
decisionmaker propounded depends upon a collaborative give
and take beginning with the earliest contact of physician-investigator and patient-subject. At a minimum the latter should
be made aware, as early as possible, of an outline or sketch of
the project on which he is being asked to embark, even if some
of the potential steps are still far in the distance. There will,
of course, be a need to review each step as it materializes, but
the practice of waiting, as is the prevailing practice, until the
very point of the intervention (for example, the night before
major surgery, after the patient has already checked into the
hospital) seriously undermines the patient's comprehension
and voluntariness, which are supposedly embodied in his "informed consent." 90
The results of the Fellner-Marshall study raise the additional issue whether, given the not inconsiderable risks and the
suddenness of the decision, the donors were in any way mentally unbalanced; they conclude not. Dr. Harrison Sadler and
his colleagues found strikingly similar results among genetically unrelated kidney donors; these physicians also clearly
believe that the donations were proper and were made for
"healthy" reasons. Sadler and the San Francisco transplant
team found no indications that their donors manifested psychopathology, character disorders, or infantile impulses which
would undercut the altruism of their acts; the "primary motive" of these unrelated donors "was not in the drives but in
the very personal area of self-identity, a self-ideal quite uncon-

9OSee Schonberg, Informed Consent, 230 J.A.M.A. 38 (1974). The possibility of
some, albeit limited, freedom of choice after the patient-subject has "crossed the
bridge" is suggested by Professor Fletcher's finding that "the decision to enter research [among the patients he studied at the clinical center in Bethesda] was made
prior to entering the hospital, though decisions about particular studies and their
related demands were not made until after admission." Fletcher, supra note 64, at 40.

UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA

LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 123:340

scious to them at the time." 9' Although the donors were unaware of these factors and thus could not take them into account
in "rational" decisionmaking, Sadler concluded that their decisionmaking was nevertheless psychologically coherent. The
decisions were dominated by nonrational forces, which seemed
nevertheless to be an integral part of their overall personality
structure; accordingly, no doubts are raised about the donor's
competency nor is it likely that they will disavow their decisions, as they might attempt to do had the decisions resulted
from psychopathology.
The most remarkable and universal quality of this
group was their aura of sureness which pervaded the
whole transplant encounter. They "knew" they would
respond to the appeal. (They spoke of an "inner
quickening-as though an already programmed circuit had been aroused.") They "knew" their response
was wholesome, and they "felt sure" that they would
match and be chosen and that the operation and postoperative period would be successful and uncomplicated. 9 2
The donors of kidneys are not the only ones in whom the
decisional process is deeply affected by "inner forces" which
do not comport with the "model" of conscious and careful
choice. The burden of disease also alters kidney transplant
recipients' thinking, because of both the physiological changes
and psychological difficulties they experience. As with other
life-threatening conditions, the physician's disclosure to the
patient that he has end-stage renal disease usually brings on
depression,9 3 followed by "denial" which "functions as a buffer
after unexpected shocking news, allows the patient to collect
'94
himself and, with time, mobilize other, less radical defenses.
For terminal patients, denial of their condition and its gravity
may thus have certain adaptive value, and this psychological
process is exhibited by most patients at some point. 95 This de91Sadler, Summary Notes on a Clinical Decision-Making Model, May 9, 1972
(unpublished memorandum by one of our consultants).
92 Sadler, Davison, Carroll & Kountz, The Living, Genetically Unrelated, Kidney
Donor, 3 SEMINARS IN PSYCH. 86, 92 (1971).
93 B. GLASER & A. STRAUSS, AWARENESS OF DYING 121 (1965).
94 E. KOBLER-Ross, ON DEATH AND DYING 35 (1969).
95 Although differing somewhat about the sequence, the in-depth psychological
studies of patients with terminal illnesses portray patients as passing through a num-
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fense may, however, seriously interfere with the patient's ability
to make realistic decisions, especially since he is also probably
suffering from feelings of helplessness, dependency, and
further depression. "Those factors . . .repressed by the denial
alter the orderly processing of data, and decisions made at this
level are processed by mechanisms which fail to account completely for reality factors and give them symbolic quality in
'96
keeping with the dominant wish.
Taken together, the startling evidence about kidney
donors' and recipients' decisionmaking illustrates and confirms
the importance of internal and often unperceived influences
on decisionmaking about accepting or rejecting interventions
in catastrophic illness. It also serves to emphasize the need for
attention to matters such as time and expectations in the administration of the informed consent requirement.
2. The Impact of the Outer World
More readily apparent, but not much easier to quantify,
are the environmental influences on patients.
A family member is dying of renal disease, and his best
chance for survival with a tolerable life is to be the recipient of a kidney from a relative whose tissue-type
closely matches his own. No matter how scrupulously
low-keyed and sensitive the medical team's process of
screening candidates may be, the fact remains that...
prospective donors are under very great inner and
outer pressure to give an organ to their suffering
relative who, in turn, is under extraordinary pres97
sure to receive one.
Fellner and Marshall found that while families did not
necessarily decide who would be the donor, they often determined who would be excluded from consideration, either to
ber of "stages" of attitude, behavior, and feeling after they learn of their condition.
See, e.g., B. GLASER & A. STRAUSS, supra note 93, and E. KOBLER-Ross, supra note
94. While these studies thus contradict the accepted medical folklore about the way
patients react to "the truth," see text accompanying notes 111-23 infra, they also in-

dicate that patients' ability to work their way through the stages beyond denial and
depression is highly dependent on their having candid, trusting relations with their

physician and other hospital personnel.
96 Sadler, supra note 91, at 6.
97 Parsons, Fox & Lidz, The "Gift of Life" and Its Reciprocation, 39 Soc. RESEARCH

367, 413 (1972).
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protect that person or to reflect the intra-familial belief that he
or she is "unsuitable." The opinions of family and friends did
not need to be expressed overtly to be influential. The pronounced effect of environmental stimuli on the decision to
volunteer for any procedure has been well recognized. 98 It
strains credibility to think, for example, that the teenage children who were asked to give up a kidney for their ailing twin
had any difficulty in perceiving the response expected from
them even when they were told that the choice was entirely "up
to you." Whatever they really thought of their fate, once their
parents had had them tested in the hospital and had petitioned
for permission to authorize surgery, it is not surprising that
they uniformly told judges and psychiatrists that they desired
to donate a kidney. 99
Heavy psychological burdens that can seriously distort
any process of informed and rational decisionmaking are not
restricted to organ donors and recipients but affect patients
on hemodialysis as well. In those centers in which dialysis was
viewed as a stop-gap until the patients could have their kidneys
replaced, the spirits of the patients would rise with the approach
of each long holiday weekend, for they knew that there would
be a large number of automobile accidents, which would heighten their chances to receive a kidney from an accident victim.
This macabre "holiday syndrome" had an equally sinister backlash: if the weekend passed without a suitable donor becoming
available, deep depression would spread through the dialysis
units. Such a state of mind is clearly not conducive to a sound
or lucid decisional process, especially on whether to persevere
with the arduous dialysis regimen.
Similarly, some families feel pressured to provide dialysis
at home because of many physicians' preference for its lower
cost (over treatment in a kidney center) and such other advantages as fewer medical complications, flexible scheduling,
and reduction of cross-infections between dialysands. Despite
some reports of "psychologic improvement, family unity and a
feeling of self-confidence and accomplishment," it must be
recognized that not all families truly want or are really able to
98 Rosenbaum,

The Effect of Stimulus and Background Factors on the Volunteering

Response, 53 J. ABNORMAL & SOC. PSYCH. 118 (1956).

"1See Curran, A Problem of Consent: Kidney Transplantation in Minors, 34 N.Y.U.L.
REV. 891 (1959).
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take on the burden of caring for kidney failure at home.io °
Finally, a patient-subject's concern for his family's economic
and emotional well-being may weigh heavily in his decision
to embark on a lengthy and perhaps risky treatment for his
catastrophic illness. These factors probably affect decisions
even in circumstances where the family professes indifference
to its possible financial suffering or where outside funding
sources are available to defray most of the expense. 10 1
3.

The Impact of the Relationship

Families do not exert the only "outside" influence on
patient-subjects' decisionmaking. Indeed, in many respects the
relationship of physician-investigator to patient-subject may
have greater impact. A great deal has been written on doctorpatient interaction, especially concerning the "transferences"
and "countertransferences" which are the hallmark of this
process. 10 2 The childlike expectations on the patient's part,
encompassed in the transference concept, and the physician's
reciprocal feelings, are nowhere more evident than in the treatment of life-threatening diseases. Any illness may undermine
a person's normal ego strength; a crippling disease which puts
a patient in a sickbed without prospect of recovery can call
forth ultimate dependence, cooperation, and devotion to the
all-powerful physician who possesses the magical means of
curing him. This combination of infantile regression and projection of a parental image onto the physician has often been
observed in treatment and research settings, particularly when
0

°See Blagg, Hickman,

Eschbach & Scribner, Home Hemodialysis: Six Years'

Experience, 283 NEw ENG. J. MED. 1126 (1970) (continued severe stress with maladjustment found in 19% of home dialysands); DePalmer, Open Forum: Home Dialysis,
2 DIAL TRANSPLANT 10 (1973) (home dialysis not suitable in approximately 80% of
cases ; Friedman & Kountz, Impact of HR-i on the Therapy of End-Stage Uremia, 288
NEw ENG. J. MED. 1286 (1974) (concluding that problems of home dialysis "are only
now emerging in perspective," making it too early to set a limit on extent of center
dialysis).
1
o'See Burton, Whither Dialysis and Renal Transplantation?, 230 J.A.M.A. 1403
(1974).
102 Freud first used "transference" to describe the "striking peculiarity of neurotics" to develop strong emotional bonds with their analysts, S. FREUD, PSYCHO,.'ALYSIS, in 20 STANDARD EDITION OF THE COMPLETE PSYCHOLOGICAL WORKS OF
SIGMUND FREUD 265, 268 (J. Strachey ed. 1959). This phenomenon occurs generally
in physician-patient relationships and is employed as a force to varying degrees by
different psychotherapeutic schools. See Gill, Psychoanalysis and Exploratory Psychotherapy, 2 J. Am. PSYCHOANALYTIC ASS'N 771 (1954). "Countertransferences" are the
therapist's projections onto the patient of his own image and desires.

UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA

LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 123:340

the patient has sought out the physician as a specialist, espe10 3
cially "the outstanding specialist," in his field.
103 The impact of these reciprocal and largely unconscious feelings and ideas is
well illustrated by a few rather illuminating passages from Dr. Philip Blaiberg's account of his transplantation experience:
The day after my admission to Ward D 1, I was lying in bed with eyes
closed, feeling drowsy and thoroughly miserable when I sensed someone at
the head of my bed. I opened my eyes and saw a man. He was tall, young,
good-looking with features that reminded me a lot of General Jan Christian
Smuts in his latter years. His hands were beautiful; the hands of the born
surgeon.
"Don't you know me?" he asked.
"No," I said with little interest, "I don't."
"I'm Professor Chris Barnard," he said.
"I'm sorry, Professor," I replied, "but I didn't recognize you. I have
never seen you in person, and you look so different from your photographs
in the Press."
He spoke earnestly. "Dr. Blaiberg, how do you.feel about the prospect of a
heart transplant operation? You probably know, don't you, that I am prepared to do you next?"
"The sooner the better," I said fervently, "and I promise you my full
cooperation at all times."
Though our conversation was brief and he stayed only a few minutes, I
was immediately impressed with the stature of the man and his air of buoyant
optimism. He inspired me with the greatest confidence, an invaluable asset in
the relations between a surgeon and his patient.
I felt somewhat better. Here was a man to whom I would willingly entrust my life. I came to know him well in the weeks and months that followed.
He is a vital, determined, somewhat mercurial, personality, utterly dedicated
to his profession.

On the morning of December 21, 1967, I was surprised to see my wife
walk into my ward at about 9:30. Her visits had always been in the afternoons
because of her morning job.
"Aren't you working today?" I asked.
"No," she said. "I just felt I wanted to see you."
"The nurses have told me that Professor Barnard is also coming to see
me this morning," I said.
It seemed strange and unusual, but I did not give the matter further
thought. I accepted Eileen's explanation and believed Professor Barnard's visit
would be mere routine. Soon afterward he walked in. Eileen rose to excuse
herself.
"No, don't go," Professor Barnard said to her. "I want to speak to you
together." I looked more closely at him. He was haggard and drawn as though
he had not slept all night. He no longer resembled the handsome Smuts, to
whom I had compared him, but more a martyred Christ. I felt a twinge of
pity for him when I noticed the pain in his face and eyes. Something, I was
sure, had happened to dampen the gaiety and boundless optimism I had
seen before.
Professor Barnard spoke in low tones. "I feel like a pilot who has just
crashed," he said. "Now I want you, Dr. Blaiberg, to help me by taking up
another plane as soon as possible to get back my confidence."
Still I did not know what he was driving at. "Professor," I said, puzzled,
"why are you telling me this? You know I am prepared to undergo a heart
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These strong dependencies and expectations running
both ways between physician and patient affect, and even play
havoc with, the rationality of the decisionmaking which was
part of the preliminary "informed consent" model. Similarly,
counter-transference phenomena probably also lie behind the
policy of a number of physician-investigators not to permit
kidney donations by non-related living donors. 10 4 Where the
doctor-patient relationship leads the transplanter to a degree
of identification with the donor he may find it distressing to
contemplate a donation "for no reason" (without the pull of
family obligation) which poses a threat to the physician's highlyvalued bodily integrity.1 0 5 When a genetically unrelated but
willing person is excluded from being a kidney donor, the
transplant surgeon is, in effect, withholding his "informed con10 6
sent" to the procedure.
Additional complications are added when, as is often the
case, the professional and his patient are of different, and even
markedly separate, social classes. 10 7 Besides their effect on the
transference and countertransference reactions, such educational and class differences have an even more palpable effect
on the degree of communication and comprehension which can
be expected in the relationship. Furthermore, these barriers
to doctor-patient communication may cumulate with any
transplant operation at any time you wish."
"But don't you know that Louis Washkansky is dead?" he asked. "He
died this morning, of pneumonia."
It dawned on me why Eileen and Professor Barnard had paid me this
unexpected visit. Now I knew the reason for his distress and agitation.
"Professor Barnard," I said at once, "I want to go through with it now
more than ever-not only for my sake but for you and your team who put so
much into your effort to save Louis Washkansky."
"Don't worry," he said a little more cheerfully now, "everything is going
to be fine."
P. BLAIaERG, LOOKING AT MY HEART 65-66, 69-70 (1968).
104 See Fellner & Schwartz, Altruism in Disrepute, 284 NEW ENG. J. MED. 582
(1971).
105Fellner and Marshall tell of a resident physician whose blood was used as a
control in a leukocyte test and proved to be compatible with the proposed kidney
recipient. When told of this finding, he immediately refused to be a donor without
even being asked. Fellner & Marshall, supra note 87, at 1247. This reaction contrasts
with that which Fellner and Schwartz found among non-physicians.
'" See Fellner, The Genetically Unrelated Living Kidney Donor: Unemployed
and Unwanted, 1972 (unpublished memorandum by one of our consultants).
"'7See, e.g., R. DuFF & A. HOLLINGSHEAD, SICKNESS AND SOCIETY (1968); A.
HOLLINGSHEAD & F. REDLICH, SOCIAL CLASS AND MENTAL ILLNESS (1958).
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number of other factors: the doctor's preoccupation with other
matters, particularly when he has a heavy caseload, as the
leading physicians do; the natural desire of the hospital staff
to "routinize" procedures, in order not to burden the patient
with anxiety or themselves with the added chore of coping with
that anxiety; and the inclination of physicians not to complicate patients' decisionmaking by reviewing with them the alternatives to the proposed treatment, on the probably faulty
assumption that these questions had been gone over by someone else earlier in the process.
If experience in other areas provides any indication, patients may fail to absorb warnings even when physicians attempt to adhere scrupulously to the model of informed consent.1 0 8 In fact, the danger that physician-investigators will
overreach their patient-subjects is probably greater in therapeutic settings than in ordinary experimentation outside the
context of therapy, since a patient is very poorly situated to
arrive at a disinterested weighing of the risks and benefits of
the proposed new treatment or to turn it down if it seems to
be favored by the physician to whom he probably already owes
such great emotional (and perhaps financial) debts for his past
care and on whom he is dependent for his future well-being.
Moreover, the new, untried technique is probably offered
despite its unknown qualities only because more conventional
modalities have proven ineffective. As Francis Moore has observed, "People in this country have been weaned on newspaper
accounts of exciting new cures. Particularly in the field of organ
transplantation, patients -are pressing their doctors to be the
subject of innovation."' 0 9 Thus, in the context of the physician-patient relationship there are many impediments to the
patient's being able to exercise rational judgment about whether
to undergo a new and experimental treatment proposed by
his physician.1 10
108A study of highly-educated young men who were interrogated by FBI agents
after they had turned in their draft cards (in protests against the war in Vietnam)
indicated that despite clearly-delivered Miranda warnings, they nevertheless gave
the agents statements (which could be used in court against them) although they had
for the most part not intended or "wanted" to do so. Griffiths & Ayres, A Postscript to the
Miranda Project: Interrogationof Draft Protestors, 77 YALE L.J. 300 (1967).
109 DAEDALUS-NATIONAL

INSTITUTES OF HEALTH, PROCEEDINGS OF THE CONFERENCE

ON THE ETHICAL ASPECTS OF EXPERIMENTATION ON HUMAN SUBJECTS 31 (1967).
110 If the pain and the fear of further deterioration and death which are experi-

enced by catastrophic disease patients were to be intentionally imposed by one party
to an agreement on another, the contract would probably be found invalid on grounds
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4. The Role of "Faith"
None of the forces that tend to undermine rationality are
likely to be mitigated by the traditional training or orientation
of clinical researchers. If anything, prevailing attitudes among
physicians only serve to increase the impact of those influences.
First, as a judgment about communication and comprehension, most physicians doubt that their patients can be told
simple, unvarnished information about their disease and the
prospects for treatment. "[I]t is meaningless to speak of telling
the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, to a
patient. It is meaningless because it is impossible-a sheer impossibility.""' Physicians are particularly likely to withhold information relating to diagnosis or prognosis, as opposed to
the nature of a proposed intervention, not only because there
is no such thing as "the truth" which can be conveyed, but also
because they believe they have a "therapeutic privilege" to do
so. 11 2 Yet there are good reasons why such medical discretion

should be narrowly confined. For one thing, a broadly defined privilege "would afford a perfect shield to cover the negligence of many [physicians] who were unable to reach a timely
' 3
or accurate diagnosis of the true illness." "
Furthermore, serious questions have been raised about the
validity of the premise underlying the therapeutic privilegethat it is beneficial to the patient's course of treatment that he
be protected from learning bad news about his condition. Professor Irving Janis has marshalled observational and psychoanalytic data which leads him to conclude that it is vital for
patients to engage in "the work of worrying" if they are to be
of coercion. Within the constitutional matrix, if the agreement were one between a
private citizen and a state official (such as a "plea bargain" between a criminal defendant and a prosecutor), the mere existence of pressures to reach an agreement,
even when not exploited by the state official, would raise questions of coercion or
undue inducement, although the pressures may be of lesser magnitude than those
set up by the hope that an experimental treatment will relieve the burdens and risks

brought on by severe illness. Cf. Ruebhausen & Brim, Privacy and Behavioral Research, 65 COLUM,. L. REV. 1184, 1199-1200 (1965).
111 Henderson, Physician and Patient as a Social System, 212 NEw ENG. J. MED.
819, 822 (1935).
"2See, e.g., Bolam v. Friern Hosp. Mgt. Comm., [1957] 2 All E.R. 118 (defendant
physicians found not negligent in failing to warn where it might interfere with treatment); 75 HARV. L. REV. 1445 (1962) (duty should be based on patient's needs, not
physician's practice).
M Smith, Therapeutic Privilege to Withhold Specific Diagnosis from Patient Sick with
Serious or FatalIllness, 19 TENN. L. REV. 349, 351 (1946).
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able to cope with their disease and treatment, among other
stressful experiences. Particularly germane to a model of informed consent in surgery or dialysis for catastrophic illness
is Janis' conclusion that
the arousal of some degree of anticipatory fear may
be one of the necessary conditions for developing
inner defenses of the type that can function effectively
when the external dangers materialize. In many of the
individual case studies we have examined, the patient
had received very little information about the suffering that he would undergo and, in some cases, this
lack of information seems to have been a major factor
in determining the relative absence of anticipatory
fear. One surmises that most people ignore problematical dangers of the future unless they receive
specific warnings or predictions from respected authorities. The unpleasant task of mental rehearsal,
which appears to be essential for developing effective
danger-contingent reassurances, is apt to be shirked,
even when a person knows that he is going to be ex14
posed to some form of suffering or deprivation.
Because of the exalted position of respect in which the physician is placed and because the patient is likely to expect the
physician to protect him from all harm, it will most often be
only the physician who can impart to the patient a more realistic view of what may develop during the illness and proposed
treatment. If informed consent is to be a reality, physicians
will either have to allocate more of their time to this activity
or effect a change in the health care hierarchy so that other
members of the treatment team are perceived as being important enough to do the work of warning, which must precede
the patient's "work of worrying" and development of comprehension.
Though ignorance may not be bliss, physician-investigators
are prone to rely on it not only to exploit the curative potential
of patients' "faith" in the ordinary course of treatment but also
to avoid what they regard as the even more worrisome consequences of disclosure where a life-threatening illness is involved. For example, ninety percent of physicians are reported
14
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352-53 (1958).
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to follow the policy of withholding the information that a
patient has cancer, although they typically tell the patient's
relative, so to avoid legal liability as well as to share the burden
that the knowledge had placed on them and to enlist the family's
cooperation in keeping the patient on the desired treatment
regimen. 115 Physicians seek by this course of conduct to maintain their patients' hope and to avoid the risk that a patient,
knowing the end is near, will attempt to take his own life. The
medical practice of withholding information appears to be
based largely on personal predilection, supported by a shared
value system among physicians, even though nearly all the doctors surveyed reported that "clinical experience" was the
major factor in determining their policy on disclosure. Only a
small percentage, however, had ever tried any policy other
than their current one.
It was the exception when a physician could report
known examples of the unfavorable consequences of
an approach which differed from his own. It was
more common to get reports of instances in which
different approaches had turned out satisfactorily.
Most of the instances in which unhappy results were
reported to follow a differing policy turned out to be
vague accounts from which no reliable inference
16
could be drawn.
While most physicians apparently believe that knowledge of
7
a life-threatening disease is "the cruelest thing in the world,""1
they take a less emotional (and paternalistic) view of how they
would like to be treated were their own physician to discover
that they have cancer; most indicated that they would want to
know the diagnosis. 1 8 This double standard demonstrates the
physicians' unresolved conflicts about disclosure, and interestingly enough puts them in line with what laymen state to be
their own wishes regarding disclosure, which according to vari"' Oken,

What to Tell Cancer Patients: A Study of Medical Attitudes, 175 J.A.M.A.

1120 (1961).
116Id. 1124.

This is a representative comment from interviews with physicians, who also
used such terms as "a death sentence," "torture," and "hitting the patient with a baseball bat." Id. 1125.
118 "The explanation usually given was that 'Iam one of those who can take it' or
'I have responsibilities.'" Id. This difference in some physicians' attitude toward what
they themselves wanted to know had no effect (or an inverse effect) on their policy
toward other doctor-patients.
117
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ous studies is desired by seventy-seven to eighty-nine percent. 11 9
This evidence has divergent implications for the informed
consent model of catastrophic disease decisionmaking. On the
one hand, the present attitude of physician-investigators,
which may seriously detract from the possibility of establishing a mutually informed joint working relationship, will probably be difficult to overcome. This limitation on a mutual relationship leading to truly informed consent is self-imposed by
one of the parties to the relationship-the physician-investigator-and its roots obviously run deep into the barriers to informed consent discussed in the previous sections. Consequently, it is unlikely that formal regulations on disclosure
or mutuality of decisionmaking could have much immediate
effect. On the other hand, if there is a genuine commitment
to informed consent, it should be possible, perhaps by revisions in the training of physician-investigators, to bring about
a change in their attitudes and practices. While the present
policies have important psychological aspects, these could
probably be overcome if medical instructors in both classroom
and clinic were to demonstrate the feasibility and desirability
of giving patient-subjects a meaningful role in making choices
about their own treatment or nontreatment by providing them
with the "truth" about their conditions and potential alternative therapies.
Such an approach has the advantage of taking realistic account of the state of knowledge that most patients achieve
anyway, their physicians notwithstanding.1 20 Present medical
practice carries the danger that when patients find out their
real condition or the actual benefits, discomforts, and risks of
their treatment they may lose confidence in the physician who
"lied" to them or at least withheld important facts from them.
Of course, a policy of informed patient decisionmaking does
not require that the "cruel truth" be unloaded on the patient
in a single interview. "The central question is not whether or
not to tell a patient about his dim outlook, but who shall tell,
119 Feifel, The Function of Attitudes toward Death, in DEATH AND DYING: ATTITUDES
OF PATIENT AND DOCTOR (G.A.P. Symposium No. 11) 632, 635 (1965). This statistical
result is fully supported by the impression gained through in-depth psychological
studies. See, e.g., E. KOBLER-Ross, supra note 94.
121,"As at least three-quarters of the patients here studied became aware that

they were probably dying, the question 'Should the doctor tell?' loses much of its
force." Hinton, The Physical and Mental Distress of the Dying, 32 Q.J. MED. 1, 19 (1963).
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how much to tell, what to tell, how to tell, when to tell, and how
often to tell."' 12 1 This formulation suggests that the primary obligation of professionals is to devise means of bringing the patient-subject into the decisionmaking process rather than creating excuses for keeping him out "in his own best interests."
If the physician spends sufficient time with the patient, it should
be possible to convey the necessary data to him in a comprehensible form.
Initially, most patients should be advised of the
doctor's findings and the treatment planned. Frankness
does not mean hopelessness ....
At the beginning, the
patient need not be told more than the facts of the
illness. His doctor's directness should convey a more
important, non-verbal message that he will not be
abandoned. Gratuitous reassurances, overly precise
predictions, and philosophical precepts are to be
22
avoided.1
A final advantage of the adoption of such a policy would
be to decrease the possible exploitation of patient-subjects'
too eager consent to research procedures. If physician-investigators adopt the new policy suggested here to guide their
actions, they are less likely to misuse the undeniably great
impact which a sudden disclosure of impending death can
have on a patient, converting him from a rational, if ailing,
person into a pliant subject who will consent to any experimental intervention "since he has no hope anyway." The abandonment of the physician's supposed blanket privilege to withhold information in the patient's "best interests" does not mean
that the physician should be permitted to overpower his patient with a needlessly harsh or ill-timed presentation.12 3 Nor
121

Weisman, The Patient nith a Fatal Illness-To Tell or not to Tell?, 201 J.A.M.A.

646 (1967).
122 Id. 646-47.
123

[T]he "best interests" doctrine is acceptable to the extent it mirrors the
physician's Hippocratic duty to "do no harm," but ... it should be abandoned
to the extent it would permit a physician to substitute his judgment for his
patient's. Thus, this modified "best interests" would place a floor under the
standard of acceptable conduct by physicians, by refusing to excuse intentional or reckless harm to patients, without allowing this protection against
potential harm to swallow up the patient's whole right to information and
consent.
Capron, Legal Rights and Moral Rights, in ETHICAL ISSUES IN HUMAN GENETICS 221, 241
n.22 (B. Hilton, D. Callahan, M. Harris, P. Condliffe & B. Berkley eds. 1973).
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is "faith"--that is, a less than fully realistic belief in the physician and hope that the treatment will succeed-out of place
in the treatment of catastrophic illnesses. Having been given
"the facts" as the physician sees them, a patient is free to discount them in any way he wishes. It is only when his decisionmaking is manipulated over a sustained period of time, through
the withholding of information or its deceptive presentation,
that "faith" is misused.
There is certainly a place in medical innovation for the
brave subject who, realizing that his life is near its end, decides
selflessly to participate in research so that more can be learned
about the disease that is killing him or about new possibilities
of treating it; indeed, such subjects are probably crucial to
"medical progress." But their participation should be based
on an unpressured weighing of alternatives and not on a dejected view of their own worth or a desperate bid to maintain
the friendship and support of a physician who, by the manner
in which he informed them of their condition and the possibilities of treatment, has left them with the impression that he
will abandon them if they fail to cooperate in his project.
III.

THE INFORMED CONSENT MODEL IN PERSPECTIVE

A.

Division of Authority

This review of the developing case law and the philosophical and psychological considerations suggests that achieving
truly informed and insightful participation of patient-subjects
will be a difficult task. Yet it is an attempt worth making. Clarity
about the division of authority is important for two reasons.
First, it elucidates duties in the primary relationship between
doctor and patient. Moreover, it serves to fit that relationship
into the context of social roles and expectations. This is particularly noticeable in the case of experimental medicine, which
has been subjected to increasing scrutiny by third parties.
1. Doctor and Patient
It would, of course, be easier to rely almost entirely on physician-investigators to handle decisions of medical intervention
than to allow patient-subjects to become informed decisionmakers. That alternative would adhere closely to the traditional
view of the doctor-patient relationship, which located all au-
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thority in the simple two-way, dominant party/submissive
party interaction. Yet the physicians themselves are responsible for a number of departures from that traditional model.
For example, the heart transplant moratorium placed major
decisions in the hands of persons outside the two-party nexus
of doctor and patient; certain choices arrived at by doctors and
patients were thereby foreclosed by decisions reached by other
physicians, hospitals, professional associations, and the like.
Thus, there seems little reason to consider retaining the traditional model of physician-patient decisionmaking for its own
sake, since if it ever existed in pure form, that day is long past.
There are other good reasons for moving from a doctoras-sole-authority model to an informed consent model. According patient-subjects the right to participate as informed
decisionmakers in the catastrophic disease process will better
enable them to protect themselves and their interests (a calculation which would probably be too complicated and burdensome to be performed well by a surrogate). This position does
not suggest that patient-subjects will not make "mistakes" or
pursue courses not "in their best interests," but they will be
their best decisions, challenged when necessary by medical opinion to the contrary.
Although a full and frank partnership between physician-investigator and patient-subject is the aim of the informed
consent model, the model recognizes that patients' decisional
processes do not always operate in a rational and unfettered
manner. Dying patients especially may be led, often in an
unconscious fashion, to offer their cooperation in return for
some special favor from those who are caring for them. Dr.
Elisabeth Kiibler-Ross sees in such bargaining "an attempt to
postpone" something (such as an operation) that reminds the
patient of how imperiled his life is; in exchange he may promise
his "good behavior," perhaps in the form of an offer to let
himself be used for scientific work that could lead to life-extending knowledge.

1 24

An honest recognition of the "bargaining" nature of the
doctor-patient relationship is particularly important when the
124 E. KBLER-Ross, supra note 94, at 73-74. See also Guttentag, The Problems of
Experimentation on Human Beings: The Physician's Point of View, 117 SCIENCE 209 (1953)
(describing how the guilt of being ill may lead the patient to feel a need to make
sacrifices for physician-investigators).
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physician-investigator is seeking to enroll the patient-subject
in a procedure which is not solely for the latter's benefit. As
suggested at the outset, "informed consent" should be viewed
not as a single act but as a process of contracting, negotiating,
and recontracting. 12 5 In the treatment of, and research on,
catastrophic diseases, this model of informed consent is the
only realistic one, since the treatment process requires constant
physical and psychic rededication over time by patient and
physician alike. Dr. Harrison Sadler even suggests that "[a]
basic requirement is a patient who is intelligent enough to
negotiate" an "honorable and dignified working partnership
and alliance ....,,126
2. Official Review
The model of decisionmaking is not restricted to physician and patient but includes others as well, such as the physician's peers and officials of the state. Under the HEW regulations described above, "institutional review committees" pass
on experimental interventions prior to their initiation. These
committees are charged with ensuring that the benefits of the
experiment outweigh its risks and that informed consent will
be obtained from the patient-subjects. If such panels take their
work seriously and are more than windowdressing, they can
serve many of the same ends that are advanced through an informed consent model of decisionmaking: they may increase
rationality, protect the human worth and dignity of experimental subjects (by preventing worthless research in which
the sacrifice of any human interests would be a mistake), and
encourage reflection on the part of investigators who will be
concerned that their arguments be well thought-out so as to
make a good impression on their peers. The committees may
125The process by which the terms of the treatment contract are negotiated is
illustrated by the intermittent contract between Dr. Denton Cooley and Haskell Karp
in the month before the artificial heart implantation in the spring of 1969. See Karp
v. Cooley, 493 F.2d 408, 412, 421 (5th Cir. 1974). In that instance, other deviations
from the paradigm suggested here introduced serious deficiencies into the decisions
reached. See notes 223-59 infra & accompanying text.
126 Sadler, supra note 91. Support from persons outside the physician-patient
relation may also be needed by patient-subjects in order to work through their conflicting feelings (self-preservation versus gratitude to physician-investigators for their
attention) and thus to maintain their freedom to withdraw or renegotiate the bargain
when they have second thoughts. See Savard, Serving Investigator, Patient and Community in Research Studies, 169 ANN. N.Y. ACAD. Sci. 429 (1970).
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also facilitate physician-patient communication by suggesting
improvements in the means used to obtain informed consent,
and in appropriate instances by actually providing a person to
facilitate communication between the "parties" in research.
The authority exercised by the institutional committees
does, of course, point to a clash of principles between the autonomy of the patient on the one hand and the greater scientific rigor and safety which are the goal of official review
on the other. This tension remains partially unresolved in the
decisionmaking model presented here, and must await further
experience for more complete articulation. But even now it is
more apparent than real. The informed consent model is not
violated by a physician-investigator's limitation on the range of
medical interventions which he is willing to undertake with a
patient-subject; 27 nor is it when those limitations arise from
formal or informal pressures placed on physician-investigators
by their peers or others outside the doctor-patient contract.
Many of those sources of influence-such as education, socialization, and the structure of the health professions-are too
subtle and pervasive even to be perceived in the typical instances of patient-physician contracting; other informal but
more apparent influences are the result of conscious choice
on the part of persons other than the doctor and patient,
though they are kept at a low level of visibility. But the problem with such sources of influence and even with the formal
efforts of committees does not derive from their mere existence; there is an undeniable need for outside values to be
represented, although this creates a tension with patient autonomy. Rather, the problem results (and the tension is sharply felt) because the proper boundaries of such influence are
poorly drawn, the processes by which they operate remain unspecified, and the means by which they might be challenged
are largely nonexistent. Thus, as standards for the operation
of review committees evolve, these groups can be expected to
be an increasingly important part of the experimental process.
It would be wrong, however, if the committees were to
review individual consents and to disallow those which they
felt were inadequately considered. If the patient-subject is
competent and the requisites of the consenting process are

127

See text accompanying note 76 supra.
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fulfilled, it is not for the committee, like a jury employing the
objective standard of the "reasonable person," to second-guess
the patient-subject and dictate his choices according to its own
view of the rational. The major objection which would likely
be interposed by institutional review committees or other representatives of collective decisionmaking on grounds of "rationality" is that the decisions made do not adequately protect
life. Such interference by a committee could take the form of
either refusing to sanction a person's participation in an experson consent to a
perimental program or insisting that a 128
procedure which he or she does not want.
a. Prevention of Dangerous Treatment
Since much of the commentary and criticism of experimental medicine has been directed at the "unethical" exposure
of patient-subjects to unjustifiable risks, 1 29 it might be expected
that the first situation, where a representative of society prevents a willing patient-subject from going ahead, would be
the more common. That does not appear to be the case. Most
of the objections to unethical research have been grounded on
the involvement of subjects who did not give valid consent, by
reason of either insufficient information or lack of ability to
make a free choice, and not on the theory that subjects' participation ought not be permitted.
As was suggested in part I of this Article, the exclusion of
certain patient-subjects also results from the exercise of informal authority by physician-investigators and their professional colleagues, and apparently never rises to the the level of a
formal decision by the state. The informal ban on unrelated
living kidney donors for the past five years provides a dramatic
case in point, since the supply of transplantable kidneys from
other sources remains deficient. Although the treatment of
kidney failure is supported by a major commitment of governI2s Needless

to say, these two situations are often hard to distinguish: if "no

treatment" were the experimental procedure chosen by a patient who needed treatment to preserve his life and the state declined to sanction his decision, this might
also be framed as the state insisting on an intervention which he opposed.
129 H.
BEECHER, RESEARCH AND THE INDIVIDUAL: HUMAN STUDIES (1970); M.
PAPPWORTH, HUMAN GUINEA PIGS: EXPERIMENTATION ON MAN (1967); Beecher,
Ethics and Clinical Research, 274 NEw ENG. J. MED. 1354 (1966); Veatch & Sollitto,
Human Experimentation-The Ethical Questions Persist, HASTINGS CENTER REP., June
1973, at 1.
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mental resources, this policy decision-which comes from
physicians' unwillingness to expose healthy persons to the risks
of having a kidney removed if they are motivated only by altruism and not by family ties-rests unquestioned and unreviewed in medical hands.
Edmond Cahn has argued, however, that a patient-subject's
consent should be passed upon by someone-by implication an
official of the state-when the procedure involves substantial
risks, and that when the risk of permanent physical or psychic
130
mutilation is "serious... the consent should not be accepted."'
Cahn would rely on the physician-investigator's evaluation
of "possible benefit to the ailing subject" rather than on "his
consent" or "the possible increment of scientific knowledge"
as the justification for risking something like "psychic mutilation" in a grievously ill person.' 3' The general cautions urged
by Cahn find expression through the informal and formal (review committee) mechanisms which limit the biomedical interventions that are permitted and which screen out unsuitable patient-subjects. The greater formality of HEW-mandated review
for projects conducted at institutions receiving federal research
funds may increase extraprofessional scrutiny, but this will still
concern only the permissibility of the research itself and not the
legitimacy of a particular individual's consent.
Extraprofessional control over catastrophic disease decisions does arise through after-the-fact review, primarily in the
context of medical malpractice litigation, but this is at most a
minor constraint. Were an intervention a criminal act, the consent of the patient-subject could, of course, be disregarded by
the state, either in attempting to prevent the event from occurring or in prosecuting the physician-investigator subsequently.' 32 Yet there is no indication that the acts to which cata130 Cahn, Drug Experiments and the Public Conscience, in DRUGS IN OUR SOCIETY

255, 264 (P. Talalay ed. 1964).
131 Id.

132If the patient-subject's agreement to the intervention were found to be voluntary and informed, he would probably be unsuccessful in suing the physician-investigator for the intervention, albeit that it was criminal. For example, in Spead v.
Tomlinson, 73 N.H. 46, 59 A. 376 (1904), the court assumed that a statute on the
unauthorized practice of medicine made treatment by a Christian Science practitioner
illegal, and that this statute was passed to benefit those such as the plaintiff who had
been injured as a result of a violation of the statute. Nevertheless, it held that the plaintiff could not recover, because she had submitted to the treatment of her own choice;
but it also noted that this act on her part would not have relieved the defendant of
criminal liability, had he been so charged by the state.
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strophic disease patients have submitted come within the category of crimes. Moreover, for obvious practical reasons the cases
provide illustrations of retrospective but never of prospective
invalidation of the consent of competent persons in biomedical
treatment.

33

While there are advantages, both for the subject and for
the scientific process more generally, in having professional
review in advance of a proposed medical procedure, the intervention of state officials in forbidding a course of treatment
does not seem appropriate on any but a paternalistic rationale
inconsistent with the premises of informed consent. The state
may legitimately decline to permit the use of collective resources (funds for medical care) where the collective benefits
are outweighed by the risks or costs. But the voluntary participation of competent adults is not a collective resource, and
the state's concern ends once it is assured that fraud and duress
have not been employed in the process of informing and obtaining consent from the patient-subject.
b.

Compelling Life-Saving Treatment
Although it would seem to involve a more severe interference with autonomy and free choice, the second type of state
interference to protect subjects from unwise choices-the overriding of patient-subjects' choices not to undergo medical
treatment-has occurred more frequently than the first. Apparently a more palpable and immediate threat to collective
values is perceived when the choice is to forego treatment believed by others to be potentially helpful than when the choice
is to accept treatment believed to be too risky. Two separate
rationales explain these state-sanctioned interferences with
the operation of the informed consent model. One rationale is
well illustrated by an example outside the context of lifethreatening illness. In the early years of compulsory vaccination for contagious diseases, the objections of persons not want133 As initially framed, the litigation over the propriety of the psychosurgery
planned by the Lafayette Clinic in Detroit on sexual psychopaths at Ionia State
Hospital would have had the court pass on the validity of "John Doe's" consent to
participate. But that issue was mooted when he was released from the hospital,
after the statute under which he had been committed was declared unconstitutional,
and then withdrew his consent to the surgery. Kaimowitz v. Michigan Dept. of
Mental Health, Civ. No. 73-19434-AW (Cir. Ct. Wayne County, Mich., July 10,

1973).
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ing to be inoculated were found to be outweighed by the
134
public interest in preserving the health of other citizens.
Vaccination is effective as a public health measure only when
it is universally applied. Compulsion was therefore upheld in
order to protect everyone and to prevent a few from attempting to get a "free ride" by obtaining the benefit of vaccinated
neighbors without taking the risk themselves. The calculus of
authority in such cases involves patient-citizen and state rather
than patient-subject and physician; the decision to proceed
despite the individual's unwillingness is grounded on the superior collective good, not on the superiority of medical judgment. What is involved here is a suspension in the operation of
the informed consent model for a set of decisions to which it
does not apply, rather than a contradiction of the model's
premises concerning the division of authority.
Where refusal of life-saving treatment is at issue, the rationale for interference appears to be different. The state's
primary interests here have been found to be a paternalistic
concern to safeguard the individual from his own unwise decision, a ritualistic desire to uphold "the sanctity of life," and a
collective interest in preserving each person's productivity for
society's benefit.' 35 The most numerous and conspicuous examples of state imposition of life-saving treatment on unwilling
patient-subjects are presented by those cases in which blood
transfusions are refused, particularly by Jehovah's Witnesses.
Judicial opinion on whether a person has a right to refuse lifesaving treatment is divided. Despite the religious basis of the
patient's objections to the transfusion, a number of forceful
opinions have held that a hospital in which a patient had sought
care could force him 36or her to accept the treatment deemed
necessary to save life.'

The opinion by Chief Justice Weintraub for the New Jersey
Supreme Court in one of the leading cases, John F. Kennedy
134 See, e.g., Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11 (1905).
135 See Cantor, A Patient's Decision to Decline Life-Saving Medical Treatment: Bodily

Integrity Versus the Preservationof Life, 26 RUTGERS L. REv. 228, 242-54 (1973).
136 In Application of President and Directors of Georgetown College, 331 F.2d
1000 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 978 (1964), the court's decision to order the
life-saving treatment was influenced by the fact that the patient had a young child
who might have been adversely affected by the loss of a parent. Id. at 1008. This
factor does not play a prominent role in the cases as a whole, however. Cf Raleigh
Fitkin-Paul Morgan Memorial Hosp. v. Anderson, 42 N.J. 421, 201 A.2d 537, cert.
denied, 377 U.S. 985 (1964) (transfusion order for woman 32 weeks pregnant).
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Memorial Hospital v. Heston, 137 would appear to expand the
medical authority in decisionmaking about life-threatening
conditions. Although the case involved the exercise of state
power rather than decisionmaking solely by physicians (since
the blood transfusion cases typically arise as petitions for the
court to appoint a guardian), the court took a view of the
medical profession's role at odds with the informed consent
model:
Hospitals exist to aid the sick and the injured.
The medical and nursing professions are consecrated
to preserving life. That is their professional creed.
To them, a failure to use a simple, established practice in the circumstances of this case would be malpractice, however the law may characterize that failure
because of the patient's private convictions.' 38
The "patient's private convictions" are, however, the compass
by which medical decisions are to be guided, with the law's protection when necessary, unless there is to be a complete reordering of the interests which are in conflict.
The cases mandating transfusions have little precedential
value for decisionmaking by competent patients in the catastrophic disease process, however. First, in all cases but one the
patients were found to be incompetent as a result of the debilitating effects of their illness or loss of blood.' 39 Second, the
religious nature of the objection rendered ambiguous the choice
made by the patient. This is illustrated by another leading
case, Application of the President and Directors of Georgetown College. 14 There Judge J. Skelly Wright found that though the
137 58 N.J. 576, 279 A.2d 670 (1971).

138 Id. at 582, 279 A.2d at 673. Particularly puzzling is the court's use of the term
"malpractice," by which it apparently means a medical view of misconduct, eschewing
the legal view of "malpractice," to which the term usually refers. There is no doubt,
however, that the court accurately reflected medical values, particularly physicians'
pronounced unwillingness to yield to death. See Parsons, Fox & Lidz, supra note 97,
at 395, identifying the physician's "nearly absolute 'commandment' to combat the death
of his 'patient'," but also detecting the emergence of a new "relativized ethic" in the
face of the strains between medical and general societal values, id. 402-10.
39 The exception, United States v. George, 239 F. Supp. 752 (D. Conn. 1965),
concerned a Jehovah's Witness who would not consent to a blood transfusion, although
he stated that he would not resist a court order directing it. Since the risks involved
in transfusions are small and, in the absence of an unusual underlying pathology, the
chances of therapeutic success are great, the transfusion cases are of problematic value
in arriving at conclusions about patients' refusal of more substantial intervention.
140 331 F.2d 1000 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 978 (1964).
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patient may have wanted to adhere to her religious beliefs and
refuse to "drink blood," she did not desire the consequences
of that choice, that is, she did not want to commit suicide. He
concluded that ordering the transfusion would thus comport
with her real though not her expressed wishes.' 4 1 In subsequent cases, Jehovah's Witnesses have gone out of their way to
deny that court-ordered transfusions, as opposed to voluntary ones, are any more acceptable under their religious
tenets, 1 42 but it is clear that Judge Wright believed that this
factor buttressed his decision. Finally, the emergency existing
in the Georgetown College case impelled an order to permit the
transfusion if the status quo were to be preserved until full
argument could be had; failure to act, in Judge Wright's view,
could have resulted in irreversible error. 4 3 Of course, ordering
the transfusion to avoid "mootness" not only amounted to
ruling against the patient's contentions but also effectively
mooted the case from the opposite perspective, since no issues
remained once the patient recovered and was released from the
hospital.
The more recent opinions (as well as some of the older
ones) have refused to compel unwilling patients to undergo
blood transfusions. The Supreme Court of Illinois, faced with
an appeal from a probate judge's order appointing a guardian
to consent to a transfusion of a Jehovah's Witness, held:
Knowing full well the hazards involved, she has firmly
opposed acceptance of such transfusions, notifying
the doctor and hospital of her convictions and desires, and executing documents releasing both the doctor and the hospital from any civil liability which
might be thought to result from a failure on the part
of either to administer such transfusions. . . . Even
though we may consider appellant's beliefs unwise,
foolish or ridiculous, in the absence of an overriding
danger to society we may not permit interference
therewith in the form of a conservatorship established
141Judge Wright also stated that he was able to avoid violating Mrs. Jones' religious beliefs, since he understood her to say that she could not request any blood but
that it could be given to her "against (her] will." Id. at 1007. Accord, United States v.
George, 239 F. Supp. 752, 753 (D. Conn. 1965); Powell v. Columbian Presbyterian
Medical Center, 49 Misc. 2d 215, 216, 267 N.Y.S.2d 450, 452 (Sup. Ct. 1965).
142 See, e.g., In re Osborne, 294 A.2d 372, 374-75 (D.C. 1972); In re Bentley, Misc.
No. 65-74, 102 Daily Wash. L. Rptr. 1221, 1224 (D.C. Super., Apr. 25, 1974).
143 331 F.2d at 1009-10.
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in the waning hours of her life for the sole purpose
of compelling her to accept medical treatment forbidden by her religious principles, and previously rewith full knowledge of the probable confused by her
44
sequences. 1
In Heston, Chief Justice Weintraub based the state's authority to override a patient's refusal to accept life-preserving
treatment directly on its power to prohibit suicide, but this reasoning has not persuaded most judges. A New York trial court
held in Erickson v. Dilgard1 45 that the refusal of medical treatment by a competent adult, irrespective of religious reasons,
does not fall under the criminal law's prohibition of suicide:
"[I]t is the individual who is the subject of a medical decision
who has the final say and . . . this must necessarily be so in a
system of government which gives the greatest possible protec14 6
tion to the individual in the furtherance of his own desires."'
The courts have further narrowed the scope of governmental authority to interfere with treatment decisions in a
number of cases involving arguably incompetent patients,
whose wishes have nevertheless been respected. For example,
a Wisconsin judge upheld the objections of a Mrs. Raasch to repeated amputation of her leg; although her condition prevented her from communicating verbally, she was "not incompetent" and her wishes (as expressed nonverbally) were to
be respected. 47 Similarly, an institutionalized mental patient
who exhibited disordered reasoning was nonetheless allowed
to refuse exploratory surgery for suspected carcinoma of the
breast. The court declined to equate a decision considered "unwise, foolish or ridiculous"'' 4 8 by others with one which was in11In re Estate of Brooks, 32 Ill. 2d 361, 372-73, 205 N.E.2d 435, 442 (1965).
The Illinois court placed heavy emphasis on the religious basis of Mrs. Brooks' objections; the case is thus primarily a first amendment "free exercise" decision.
,15 44 Misc. 2d 27, 252 N.Y.S.2d 705 (Sup. Ct. 1962).
146 Id. at 28, 252 N.Y.S.2d at 706.
,47 D. HENDIN, DEATH AS A FACT OF LiiE 67-69 (1973).
48 In re Yetter, 62 Pa. D. & C.2d 619, 623 (C.P. Northampton County, 1973).
Maida Yetter, a sixty-year-old woman, had been a resident of a state mental hospital
for treatment of chronic undifferentiated schizophrenia for two years at the time of the
hearing. Her brother sought authority to be appointed her guardian to consent to exploratory breast surgery for suspected cancer. Mrs Yetter had declined the operation
because she feared that it would make her condition worse and would lead to her death,
as she believed (apparently erroneously) that a similar operation had killed an aunt
of hers. Mrs. Yetter's social worker described her as "lucid, rational and appear[ing] to understand that the consequences of her refusal included death," id. at 621,

1974]

INFORMED CONSENT

competent, provided that the decision showed that the patient
had an understanding of the consequences of her various alternatives.
Practical reasons as well as principles 1 49 support the disposition reached by the majority of the cases. Almost insuperable
problems of administration would be presented if physicians or
committees were free to second-guess the informed decisions
made by patient-subjects. The only reason why this problem is
not more pronounced at the present time is that the manner in
which physicians now control the process of information-giving
and decisionmaking probably reduces the likelihood that they
will find themselves irreconcilably opposed to the choices made
by their patients. If adherence to the informed consent model
increases these instances, it is not clear that physicians would in
fact welcome the power explicitly to override their patients'
wishes in the name of society and of their professional commitment to maintaining life at all costs, as seems to be suggested by
the decisions of Judge Wright and Chief Justice Weintraub.
B. Resolving Conflicts in the Case Law:
A Hybrid Cause of Action
To what extent is the "model" of informed consent developed here-one which, based on the purposes which the
requirement of informed consent is supposed to serve, predicts
various allocations of authority among the participants in the
decisionmaking process-presently embodied in case law? This
is a field characterized by major developments in the past few
years. Yet, although a number of recent opinions have exhibited
greater concern for the protection of patients' interests, further
changes are needed if the doctrine is to operate in the way
hypothesized in the model. Part of this problem can be traced
but subsequently she became delusional in her reasons for not consenting. At the
hearing her delusions on this subject were shown when she gave as her reasons for
refusing the operation its adverse effects on her ability to have babies and on her
potential movie career. Although the physician was of the view that Mrs. Yetter
could not reach a considered view about the surgery, the court declined to appoint a
guardian, holding Mrs. Yetter to be competent to exercise her constitutional right of

privacy by refusing life-prolonging treatment, since "there are no minor or unborn
children and no clear and present danger to public health, welfare or morals." Id. at

623.

149 Cf. Morris, Voluntary Euthanasia, 45 WASH. L. REv. 239, 251-55 (1970), identifying three basic values which are relevant to choice about life-saving treatment as well
as to euthanasia: prevention of cruelty, allowance of liberty, and enhancement of
human dignity.
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to the dispute, mentioned at the outset, over whether an informed consent action properly sounds in battery or negligence.
The reasons for this difficulty are readily apparent. While
a medical intervention without consent is a battery, many courts
have declined to find that the absence of information invalidated the consent which had been obtained and have decided
instead that it indicated a lapse in professional behavior-a part
of the physician's obligation-to be judged by malpractice standards. Whichever theory was chosen, innumerable difficulties
were faced in reaching results that squared with justice and
common sense. Although the origins of the dichotomy are
plain, there is no reason for it to detain the courts any longer.
The courts should recognize that they are on the brink of creating a new ground for recovery: a hybrid of negligence and
battery theories that is controlled by its own logic and is not confined by the rules which attach to either of its parent causes of
action.' 5 0
The choice of negligence or battery theories determines a
range of legal questions, such as the applicable statute of limitations and the distribution of the burden of proof on the various
elements needed to establish or avoid liability. This discussion,
however, will address only the central differences with which
the courts have wrestled: establishing the amount that must be
disclosed to the patient and determining whether the doctor's
act caused the patient's injury.
1. Disclosure and Comprehension
From the outset, most judges have rejected the notion that
there is an "absolute" duty to inform a patient of any and all
risks and consequences expectable from an intervention. Instead, the extent of what a physician must tell his patient has
usually been stated with the sort of uninformative circularity
that the California district court of appeal employed in Salgo v.
Leland StanfordJr. University Board of Trustees: "full disclosure of
facts necessary to an informed consent.'

15 1

Under the negli-

gence rationale, if a patient asserted that his physician had with150The Natanson court rejected the suggestion that informed consent be regarded
as a hybrid; it adhered instead to the negligence theory. Natanson v. Kline, 187 Kan.
186, 354 P.2d 670 (1960).
151 154 Cal. App. 2d 560, 578, 317 P.2d 170, 181 (1957). See Staffard v. Schultz,
42 Cal. 2d 767, 777, 270 P.2d 1, 7 (1954) ("full and complete" disclosure); Woods v.
Brumlop, 71 N.M. 221, 227, 377 P.2d 520, 524 (1962) ("full and frank disclosure").
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held information from him, the patient-plaintiff was generally
obliged to show that the physician-defendant had deviated from
what expert testimony showed to be the established, acceptable
medical practice on disclosure in the community. 152 This reliance on a professional standard was supported by the argument
that the major reason for nondisclosure would be the physician's
conclusion, as a result of his expert judgment, that disclosure
would be harmful to the patient.
Courts following the assault and battery rationale were
faced with a harder task. Whether information was withheld
negligently, wilfully, or otherwise could make no difference
under their theory, provided that the gap was sufficient to render nugatory the consent supposedly given by the patient; yet
some information is perforce always left out by physicians, so
liability would always attach if absolute disclosure were required. The courts were thus faced with two choices, neither
really satisfactory. On the one hand, they could attempt to narrow the field of battery cases to those in which the operation
performed was not the one to which the plaintiff had consented, and leave malpractice theories to cover situations in
which information about the operation (for instance, risks) was
not disclosed.' 5 3 The difficulty with this dichotomy is plain,
however. What makes the physician's conduct objectionable in
the first situation-that the patient has given "consent" under a
misimpression of the relevant facts-is equally true of the
second. At the least, the dividing line between omissions of fact
and errors of description that fundamentally change what has
been approved and thereby open the physician to liability for
battery defies description. The second alternative, which some
courts pursued, was to draw on the fiduciary relationship that a
physician has to his patient and hold that a battery occurred
when the physician wilfully or negligently breached the fiducial
duty of disclosing "to his patient all materialfacts which reasonably should be known if his patient is to make an informed and
intelligent decision."' 54 This led to a groping for some standard
See note 24 supra.
'3See Cobbs v. Grant, 8 Cal. 3d 229, 240, 502 P.2d 1, 8, 104 Cal. Rptr. 505, 512
(1972) (citing W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 32, at 165-66 (4th ed.
1971) for the proposition that limitation of the battery theory is the majority viewpoint).
54 Hunter v. Brown, 4 Wash. App. 899, 906, 484 P.2d 1162, 1166 (1971), aff'd,
81 Wash. 2d 465, 502 P.2d 1194 (1972).
152
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of materiality beyond the plainly uninformative "full disclosure."
In three major recent opinions in this area, the courts
seemed to take both routes. 55 Most notably, the California supreme court in Cobbs v. Grant1 56 clearly adopted negligence
157
rather than battery as the theory of recovery in that state,
but at the same time rejected the "reasonable medical practice
standard" which formed the backbone of the negligence theory.
Paraphrasing the holding handed down earlier in 1972 by the
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit in Canterbury v. Spence, 15 8 the California court held that "the patient's
right of self-decision is the measure of the physician's duty to
reveal.... The scope of the physician's communications to the
patient, then, must be measured by the patient's need, and that
59
need is whatever information is material to the decision."'
155Prior to the trilogy of cases discussed in detail in the text, Canterbury v.
Spence, 464 F.2d 772 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1064 (1972); Cobbs v. Grant,
8 Cal. 3d 229, 502 P.2d 1, 104 Cal. Rptr. 505 (1972); Wilkinson v. Vesey, 110 R.I.
606, 295 A.2d 676 (1972), several courts had abolished the medical community
standard for informed consent, e.g., Woods v. Brumlop, 71 N.M. 221, 377 P.2d 520
(1962); Getchell v. Mansfield, 260 Ore. 174, 489 P.2d 953 (1971); Cooper v. Roberts,
220 Pa. Super. 260, 286 A.2d 647 (1971), and since then more have followed, e.g.,
Riedinger v. Colburn, 361 F. Supp. 1073 (D. Idaho 1973); Fogal v. Genesee Hosp.,
41 App. Div. 2d 468, 344 N.Y.S.2d 552 (1973); Trogun v. Fruchtman, 58 Wis. 2d
569, 207 N.W.2d 297 (1973), although one court has chosen to retain the rule,
ZeBarth v. Swedish Hosp. Med. Center, 81 Wash. 2d 12, 499 P.2d 1 (1972). But see
Miller v. Kennedy, 11 Wash. App. 272, 522 P.2d 852 (1974) (synthesizing ZeBarth with
Canterbury, Cobbs, and Wilkinson, and rejecting the medical community standard). The
pre-1972 cases are less significant than the 1972 trilogy: Woods dealt with the issue in a
truncated fashion, Getchell confused "materiality" and the need for expert testimony
on the risks which actually existed, and Cooper skipped over the problem of causation.
Hence, this Article will draw primarily on Canterbury, Cobbs, and Wilkinson, which addressed the issues head-on and put a new stamp on the law.
1568 Cal. 3d 229, 502 P.2d 1, 104 Cal. Rptr. 505 (1972).
151 The California cases were divided. The early case of Salgo v. Leland Stanford Jr. Univ. Bd. of Trustees, 154 Cal. App. 2d 560, 317 P.2d 170 (1957), had come
up on a negligence action, which was accepted without much criticism; this view of
the cause of action was followed in Dunlap v. Marine, 242 Cal. App. 2d 162, 51 Cal.
Rptr. 158 (1966), and Tangora v. Matanky, 231 Cal. App. 2d 468, 42 Cal. Rptr. 348
(1964). But it was also held that in California "the cause of action which arises from
medical treatment based on an uninformed consent sounds in battery and not negligence." Dow v. Kaiser Foundation, 12 Cal. App. 3d 488, 505, 90 Cal. Rptr. 747, 757
(1970). Accord, Berkey v. Anderson, 1 Cal. App. 3d 790, 82 Cal. Rptr. 67 (1969).
158464 F.2d 772, 787-88 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1064 (1972).
15. 8 Cal. 3d at 245, 502 P.2d at 11, 104 Cal. Rptr. at 515. Canterbury v. Spence,
464 F.2d 772 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1064 (1972), provides an excellent summary critique of reliance on explicit medical testimony on the scope of disclosure:
There are, in our view, formidable obstacles to acceptance of the notion
that the physician's obligation to disclose is either germinated or limited by
medical practice. To begin with, the reality of any discernible custom reflecting a professional concensus on communication of option and risk information to patients is open to serious doubt. We sense the danger that
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Without explicitly so declaring, the California court appears to have adopted a "subjective" standard for determining
whether the information withheld from the patient should have
been disclosed: the measure of materiality is "the patient's
need," whatever the particular plaintiff needed to make up his
or her own mind about whether to permit the medical intervention. The two other courts which have taken the lead in redefining consent, the Supreme Court of Rhode Island and the
federal appellate court in the District of Columbia, approached
the issue of materiality "from the physician's point of view," as
two commentators had urged. 160 In holding that the materiality
of information is to be judged by what the law's mythical "reasonable person" would want to know, these courts retreated
161
from the logic of their own reasoning.
what in fact is no custom at all may be taken as an affirmative custom to
maintain silence, and that physician-witnesses to the so-called custom may
state merely their personal opinions as to what they or others would do under
given conditions. We cannot gloss over the inconsistency between reliance on
a general practice respecting divulgence and, on the other hand, realization
that the myriad of variables among patients makes each case so different
that its omission can rationally be justified only by the effect of its individual circumstances. Nor can we ignore the fact that to bind the disclosure obligation to medical usage is to arrogate the decision on revelation to the physician alone. Respect for the patient's right of self-determination on particular therapy demands a standard set by law for physicians rather than one
which physicians may or may not impose upon themselves.
Id. at 783-84 (footnotes omitted). The difficulty of obtaining experts to testify, the
so-called "conspiracy of silence," has also been given as a reason for not employing a
professional standard to measure a physician's duty to inform. See Cooper v. Roberts,
220 Pa. Super. 260, 267, 286 A.2d 647, 650 (1971); Comment, Informed Consent in
Medical Malpractice, 55 CALIF. L. REV. 1396 (1967). The Supreme Court of Rhode
Island doubted whether even the trial court's statutory power to appoint expert witnesses of its own was sufficient, in light of the economics of medical practice and
malpractice insurance, to overcome this hurdle to plaintiff's prima facie case. Wilkinson v. Vesey, 110 R.I. 606, 623-24, 295 A.2d 676, 687 (1972).
160 Waltz & Scheuneman, supra note 20, at 639. Waltz and Scheuneman disavow
any intention of making the standard of materiality "subjective to the physician,"
claiming only that they want to avoid the complications of hindsight: "the correctness
of [the physician's] decision must be assessed on the basis of the data then available
to him." Id. n.41. Yet this begs the question. Without expecting omniscience from
health professionals, it goes too far to cut their disclosure free of what the patientsubjects actually want and need to know and anchor it only to what data the professionals happen to have available about the patient-subjects.
M Yet they plainly are uncomfortable with this result, leaving the reader ambivalent about how "objective" a standard is that speaks of a "reasonable man who finds
himself in the position of the patient." Waltz & Scheuneman, supra note 20, at 640
(relied on in Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772, 787 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 409
U.S. 1064 (1972), and Wilkinson v. Vesey, 110 R.I. 606, 627, 295 A.2d 676, 689
(1972)). If this is nothing more than the usual "under all the circumstances" language
common to negligence law, then it adds little. But it may be meant to suggest that
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The courts thus adopted an "objective" standard, rather
than keying the definition to what information the actual patient
needed for his or her personal decisionmaking process. The
judges, like the commentators, recognized the subjective standard as "optimal" or "the ideal rule" to protect the interests that
prompt the concern with "informed consent" in the first place,
but then they backed away from this result for pragmatic reasons.1 62 It is not hard to understand the motivation for this
outcome; for it might seem harsh to judge the materiality of information by "the patient's need," since a physician "obviously
cannot be required to know the inner workings of his patient's
mind. '163 But an objective standard shares the basic fault of
the "medical community" standard which these courts were
abandoning. Adherence to what a group in the lay community
believes to be "reasonable" may rob the patient of "the undisputed right ... to receive information which will enable him to
make a choice" 164 as surely as will adherence to a judgment of
the medical community.
Whatever the merits of an "objective" standard of disclosure in highly routine interventions-when the very ordinariness of the medical procedures would suggest that a particular
patient would be satisfied with information sufficient to satisfy
the average, reasonable person, and where jurors would
generally be better able to draw on their own experiences in applying the standard-it has no place in the case of the major
and often experimental interventions used to treat catastrophic
diseases. Since the purpose of requiring informed consent is to
allow patient-subjects to participate in the course of therapy
and research as informed decisionmakers, concern should focus
on whether the patient-subject in question understood what the
physician-investigator was proposing to do as compared with
other ways of proceeding. To eliminate the "subjective" elements that relate to the particular patient-subject (which lead
him, for example, not to be "reasonable" in deciding about
certain kinds of interventions) is to make the informed conthe jury consider the personal "position of the plaintiff" with an eye to such details
as whether the patient-plaintiff deviates in some respects from the norm of reasonableness.
162 See, e.g., Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772, 787 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 409
U.S. 1064 (1972); Waltz & Scheuneman, supra note 20, at 639.
'63 Waltz & Scheuneman, supra note 20, at 639.
114Wilkinson v. Vesey, 110 R.I. 606, 625, 295 A.2d 676, 688 (1972).
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sent doctrine an engine of depersonalization rather than personalization. The after-the-fact application of this rule in the
courtroom need cause no greater difficulty. Jurors are not
fools; they know when to credit, and when not, a plaintiff's
testimony that he needed to know a particular fact in order to
65
reach an informed judgment.1

The standard of reasonably prudent conduct is, of course,
the one customarily employed in negligence actions, but there
are reasons to question its application to the disclosure requirement of informed consent. First, the courts apparently seized
upon reasonableness because, in Judge Robinson's words, it
"would in any event ease the fact-finding process.1' 1 6 6 It may be
harder for jurors to assess the particular characteristics of individual patients, but they are called upon occasionally to take
"subjective" factors into account, especially regarding plaintiff's conduct, even in negligence cases.'

67

Moreover, con-

165 As Justice Kelleher of the Rhode Island supreme court observed, the plaintiff's description of the consenting process involves "issues of credibility to be resolved
by the trier of fact." He expressed "every confidence that a juror will adhere to his
oath and 'give a true verdict .. .according to law and the evidence given [him].'" Id.
at 626, 295 A.2d at 688.
166 Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772, 791 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 409 US.
1064 (1972). This comment was made in discussing the use of the reasonableness
standard in determining causation, see text accompanying notes 192-204 infra, but
Judge Robinson employed the same reasoning to justify that standard as was used in
establishing the rule for disclosure.
167"Subjective" judgments come in at both ends of the scale. The infirmities or
handicaps of an actor are taken into account by the courts in charging juries to consider such factors as being among the circumstances affecting whether his or her conduct was reasonable or to consider what a prudent person with a like infirmity would
do. A subjective standard, including such factors as age and insanity, is particularly
prevalent in measuring contributory negligence. At the opposite extreme, an actor
is held to the greater knowledge or skill which the jury concludes that he or she possessed or should have possessed as a result of experience with the activity in question.
To some extent, negligence cases do not provide complete analogies, since the
issue for the factfinder in informed consent is not the reasonableness of the patient's
conduct but simply what was understood and agreed to by the parties. From this
angle, an analogy may be made to cases on the authorization of a gift from the estate
of an incompetent person. In arriving at the necessary "substituted judgment,"
courts have applied a subjective standard to determine what the person would decide
if competent, see, e.g., City Bank Farmers Trust Co. v. McGowan, 323 U.S. 594,
598-99 (1945); In re Guardianship of Brice, 233 Iowa 183, 186-87, 8 N.W.2d 576,
578-79 (1943); In re Flagler, 248 N.Y. 415, 418-20, 162 N.E. 471, 471-72 (1928),
even though the determination is rendered very difficult by the impossibility of receiving evidence directly from the incompetent. While the judicial willingness and
ability to be "subjective" displayed by these cases supports the argument for a subjective standard in informed consent law, the other premise behind the cases-that
the court must make a judgment on behalf of the incompetent-has, of course, no
applicability to the doctrine of informed consent which is designed to protect the
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venience alone hardly seems an adequate rationale if substantive
reasons do not lead to the same conclusion. Second, the greater
ease of administration does not explain the general approbation
for measuring by reasonableness; rather, "the strongest case
for an external standard"'1 68 is to be found in its substantive effect, namely, that it protects people from unreasonably dangerous conduct on the part of others who may nevertheless have
tried their best to be careful. As used by the courts in establishing the disclosure rule, however, the focus is on plaintiff's, not
defendant's, actions, so the usual substantive justification is
absent. The patient owes no one a duty to decide prudently or
to require for his decision only the facts that an ordinary person would want. The rule established in the recent cases would
bar recovery by a patient whose idiosyncratic decisionmaking
takes him outside the realm of the "reasonably prudent person."
This is equivalent to a defense of contributory negligence,
which has no place in an action for failure to obtain informed
consent.
Finally, the opinions verge on abandoning the negligence
theory in all but name. They come close to adopting a theory
similar to that used in post-negligence statutory duty cases; this
theory would be better served if the courts were to complete the
movement away from negligence. Liability may be established
by a breach of a statutory duty that places responsibility for
harm upon the defendant; since such an action is for harm
caused by the statutory violation, and not for negligence, recovery is independent of the defendant's carefulness and is not
barred by the plaintiff's lack of care, when the statute is "enacted to protect a class of persons from their inability to exercise self-protective care ....
,,169 By analogy, the physician's
duty to his patient in informed consent cases has been found to
be established by the law (judge-made rather than statutory);
its purpose is to protect the patient from choices that are uninformed-and hence unacceptable according to his own lights.
The way in which the courts approached their task in Canterbury and its siblings indicates that an analogy to statutory
duties should prove instructive. The sweep of physicians' duty
competent patient's right to choose for him or herself, a matter on which his own
testimony is usually available. But see note 194 infra.
168 2 F. HARPER & F. JAMES, THE LAW OF TORTS § 16.2 (1956).
169 Koenig v. Patrick Constr. Co., 298 N.Y. 313, 317, 83 N.E.2d 133, 134 (1948).
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to inform was limned but the details were left to be filled in
case by case. The California supreme court, for example, dismissed the need for "a lengthy polysyllabic discourse on all possible complications" or a "mini-course in medical science"' 70 in
favor of informing the patient undergoing an ordinary procedure of "the risk of death or bodily harm, and problems of recuperation."' 7'I The District of Columbia opinion went into still
greater detail.
The topics importantly demanding a communication of information are the inherent and potential
hazards of the proposed treatment, the alternatives to
that treatment, if any, and the results likely if the patient remains untreated. The factors contributing significance to the dangerousness of a medical technique
are, of course, the incidence of injury and the degree
of the harm threatened. A very small chance of death
or serious disablement may well be significant; a potential disability which dramatically outweighs the potential benefit of the therapy or the detriments of the
existing 2malady may summons discussion with the
7
patient.
In the context of medical innovation, a further step in defining physician-investigators' obligation to inform their patient-subjects is provided by the HEW regulations described
previously. 17 3 The elements prescribed by those guidelines for
valid consent centered around a description of the risks, discomforts, and benefits of the proposed procedure and of alternative procedures, and their experimental or established
nature, 7 4 particularly if the proposed intervention represents
an initial trial of a new procedure in man. In addition to the
points set out by HEW, others of primary importance in the
context of the research and treatment of catastrophic diseases
170

Cobbs v. Grant, 8 Cal. 3d 229, 244, 502 P.2d 1, 11, 104 Cal. Rptr. 505, 515

(1972).
11Id. For more complicated procedures, such as the surgery performed on Mr.
Cobbs, the minimal disclosure must include "the potential of death or serious bodily
harm, and ... in lay terms the complications that might possibly occur." Id.
172Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772, 787-88 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S.
1064 (1972). Cf. Note, supra note 25, at 1561, urging "formal rules of disclosure
stipulating the minimum amount of information," and setting forth nine substantive
items to be included.
171 See note 75 supra & accompanying text.
174 See also Fiorentino v. Wenger, 26 App. Div. 2d 693, 272 N.Y.S.2d 557 (1966),
rev'd in part, 19 N.Y.2d 407, 227 N.E.2d 296, 280 N.Y.S.2d 373 (1967).
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include the physician-investigator's degree of personal experience with the proposed procedure, and the degree of uncertainty which surrounds the new technique and the extent to
which its use on the patient may help in resolving that uncertainty. If the patient is to be a partner in this enterprise it will
be necessary for him to be aware of the scientific as well as the
personal purposes and objectives involved so that he can be
alert for any important developments. It should be possible to
discuss this information with him in such a way as not to increase the probability that his observations will be improperly
than the physicolored by what he expects to find, any 17more
5
cian-investigator's are by what he expects.
The upshot of the opinions and regulations is the specification of a duty as definite as the duties of "safety" at issue in the
statutory violation cases. An adoption of the rationale of those
cases is not necessary for the use of a subjective standard in measuring disclosure, but it would fit more logically with the judicially articulated duty of disclosure.1 76 It would especially ad175 Special rules and procedures must be promulgated to govern instances in
which double-blind studies are scientifically called for.
176 There remains the difficult question of what scope, if any, should be given to
the "therapeutic privilege." See notes 112-14 supra & accompanying text. Clearly, it
must be narrowly confined, lest it swallow up the physicians' duty entirely and open
the door to after-the-fact rationalization for a failure to inform. The so-called privilege
was more or less created by Dr. Hubert W. Smith in a series of articles, particularly
Therapeutic Privilege to Withhold Specific Diagnosisfrom Patient Sick with Serious or Fatal
Illness, 19 TENN. L. REV. 349 (1946), on the basis of very scanty case law; since then,
though often mentioned in opinions, it has only rarely been invoked in a court's
holding. See Patrick v. Sedwick, 391 P.2d 453 (Alas. 1964); Nishi v. Hartwell, 52 Haw.
188, 473 P.2d 116 (1970) (criticized in Shaitsis, Informed Consent: Some Problems Revisited, 51 NEBR. L. REV. 527 (1972)).
Although it might thus be tempting to junk the concept as being without precedent, it is too firmly established in medical thinking and in legal folklore to be completely interred. As distinguished a commentator as Professor Jon Waltz argues that
a physician's "training and responsibilities" toward an "irrationally apprehensive"
patient allow him to act "on the basis of his judgment rather than that of his patient."
A physician should, Waltz writes, "be permitted to establish the medical propriety of
his decision not to disclose the collateral risk." Waltz & Scheuneman, supra note 20,
at 642-43. Beyond doubting that most physicians have sufficient training or acumen
to detect "irrationality" on anything but a personal, ad hoc basis, one is also led to
wonder whence does the profession derive its standard of "reason" by which is established the "medical propriety" of depriving the unreasonable (but not incompetent)
patient of his authority to make his own decisions? This is likely to reduce to a physician-defendant producing colleagues who testify in effect that the course of treatment chosen by the defendant was wiser than the one the plaintiff apparently would
have chosen. Yet if such becomes the rule, physicians could routinely act on the
basis of their own judgment which will always be more medically "proper" than patients'. For both "rational" and "irrational" patients alike, the reasonableness of a
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vance the subjective version of the measure of materiality by
eliminating the confusion caused by reference to the reasonableness of the physician's conduct in informing the patient of whatever the latter would reasonably want to know.
If this subjective standard of materiality places an additional burden on physician-investigators to inquire specially
about the attitudes and biases, strengths and weaknesses of the
persons whom they propose to treat, that would seem all to the
good. Indeed, this might provide encouragement to physicians, and hence to courts, to make the patient's comprehension of the information conveyed the hallmark of a determination of valid consent. 17 7 The mere relaying of information is
not, in itself, more than a necessary precondition to the patientsubject's capacity to give informed consent. Although commentators have usefully observed that the doctrine has two parts, inmedical procedure depends on personal views about risks and benefits, not on any
objective touchstone.
The very foundation of the doctrine [of informed consent] is every man's
right to forego treatment or even cure if it entails what for him are intolerable
consequences or risks, however warped or perverted his sense of values may
be in the eyes of the medical profession, or even of the community,so long
as any distortion falls short of what the law regards as incompetency. Individual freedom here is guaranteed only if people are given the right to
make choices which would generally be regarded as foolish ones.
2 F. HARPER & F. JAMES, THE LAW OF ToRTs, § 17.1 n.15, at 61 (Supp. 1968).
If the "privilege" is to be retained to prevent direct and immediate harm to the
patient which cannot be avoided by the manner and timing of the disclosure, it must
be better policed; to make out the privilege, evidence would be needed about the harmful effects to be expected from disclosure so that the jury may decide whether the
withholding was justified, just as it now decides whether an "emergency" was grave
enough to justify the physician in proceeding without consent. See, e.g., Dunham v.
Wright, 423 F.2d 940, 941-42 (3d Cir. 1970); Koury v. Follo, 272 N.C. 366, 374,
158 S.E.2d 548, 555 (1968).
The "duty" approach to the informed consent cause of action advances this objective, because it places an important limitation on the role of the "privilege" at trial.
Under negligence theory, the physician should be able to claim that where he has a
good reason not to inform he has not been negligent, since his withholding of information did not produce but rather diminished an unreasonable risk of harm. Consequently, the plaintiff should bear the burden of proving that the privilege was not
applicable under the facts of the case. But the courts have, in fact, been unwilling to
place this burden on the plaintiff. See, e.g., Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772, 791
(D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1064 (1972). This is a further indication of their
movement toward the breach of duty rationale, since it does make sense under that
theory for the physician to bear the burden of an affirmative defense of "therapeutic
privilege" once the patient has made out a breach of duty.
177 Attention to the question of "comprehension" reflects battery theory in the
lineage of the emerging informed consent cause of action, which has been obscured but
not abandoned as a result of the courts' greater reliance on negligence theory. In
battery, the plaintiff's understanding of what the defendant was proposing to do was
always an important element.
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formation and consent, 178 "information" and "informed" are
not equivalents. It would be more accurate to say that its two
parts are first, disclosure and comprehension, and second,
voluntary consent. Information may, in the manner in which
it is conveyed, even be used to decrease the likelihood that the
choice is made with insight and understanding. One study suggests that untutored subjects' comprehension is inversely corre79
lated with how elaborately the information is presented.
Even when the information presented is adequate, therefore, the consenting process may be nothing more than a "ritual" if the patient-subject remains "uneducated and uncomprehending."' 8 0 To avoid this result, the physician could be held
responsible for taking reasonable steps to ascertain whether the
information presented has been understood, so that if it has
not he may supplement it as needed or may convey the same
information in a manner more comprehensible to the particular patient. Such a process might also be expected to reveal
additional factors whose materiality could not have been suspected before the physician questioned the patient. The continual exchange of information between patient and physician
which the comprehension-testing requirement is likely to produce gives substance to the idea of mutuality in the catastrophic
disease process.
The Department of Health, Education, and Welfare has
rejected the suggestion that it include a requirement of comprehension as part of its guidelines on informed consent, because such a requirement would go beyond what the courts have
demanded. 8 ' The District of Columbia court, in Canterbury v.
Spence,' 81 gave the most explicit recognition to the relationship
between "a reasonable divulgence by physician to patient" and
the "enlightenment with which [the latter can] reach an intelligent decision."'183 Judge Robinson relegated to a footnote the
178 Waltz & Scheuneman, supra note 20, at 630.
179 Epstein & Lasagna, Obtaining Informed Consent: Form or Substance, 123 ARCH.
INTERN. MED. 682 (1969).
180 Ingelfinger, Informed (But Uneducated) Consent, 287 NEw. ENG. J.

MED. 465,

466 (1972). Dr. Ingelfinger's pessimistic conclusion is that "the chances are remote
that the subject really understands what he has consented to," so that it is vain to conceive of him as in any sense a partner of the physician-investigator. He believes that
subjects must rely for their "real protection" on the "conscience and compassion of
the investigator and his peers" rather than on informed consent. Id. 465-66.
181See 39 Fed. Reg. 30649 (1974) (declining to amend 45 C.F.R. § 46.3(c) (1974)).
182 464 F.2d 772 (D.C. Cir.) cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1064 (1972).

183 Id. at 780.
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difficulties posed by looking to the former but not the latter as
a measure of "informed" consent. The duty of the physician,
he concluded, is to disclose rather than to inform. "Even though
the factfinder may have occasion to draw an inference on the
state of the patient's enlightenment, the factfinding process on
performance of the duty ultimately reaches back to what the
physician actually said or failed to say."' 184 His invitation to the
trier of fact to develop inferences about the patient's comprehension-at odds with the rest of the opinion-may merely
have been loose language. Or perhaps Judge Robinson intended by this formulation quietly to encourage the development in future cases of a duty to inform which places more
emphasis on "the state of the patient's enlightenment." There
are other indications in the informed consent opinions that the
courts recognize the central importance of comprehension. The
plainest of these is the limitation placed on the duty of disclosure; in the words of the Wilkinson court, "Obviously there
is no need to disclose risks that are likely to be known by the
average patient or that are in fact known to the patient usually
185
because of a past experience with the procedure in question."'
If the disclosure duty were really the key to the cases, this conclusion would not be so obvious. But as the duty is instrumental
to the real concern-that the patient be an educated and comprehending decisionmaker-it is obvious that further disclosure is superfluous when the patient is already acquainted with
the information.
While Judge Robinson may thus have been opening the
way for development of "comprehension" as the keystone of
informed consent, the present formulation in Canterbury leaves
the court with some basic difficulties, for in his words, "the
factual conclusion on adequacy of the revelation will vary as
between parties."' 86 He would have one discount the variations
in the "duty-to-disclose" as merely incidental to "the kind of di'87
vulgence which may be reasonable under the circumstances,"'
given the variation in patients. But this only serves to empha84

Id. n.15.
'8 Wilkinson v. Vesey,
'

110 R.I. 606, 627, 295 A.2d 676, 689 (1972). Accord,
Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772, 788 (D.C. Cir.), cert denied, 409 U. S. 1064 (1972);
Cobbs v. Grant, 8 Cal. 3d 229, 244, 502 P.2d 1, 11, 104 Cal. Rptr. 505, 515 (1972);
Waltz & Scheuneman, supra note 20, at 630.
,96 464 F.2d at 780 n.15.
87
1
Id.
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size rather than diminish the importance of comprehension,
for the major difference in patients comes in how much they
must be told in order to comprehend the risks and benefits of the
alternatives which the physician is presenting to them.
The very factors which led the courts to base the disclosure requirement on "the patient's need" would seem to make
necessary the inclusion of some measure of how well that need
had been met as an element of the new cause of action.' 8 8 It was
suggested previously that the courts might do well to complete
the movement from disclosure only at the will of the medical
community through standard negligence to a legally established duty. This development made sense in establishing an
easily measured, and one hopes easily followed, rule of divulgence, free from the constraints of a negligence formulation.
The focus of attention there was on what the physician-investigator did (adequate disclosure vel non). In speaking of comprehension, however, the focus is on the patient-subject and
whether he was informed when he made his decision to proceed. Thus, policy as well as logic dictates that physician-investigators not be held to determine beyond peradventure the
state of patient-subjects' knowledge but only to make reasonable
efforts to ascertain that they adequately comprehend what is
being proposed, including the risks and alternatives.' 89
The importance of a subjective rather than objective standard of materiality can be seen by comparing how well each
standard would serve the functions of informed consent. For
example, a physician-investigator's self-scrutiny is likely to be
increased if he has to ask, "Is this procedure right for this patient, based on what I actually know about him or her?" and
not on what is known about the "reasonable patient." The very
routine nature of the latter does nothing to promote reexamination on the part of the physician-investigator as he plans how
he will explain the proposed intervention to the patient-subject. The requirement that the physician-investigator individ188 A means of increasing, and of measuring, patient-subjects' comprehension
is contained in Miller & Willner, .4 Suggestion for Promoting Free and Informed Consent,
290 NEw ENG. J. MED. 964 (1974).

189 Waltz and Scheuneman likewise conclude that the patient's awareness is an
element of a valid consent, so that the test becomes "whether a reasonable man would
conclude from the patient's behavior that he was aware of the risk and that he manifested a willingness to encounter it." Waltz & Scheuneman, supra note 20, at 645.
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ualize the informing process is consistent with the obligation to
individualize the diagnostic and therapeutic processes. 190
Similarly, the respect for the patient-subject as a full human
being is better served by a subjective standard. As the courts
have recognized, one reason why a physician might withhold
information is a belief that if the patient knew it he would re"'See, e.g., Cobbs v. Grant, 3 Cal. 3d 229, 245, 502 P.2d 1, 11, 104 Cal. Rptr. 505,
515 (1972) ("[A] doctor must, of course, make such inquiries as are required to determine if for the particular patient the treatment under consideration is contraindicated ....").
Using a "subjective" standard does not mean that physician-investigators need
conduct a psychoanalytic probing of their patient-subjects nor even that they should
do so. It is important that the informing process be individualized for each patient's needs; the lack of inclination for such a task exhibited by many physicianinvestigators, particularly the surgeons involved in catastrophic disease research and
treatment, ought not excuse this task being left undone, though it is obvious that
rules must be kept "within the reach of obedience," Fletcher, supra note 64, at 39,
since a requirement which is too onerous and for which physician-investigators have
neither time nor inclination will be routinely ignored. Rather than abandon the
duty to inform, however, the obligation can be framed in such a way that it is performed by other members of the research/treatment team, see text accompanying
note 114 supra, who are capable of responding to the individual patient-subject's
ability to deal with various pieces of information. Or a special "physician-friend"
from outside the team could be appointed as suggested by Otto Guttentag, among
others, see Guttentag, supra note 124, at 210, although the advocacy role imagined
for such a person must be carefully cabined lest it usurp the patient-subject's own
decisionmaking authority.
As was shown in Part I-B supra, from the empirical studies of decisionmaking
by kidney donors and recipients, even sensitivity to the timing of the informed consent process and to the expectations of the patients may not fully overcome the qualms
of physician-investigators about the "rationality" of some decisions reached. But the
"subjective" standard of information disclosure provides no warrant for physicianinvestigators to reverse their patient-subjects' choices by probing into the underlying
psychological processes and discovering "ambivalences," "fixations," or other unconscious elements, short of the extreme of legal incompetency. See text accompanying
notes 147-49 supra. "Subjective" refers, in other words, to the recognition that a patient-subject may hold different beliefs and values than the average "reasonable person," and not to the interior mental processes which might be uncovered through a
psychoanalytic investigation of the motivations and conflicts lying behind the consent of an apparently informed and coherent patient-subject. Since such probing is
not part of the initial consenting process, it also has no place in after-the-fact review,
provided that the physician-investigator has not intentionally manipulated the process
to thwart the aims of comprehension and voluntariness. See text accompanying notes
123-26 supra.
"The weighing of these risks [of undergoing or foregoing a proposed treatment] against the individual subjective fears and hopes of the patient is not an expert
skill," as the California Supreme Court declared. "A patient should be denied the
opportunity to weigh the risks only when it is evident he cannot evaluate the data ...."
Cobbs v. Grant, 8 Cal. 3d 229, 243, 502 P.2d 1, 10, 104 Cal. Rptr. 505, 514 (1972). As
argued previously, see text accompanying note 127 supra, the patient's weighing of
risks ought no more be filtered through the "expertise" of the lay community (as
embodied in the jury) than through that of the medical community.
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fuse an intervention believed necessary by the physician. 19 1 Yet
such a substitution of judgment, permitted under the negligence rationale if nondisclosure were the professional norm,
clearly deprives the patient of his power of self-determination
and human dignity. The "objective" test has the same effect,
for it asks the jury to decide whether the patient would have
wanted to know something, had he been a "reasonable person." The paternalistic judgment that it would have been better
not to know is thus shifted from the physician's sole discretion
to the jury's. It seems highly dubious to say, in the case of the
major and often experimental interventions which occur in the
catastrophic disease process, that the right of the patient to say
"no" on even the least rational grounds should ever be taken
away.
2. Causation
The second major stumbling block posed by the choice between battery and negligence theories has been the determination of the extent of the defendant's liability for the injuries
which resulted from the intervention. Under a battery rationale,
if the information withheld were sufficiently important to have
vitiated consent, causation would not be a major issue since a
physician is liable for the "unauthorized touching" of his or her
patient.192 In addition to exemplary damages, all harm actually
resulting from the touching would be recoverable. Most judges
have found this too harsh a result, however, since physicians
typically act without "malice" in performing an inadequately
consented intervention.
The negligence rationale has tended to the opposite extreme. Under it, courts and especially commentators have elevated causation to a central position.' 93 Unless the patient can
91 Compare Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772, 789 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 409
U.S. 1064 (1972), rejecting "the paternalistic notion that the physician may remain
silent simply because divulgence might prompt the patient to forego therapy the physician feels the patient really needs," with Zebarth v. Swedish Hosp. Med. Center, 81
Wash. 2d 12, 25-26, 499 P.2d 1, 9-10 (1972), holding that the physician need not "risk
frightening the patient out of a course of treatment which sound medical judgment
dictates the patient should undertake." Cf. Beeson, Moral Issues in Clinical Research, 36
YALE J. Bio. & MED. 455, 465 (1964), arguing for limited disclosure because "if we were
to tell a person of all the possible things that could go wrong in the course of the experiment he probably would not wish to submit to it."
1'92See, e.g., Lacey v. Laird, 1 6 Ohio St. 12, 139 N.E.2d 25 (1956) (in absence of
proper consent, surgery is actionable even if harmless or beneficial).
193 For a recognition of the importance of proving causation for recovery under a
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prove that "but for" the withholding of a certain piece of information he would never have consented to the intervention, he
is not permitted to recover. Moreover, some of the courts have
employed the "objective" standard here, too. The question is
thus framed as whether a "reasonable person" would have refused to undergo the intervention if he had known of the fact
1 94
withheld by the physician.
negligence theory, see (in addition to the recent informed consent trilogy of opinions)
Shetter v. Rochelle, 2 Ariz. App. 358, 409 P,2d 74 (1965), modified, 2 Ariz. App. 607,
411 P.2d 45 (1966); Aiken v. Clary, 396 S.W.2d 668 (Mo. 1965); Comment, Informed
Consent in Medical Malpractice, 55 CALiF. L. REv. 1396 (1967).
194 See Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772, 791 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S.
1064 (1972); Cobbs v. Grant, 8 Cal. 3d 229, 245, 502 P.2d 1, 11-12, 104 Cal. Rptr.
505, 515-16 (1972). This holding appears to have originated with Waltz & Scheuneman,
supra note 20, at 647, who also discerned a bright line separating materiality and
causality. Id. 638-39 & n.40; but see note 195 infra. These commentators present two
grounds, neither persuasive, for a "reasonable person" standard. First, they argue that
whether the patient would have acted differently if properly informed "can only be a
guess," so "posing the causation issue in that form does not promote rational resolution of it." Id. 647. Yet any after-the-fact assessment of the elements of an injury is in
this sense always "a guess," based most often on the jurors' untutored sense of the
probable (in actions of persons and movements of physical objects), aided by whatever "facts" the parties can supply to explain how something happened and, in some
cases, how it would not have happened had the responsible party behaved differently.
There are many times that in passing on causation, as Learned Hand wrote, "no certain conclusion [is] possible." Zinnel v. United States Shipping Bd. Emergency Fleet
Corp., 10 F.2d 47, 49 (1925). The factfinder, of course, is not permitted to engage
in "mere speculation," but there is no reason to believe that in every case the resolution of the hypothetical issue of what the patient would actually have done will fall
into such a category. When the issue is capable of resolution, it would seem an eminently "rational" means of determining causation.
Second, Waltz and Scheuneman reason that since the plaintiff's testimony about
what he would have done if informed "will be assessed primarily on the basis of its
reasonableness" in the factfinder's view, the latter should be told that the standard
for measuring causality is "the effect of disclosure or nondisclosure . . . on a reasonable person in the plaintiff's position ....
" Waltz & Scheuneman, supra note 20, at
647. This confuses the jury's common sense approach to credibility-that they will be
highly skeptical of the plaintiff who claims that he would not have consented had he
known of the very small probability of a very inconsequential injury-with the legal
standard which will constrain the jury in determining causation in the case of "unreasonable" or otherwise idiosyncratic patients. If, in an attempt to avoid this difficulty, the
weight of the rule is cast upon its concluding phrase, "in the plaintiff's position,"
rather than on reasonableness, then the rule becomes, in effect, subjective rather
than objective.
A third difficulty with the Waltz-Scheuneman position is that the one case they
relied on to support it, Aiken v. Clary, 396 S.W.2d 668 (Mo. 1965), does not adopt a
"reasonable person" standard. Mr. Aiken was unable to testify (because the insulin
shock therapy had left him brain-damaged, although not dead as Waltz and Scheuneman state), and on that basis the physician-defendant asserted that there could be
no proof of causation. The court disagreed, holding that the jury could decide from
the circumstances whether the operation would have been refused "even though
plaintiff does not specifically so testify." Id. at 676. The Missouri court's conclusion is
clearly correct, since it would be unjust to bar recovery when the harm caused by a
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Again, the battery/negligence dichotomy seems more concerned with the formalities of legal rules than with the functions
which informed consent is to serve. Injuries which occur because the patient-subject has been prevented from being an
informed decisionmaker should be compensable. Moreover,
the importation of the "reasonable person" standard for causation is as misplaced here as it was in judging materiality of disclosure. 195 An "individualized test of causation is indicated because informed consent seeks to assure patients the right to
make even irrational decisions."'1 96 To deny recovery because
the jury believes that a reasonable person would not have cared
about a certain factor (although they also believe that the factor
did matter to the particular patient-plaintiff) undermines the
fundamental purpose of the informed consent rule, the promotion of individual autonomy. The danger that a physiciandefendant will be unfairly prejudiced by the patient-plaintiff's
testimony is slight. It can be minimized through cross-examination and through defense counsel's perfectly legitimate suggestion in argument to the jury that the patient's statements be
received with suspicion if they deviate too greatly from common experience without adequate explanation. Yet each person is his or her own decisionmaker, no matter how "unreasonable" the decisions made, because each is ultimately responsible
for the outcomes of the decisions. To judge the refusal of a
blood transfusion during surgery under the lens of the ordinary,
prudent person is to deny the patient-subject with special "fears
and hopes," 197 or the religious beliefs of a Jehovah's Witness,
the right to make a decision.
Even without the "reasonable person" overlay, the negligence standard needs some refinement, lest it focus on the "but
possibly-unconsented medical procedure was so great as to prevent the injured party
from testifying, just as defendants who killed their victims, before Lord Campbell's
Act, were less in jeopardy than those whose conduct had not been fatal. The Aiken
court said nothing, however, to indicate that in the ordinary case the jury ought not
look to the plaintiff's own decisionmaking in assessing causation.
195Materiality and causation should be treated by the same standard in part
because they are inseparable concepts. For a piece of information to be material to
the patient-subject's decision must mean that the decision might come out differently
without that information.
196 Note, Informed Consent and the Dying Patient, 83 YALE L.J. 1632, 1642 (1974);
accord, Wilkinson v. Vesey, 110 R.I. 606, 629, 295 A.2d 676, 690 (1972). Contra, Waltz
& Scheuneman, supra note 20, at 647.
197Cobbs v. Grant, 8 Cal. 3d 229, 243, 502 P.2d 1, 10, 104 Cal. Rptr. 505, 514
(1972).
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for" nature of the particular piece of information which was
withheld. If the courts are serious in seeking to promote rational decisionmaking, the fractionization of thinking hypothesized by such a theory of causation has no place. A single fact
(not limited to facts about danger) may not seem important, but
decisionmaking is not a matter of single facts but of relating
many diverse facts, some "large" and others "small," to one another. 19 8 The question of causation can therefore best be resolved by determining whether the patient-subject was injured
in a way related to the information which was withheld. If the
information which the jury determines the physician-investigator should have disclosed (using the standard of materiality
previously set forth) would have led the patient-subject to decline the operation, the latter should be able to recover for any
injuries. The extent of this liability has apparently been too
great for some courts to accept, 19 9 although it is the logical con195 In discussing materiality, the District of Columbia court rejected the polar views
that all risks, no matter how slight, must be revealed, see Oppenheim, Informed Consent to Medical Treatment, 11 CLEV.-MAR. L. REV. 249, 264-65 (1962); Comment, Valid
Consent to Medical Treatment: Need the Patient Know?, 4 DUQUESNE L. REV. 450, 457-58
(1966), and that only risks that would lead the patient to decline treatment must be
divulged, see Johnson, Medical Malpractice-Doctrinesof Res Ipsa Loquitur and Informed
Consent, 37 U. CoLo. L. REV. 182, 185-91 (1965); Comment, Informed Consent in Medical
Malpractice, 55 CALIF. L. REV. 1396, 1407 n.68 (1967), because "while a single risk might
not have that effect, two or more might do so." Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772,
788 n.89 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1064 (1972). "Risks" may be the primary
items of concern to patient-subjects, but other facts-concerning, for example, discomforts, restrictions on permissible activities, and degree of eventual recovery-are
also important and sometimes determinative. See, e.g., P. RAMSEY, THE PATIENT AS
PERSON 225-27, 235-38 (1970); Daly, Don't Wave Goodbye, 4 HASTINGS CENTER REP.,

Nov. 1974, at 7 (recounting the different expectations held by the author-patient and
her physicians about the outcome of her treatment); text accompanying note 63
supra. The cases frequently take a view of what needs to be communicated that goes
well beyond solely "risks," but it has apparently never been the point at issue in litigation. For instance, in granting plaintiff's motion for summary judgment against her
physician for injuries resulting from an operation performed without informed
consent, an Ohio trial court defined the items to be communicated as "the nature of
the probable consequences, risks and hazards of this procedure, and
the surgery ....
the benefits that can be anticipated from this procedure." Congrove v. Holmes, 37
Ohio Misc. 95, 101, 308 N.E.2d 765, 769 (C.P. Ross County 1973).
199 See, e.g., Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772, 790 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied,
409 U.S. 1064 (1972) ("unrevealed risk that should have been made known must
materialize"). The Rhode Island supreme court appears to accept the broader definition of compensable injury in declaring that plaintiff prevails when he proves (1) a
causal connection between the defendant's failure to inform him and his consent
and (2) "that he had been injured as a result of submitting to the procedure." Wilkinson v. Vesey, 110 R.I. 606, 629, 295 A.2d 676, 690 (1972) (citing Shetter v. Rochelle,
2 Ariz. App. 358, 409 P.2d 74 (1965)); the California supreme court did not advert to
this issue in Cobbs v. Grant, 8 Cal. 3d 229, 502 P.2d 1, 104 Cal. Rptr. 505 (1972).
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clusion from their premise that "it is the prerogative of the patient . . . to determine for himself the direction in which his
interests seem to lie."20 °
The rationale for allowing recovery is that although the patient may have been satisfied with a stated risk of x that A would
occur, he would not have proceeded had he known that the risk
was x' and/or that there was a y risk of B occurring, that "cure"
would still leave him seriously impaired, and so forth.20 1 In
many instances, the alternative to the treatment undertaken is
not to forego treatment altogether but to undertake another
mode of treatment,2 0 2 with its own set of projected risks and
benefits; 20 3 particularly in the treatment of catastrophic illness,
for which many interventions are still experimental, the alternative is typically a more conservative procedure which is less
risky but which promises less than a complete cure. Certainly,
this is the sort of choice which should be governed by "the patient's right to be the final judge to do with his body as he
wills."

20 4

200 Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772, 781 (D.C. Cir.) (footnote omitted), cert.
denied, 409 U.S. 1064 (1972); accord, Cobbs v. Grant, 8 Cal. 3d 229, 242, 502 P.2d 1, 10,
104 Cal. Rptr. 505, 514 (1972); Wilkinson v. Vesey, 110 R.I. 606, 625, 295 A.2d 676,
688 (1972).
201 Two commentators have argued that even limiting recovery to the occurrence
of a risk which was not disclosed, see Natanson v. Kline, 186 Kan. 393, 411, 350 P.2d
1093, 1107, clarified and rehearing denied, 187 Kan. 186, 354 P.2d 670 (1960) (dictum),
is"unduly harsh" on physicians, Waltz & Scheuneman, supra note 20, at 649. They
suggest that damages be calculated as "the difference between [the patient's] condition
with no treatment and his condition after the undisclosed risk materialized." While
not impossible of estimation, this assessment would seem to open the door to highly
hypothetical speculation, see note 194 supra.
202 Or another alternative may be to delay the proposed treatment "in order to
attend to personal or business matters," Note, supra note 196, at 1641 (footnote
omitted); the Note writer suggests that damages are properly gauged by "the malpractice measure: the damage resulting from the breach of duty." In informed consent
this is "the materialized undisclosed risk," as Natanson suggested. Id. A remaining
problem with the Natanson formulation is that it ignores the situation in which an
operation would have been declined on grounds other than an undisclosed risk.
See note 198 supra & accompanying text.
203 As is admitted by the proponents of limiting damages by looking to the patient's hypothetical condition without treatment, the possibility of alternative treatments makes the case "more difficult." "A new variable would then be introduced-the
probability of use of a technique that did not involve the risk [that materialized]. It is
possible that this imponderable would justify reverting to the more stringent Natanson
measure of damages." Waltz & Scheuneman, supra note 20, at 649.
204 Wilkinson v. Vesey, 110 R.I. 606, 625, 295 A.2d 676, 688 (1972). Although
a physician may not be competent to offer all the alternative forms of treatment himself, see Kessenick & Mankin, supra note 20, at 279, he is still obliged to acquaint the
patient with general information about them and to point the patient to another
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This formulation uses the negligence standard of "cause
in fact" but broadens it by looking to the subjective decisionmaking of the individual plaintiff. The result is, however, less
sweeping than the measurement of injury provided by the battery approach. It seems appropriate to modify the latter, which
would permit recovery for a dignitary injury without any showing of actual harm. Although the informed consent cause of
action is intended in part to protect the dignity and autonomy
of patient-subjects, this protection must be seen in the context of the risk-taking inherent in the treatment of, and research on, disease. Thus, the primary purpose of the doctrine is
to hold physician-investigators, rather than patient-subjects,
responsible for the harm inflicted when risks materialize if the
agreement of the patient-subjects to enlist in the undertaking
was not fully informed and voluntary. The punitive aspects of a
battery action would therefore not ordinarily be appropriate;
where the conduct of the physician justifies recovery for an
intentionally wrongful invasion of the plaintiff's interests, such
action should be maintained under a separate heading, as a
battery rather than as a breach of the duty to obtain informed
consent.
C.

"Consent"for the Legally Incompetent

"Consent" for a procedure in catastrophic disease research
and treatment must sometimes be sought from someone other
than the patient-subject, since he is often legally incompetent.
For example, when a patient is admitted to an emergency room,
his condition may be such (due, for example, to a cardiac arrest
or acute renal failure) that he is unable to participate in the deliberations about his treatment, and the decision must then be
made instead by a member of his family. This was the situation
with the first heart transplant in man, in which the recipient's
sister gave permission for the operation. 20 5 Additionally, many
of the initial clinical trials of transplant procedures (renal grafts
in the 1950's and bone marrow currently) have been performed
health professional who performs the treatment. At the least, a physician-defendant
should not be heard to complain if the patient-plaintiff introduces proof that had he
chosen another therapeutic modality-to which the defendant failed to alert himhis injuries would have been nonexistent or greatly reduced.
205 See Hardy & Chavez, The First Heart Transplant in Man-Historical Reexamination of the 1964 Case in the Light of Current Clinical Experience, 1 TRANSPLANT PROc. 717,
721 (1969).
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on children, who because of their age lack the legal, and often
20 6
the actual, capacity to consent.
The problems of intervening medically with the legally incompetent is usually resolved by reliance on what is termed
"proxy consent." As an initial matter, it is necessary to distinguish between interventions which involve routine treatment
and those which partake of the experimental. The former
seldom raise serious problems in practice, although as a theoretical matter difficulties arise whenever one person is given
power over another. The customary way to minimize these difficulties is to place the power with someone thought to be closely
identified with the patient and who has interests highly congruent to his. This is typically the patient's parent, spouse, or
other close relative, although it is recognized that occasionally
the dangers of an abuse of power may be exacerbated rather
than reduced when the persons involved are members of the
same family. Yet there are reasons of sentiment, convenience
and even good sense for this allocation of authority,2 0 7 and it is
2 6

" See Curran, A Problem of Consent-Kidney Transplantationin Minors, 34 N.Y.U.L.
REV. 891 (1959).
In some instances the status of the minor-as "patient" or "subject"-is not clearly
defined. This is illustrated by a case recounted by Dr. Francis Moore, the head surgeon at Peter Bent Brigham Hospital in Boston, where much of the pioneering renal
transplant research took place in the 1950's. One early kidney recipient, Mrs. L.,
was given massive radiation treatment and then injections of bone marrow from 11
donors to restore health to her system and (it was hoped) to achieve "cross-acceptance"
of the eventual kidney graft. Then a questionable step was taken:
As the days went by, it appeared inadvisable to take a kidney from a
healthy normal donor. There were too many uncertainties and unknown
variables in the plan. Therefore, a kidney that had to be removed from a
young child having the hydrocephalus operation was placed in the patient's
right thigh by Dr. Murray ....
Just before the kidney graft, the patient received another 170 million
bone marrow cells from the same donor who gave the kidney. Thus, by adding
this procedure, the identity of donor for both marrow and kidney was
achieved.
F. MOORE, TRANSPLANT: THE GIVE AND TAKE OF ORGAN TRANSPLANTATION 115 (1972).
Dr. Moore goes on to tell how the four week survival of the kidney graft in Mrs. L.
(who died of bleeding because the bone marrow injections were unsuccessful in restoring her platelet level) was a key event in the history of transplantation, since it
showed that if the immunological barrier were sufficiently incapacitated, a transplanted
organ could survive. No mention is made of the problematic nature of taking 170
million bone marrow cells from the infant kidney donor (apparently with the permission of his parents). Moore earlier observed that marrow donation "does not harm
the donor at all," yet like all medical procedures it does carry some risk, pain and inconvenience. Indeed, officials of the National Institutes of Health have felt the need to
seek judicial approval before aspirating bone marrow from minors for transplantation
to their siblings. See note 209 infra.
207 There are any number of explanations for this societal allocation of author-
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a practice which is so well known in society at large that any individual who finds the prospect particularly odious has ample
warning to make other arrangements better suited to protecting his own ends or interests.
More troublesome problems are raised when consent is
sought for an experimental intervention or one which is otherwise not solely for the patient's benefit. It is generally assumed,
though not authoritatively established, that a guardian lacks
the authority to give consent in such circumstances. This issue
has been raised in a number of the kidney transplants involving
identical twins 20 8 and bone marrow transplants between siblings. 2 0 9 Where the potential donor is a minor, the apparent
rule that a parent cannot consent to a nonbeneficial operation
has been side-stepped by the courts' finding that the healthy
child would benefit from the operation because the risk of emotional disturbance would be reduced. The decisions in the first
cases, involving kidney transplants in teenage twins at the Peter
Bent Brigham Hospital in Boston, have proven very influential
with subsequent courts faced with similar issues. Therefore, it
is particularly significant that in one of those cases the court
went so far as to rule-after shifting the ultimate decision as to
ity [in the case of parental consent for interventions in their children]: respect
for the family and a desire to foster the diversity it brings; the fitness of giving
the power to decide to the same people who created the child and have the
duty to support and protect him; the belief that a child cannot be much
harmed by parental choices which fall within the range permitted by society
and a willingness to bear the risks of harm this allocation entails or a belief
that in most cases "harm" would be hard for society to distill and measure
anyway; or simply the conclusion that the administrative costs of giving
authority to anyone but the parents outweigh the risks for children and
for society unless the parents are shown [in a particular case] to be unable
to exercise their authority adequately.
Capron, Legal Considerations Affecting Clinical Pharmacological Studies in Children, 21
CLINICAL RESEARCH 141, 146 (1973) (arguing for a model of "successive limited approximations" under which authority to give permission might in some instances not
be lodged with parents).
208 Hart v. Brown, 29 Conn. Supp. 368, 289 A.2d 386 (1972); Strunk v. Strunk,
445 S.W.2d 145 (Ky. 1969); Foster v. Harrison, Eq. No. 68674 (Mass. Sup. Jud. Ct.,
Nov. 20, 1957); Huskey v. Harrison, Eq. No. 68666 (Mass. Sup. Jud. Ct., Aug. 30,
1957); Masden v. Harrison, Eq. No. 68651 (Mass. Sup. Jud. Ct., June 12, 1957).
209 During 1971 and 1972, the National Institutes of Health received permission
from the Maryland Circuit Court for Montgomery County to undertake bone marrow
transplants from minor donors to their ailing siblings in a series of five cases. In re
Sharpe, Eq. No. 44478 (Cir. Ct. Montgomery County, Md., Dec. 28, 1973); In re Landry, Eq. No. 44338 (Cir. Ct. Montgomery County, Md., Sept. 5, 1973); In re Martin,
Eq. No. 44602 (Cir. Ct. Montgomery County, Md., Oct. 20, 1972); In re Jones, Eq. No.
44601 (Cir. Ct. Montgomery County, Md., Oct. 11, 1972); Smith v. Smith, Eq. No.
43919 (Cir. Ct. Montgomery County, Md., July 19, 1972).
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risks and benefits back to the physicians, "if [they] decide to
perform the operation"--that the operation was not merely
permissible but "necessary to [the well twin's] future welfare
and happiness."21 0
This rather unsatisfactory handling of the issue invites a
number of responses. First, one might simply conclude, with
Professor David Daube, that "[c]hildren should on no account
be donors, and there should be no cheating by maintaining,
for example, that the child would suffer a trauma if he were
21
not allowed to give his twin a kidney or whatever it might be." '
Recent bone marrow transplants have presented this issue
squarely to the judiciary because in at least one case a prospective donor was so young that any "psychological injury" from
the death of the older, ailing sibling which resulted from the
transplant being withheld was too dubious even to have been
pleaded in the petition. Yet the petition was granted, without
any attempt to justify the exposure of the nonconsenting child
21 2
to an uncompensated risk.
The necessity of seeking judicial approval in such circumstances appears to be denied by the position advanced by Professors Henry Beecher and William Curran. Their argument,
diametrically opposed to that of Daube, is that American
statutes, medical codes, and cases permit patients to give consent
for medical interventions of no direct, and in some instances,
no indirect, benefit to their child.2 1 3 They read the leading case
in this area, Bonner v. Moran,21 4 which involved the validity of a
210 Foster v. Harrison, Eq. No. 68674 (Mass. Sup. Jud. Ct., Nov. 20, 1957). When
attempting to make a rule about a guardian's power to consent to nonbeneficial interventions, those drawing on the Massachusetts cases and their progeny seldom acknowledge the particular problems involved in such a situation where the guardian (parent)
had a conflict of interest between helping the sick twin and protecting the well one,
although this factor probably explains, at least in part, why the cases were litigated in
the first place. Cf. Shaw, Dilemmas of "Informed Consent" in Children, 289 NEW ENG. J.
MED. 885 (1973).
211 Daube, Transplantation: Acceptability of Procedures and the Required Legal Sanc-

tions,

in ETHICS IN MEDICAL PROGRESS: WITH SPECIAL REFERENCE TO TRANSPLANTATION

188, 198 (G. Wolstenholme & M. O'Connor eds. 1966).

2121n re Martin, Eq. No. 44602 (Cir. Ct. Montgomery County, Md., Oct. 20, 1972).
213 Curran & Beecher, Experimentation in Children, 210 J.A.M.A. 77 (1969).
214 126 F.2d 121 (D.C. Cir. 1941). The trial court had told the jury in Bonner that
it could find that no parental approval was necessary for the fifteen-year-old plaintiff to have given valid consent to donate the skin graft if he was "capable of appreciating the nature, extent and consequences of the invasion." Id. at 122 (paraphrasing
RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 59 (1934)). The jury found for the doctor-defendant, and on
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fifteen-year-old's donation of skin grafts to his cousin, to hold
"that such procedures can be legally permitted as long as the
parents (or other guardians) consent to the procedure."2 15 This
casts more weight onto the opinion than it can bear. The actual
ground for the decision appears to be that the young donor
was simply too immature to give valid consent to the procedure,
with the suggestion that there were no benefits to him being
merely a judicial observation. (After all, the reasons which were
given by the court for why his mother might have consentedthe newspaper acclaim and scholarship donations-are benefits
which apply equally to the boy.) Moreover, the case is really one
of a parent ratifying the consent of a youngster, rather than of a
parent making the choice instead of the child's making it. The
Bonner court nowhere suggests that a parent has independent
authority to give consent for a "nonbeneficial" intervention
in a child who is too young to give any consent or who opposes
the intervention. This question remains unsettled, and the
singularity of Bonner emphasizes that the judiciary has otherwise gone out of its way to avoid having to rule on this issue.
Although Professor Daube's position has more support in
current law, it seems unlikely to persuade decisionmakers such
as judges. Indeed, its uncompromising refusal to admit that
there may be situations in which the very great benefits to be
gained counterbalance small risks to an incompetent may be reflected in the less than candid way that "compromises" in this
area have appeared in the case law. Midway between the poles
of Daube and Curran-Beecher lies a formulation which builds
on the present system in allowing permission for nonbeneficial interventions to be given on behalf of incompetents by
someone, 2 16 but which demands a clearer recognition of the
competing interests. Only by acknowledging that certain interests are at war and then by attempting to balance them in
each case can progress be made toward a satisfactory resolution
appeal the court reversed. It held that the consent of an "immature colored boy" was
not sufficient for an operation on himself that was not for his benefit and that was "so
involved in its technique as to require a mature mind to understand precisely what

the donor was offering to give." Id. at 123. The case was returned to the lower court
for a retrial in which the jury was to be instructed that the surgeon was liable unless

the boy's mother had given her consent, directly or by implication.
215Curran & Beecher, supra note 213, at 79.
216 The authority to give permission need not, however, be vested as it presently

is. See Capron, supra note 207, at 145-48.
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of this problem. On the one hand, there is the interest a person
has in being protected from abuse and exploitation should he
become unable to protect himself. On the other hand, each person has an interest in not having the right to choose taken
away while he is still able to make choices which reflect his own
view of his goals and values.
In the case of the adult competent to make his own choices,
the former interest is protected through the latter. For someone
who is legally incompetent, however, the latter interest does not
operate, and attention is focused entirely upon the former.
This has led to varied attempts to subject the "informed consent" given by one person for another to the analysis used for
regular informed consent. Yet the model plainly does not attempt to answer when, for what reasons, and by whom permission may be given in lieu of personal informed consent. Indeed,
a small but definite advance in analysis could be achieved by
ceasing to call such substitute permission "consent." This would
indicate that different considerations apply when talking about
such permission from a guardian than when a person gives
consent for interventions into his or her own sphere of privacy
and bodily integrity. The reasons for relying on consent which
were discussed earlier in this Article all relate back to the respect
owing the individual and his right to autonomy and dignity.
Wherever possible, the law tries not to second-guess decisions
which a person makes for himself, once it is apparent that the
framework within which the decisions are made is one which
permits voluntary, knowledgeable consent. Just as the law must
be concerned that as a general principle patient-subjects are
adequately protected by the methods that are employed to gain
consent, so too it must give meaning to the process of making a
choice by holding the parties to the burdens and costs inherent
in their choices. Where the permission is given on behalf of
someone else, however, these considerations do not attach.
Accordingly, it would not only be acceptable but also advisable
for such grants of permission to be subject to review as to their
competency and motivation, so as to screen out those which
are made maliciously or unwisely. 21 7 This only serves, however,
2'7 An initial attempt at devising special protections for children and other nonconsenting subjects of biomedical and behavioral research appears in U.S. Dep't of
Health, Education, and Welfare, National Institutes of Health, Protection of Human Subjects-Policies and Procedures, 38 Fed. Reg. 31738 (1973), which has been
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to emphasize the importance of keeping analytically separate
the "permission" and "consent" situations, so that the process
of scrutiny and possible rejection which is appropriate in permission cases will not erroneously be carried over to the case
where a person "unwisely" consents to a medical procedure on
himself.
IV. EPILOGUE
The law of informed consent is still very much in a process
of evolution and has not yet developed to a point coincident
with the "model" of decisionmaking that was derived from the
functional analysis earlier in this Article. The action for a violation of the duty to obtain informed consent owes more to the
law of negligence than of trespass, but it is an amalgam of both.
To the extent that "reasonableness" sets the standard, the better
view is that the conduct being judged be that of the physician
(in ascertaining whether the patient comprehends the proposed
intervention and assents voluntarily to its performance) and not
that of the patient.
The evolutionary development of the law not only reflects
the incremental cast of judicial thinking, but very properly permits conduct to be adjusted over time, rather than at a fell
swoop, to changes in requirements set by the law. It may be too

much to hope that legal rules will have any great impact on
most types of human behavior; but that premise seems less
unrealistic for medical practice than for other activities, given

physicians' concern to avoid liability.2 1 8 There is no reliable
way to predict the effects which the unfolding rules on informed consent will have on the amount of litigation,2

19

but

they should at least not increase it if health professionals adjust
their conduct. 220 If the law is to provide reasonable protection
partially revised and published as proposed amendments to departmental guidelines
on human experimentation, U.S. Dep't of Health, Education, and Welfare, Protection of Human Subjects-Proposed Policy, 39 Fed. Reg. 30648 (1974).
2" This concern is reflected in the activities of insurance carriers and professional associations. See, e.g., Kessenick & Mankin, supra note 20, at 261-62 (describing
educational campaign of California Medical Association in the wake of the Cobbs decision).
219 An accurate prediction is no more possible than knowing whether the model
of decisionmaking propounded here will increase or decrease the total cost of medical
care.
220 As suggested by Irving Janis, see note 114 supra & accompanying text, the patient who is prepared for the risks, discomfort, and other consequences of his treatment is better equipped to deal with it without emotional disturbance. Consequently,
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for the interests of patient-subjects, such a change in the behavior of physician-investigators seems the most likely to succeed. Neither prospective review by a physician-investigator's
colleagues and others (which is required in the case of experimentation 221 and sometimes employed in other cases 222 ) nor
retrospective review through litigation or professional censure
is likely to safeguard those interests adequately.
The importance of physician-investigators' adjusting their
behavior according to the model of informed decisionmaking
223
is made painfully clear by the Houston artificial heart case.
2 24
It is apparent that the existing means of control failed there.
The case, however, not only demonstrates the need for informed consent, but also illustrates the barriers to its achievement.
The failure of the Houston artificial heart team to make
Haskell Karp a knowledgeable collaborator came back to haunt
them even though they eventually escaped legal liability. Their
experience, although in some ways unique, points up an aspect
of the informing process seldom considered in the cases: the
degree to which treatment plans for the patient are to be disclosed to his relatives. Revelations of diagnosis or plans to anyone but the patient without his consent violate the physician's
ethical and legal obligations of confidentiality, despite the offhand endorsement of such a practice by courts and scholars
when, in the exercise of his "therapeutic privilege, '

225

a physi-

cian proceeds with treatment without having obtained his paa physician who is candid with his patients is less likely to become the subject of their
"bitterness," as the courts seem to fear, see Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772, 791
(D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1064 (1972), and as Dr. Janis found in uninformed
patients who railed against their doctors as "amateurs" and expressed great annoyance
at not being told what to expect. I. JANIs, supra note 114, at 359.
221 See 45 C.F.R. Part 46 (1975); 39 Fed. Reg. 18914 (1974).
222 Professors Parsons, Fox, and Lidz recount how physicians are "[w]idening
the orbit of colleagues whose advice they seek" outside of medicine into ethics, law,
and social science, not only for ex post facto analyses of cases or discussions of general
principles, but also while the physicians are still deliberating about what course to
take. Parsons, Fox & Lidz, supra note 97, at 410.
222 See notes 1-16 supra & accompanying text.
224 Although they conclude that Mrs. Karp's lawsuit against her husband's doctors
was, more than any other "formal and informal sanctions," the "strongest action taken
in the case of the artificial heart," Professors Fox and Swazey nevertheless doubt that
"persons like Haskell Karp, on whom therapeutic innovations are tried, are adequately
protected by the present legal process." R. Fox & J. SWAZEY, THE COURAGE TO FAIL: A
SOCIAL VIEW OF ORGAN TRANSPLANTS AND DIALYSIS 210-11 (1974).
222 See note 176 supra.
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tient's informed consent. 226 A patient may, of course, permit

disclosure, through an explicit or, as would appear to have
been the case with Mr. Karp, implicit waiver of the duty of confidentiality. The unusual aspect of the Karp-Cooley case is that
the information given to Mrs. Karp was relevant not only to
her husband's treatment, but to the demands which were placed
on her to assist the transplant team in obtaining a donor. In
her pleas, issued by the hospital's publicity office, she extolled
Drs. Cooley and Liotta as gifted, God-given saviors of dying
patients. 22

7

This cannot help but have increased her bitterness

when, having lost her husband despite the doctors' high expectations, she concluded that the men she had praised so highly
had misled and exploited her.
In addition to avoiding the bitterness of disappointed expectations, adherence to the informed consent model would
have performed a number of other basic functions in the artificial heart case. It would, most fundamentally, have protected
Mr. Karp's autonomy and dignity as the first patient-subject
for a radical innovation in treatment. His widow contended on
appeal
that Mr. Karp was not told about the number of
animals tested or the results of those tests; that he was
not told there was a chance of permanent injury to his
body by the mechanical heart, that complete renal
shutdown could result from the use of the prosthesis,
that the device was "completely experimental" ....

22

Such information was of particular importance in this case because there was apparently some attempt to falsify the results
of experiments with the artificial heart in calves, 22 9 and because
the results of those experiments led Dr. DeBakey and his col226 See, e.g., Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772, 789 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied,
409 U.S. 1064 (1972); 75 HARV. L. REv. 1445, 1448 (1962).
227 R. Fox & J. SWAZEY, supra note 224, at 152.
228 Karp v. Cooley, 493 F.2d 408, 420 (5th Cir. 1974).
229 Dr. Liotta apparently submitted an abstract describing ten successful trials of
the pump in calves before having begun the first experiment; the series was eventually
limited to seven, not ten, calves, implanted between January 30 and March 20, 1969.
Four of them died on the operating table; the other three all had renal failure and
general weakness before dying at 8 , 12 , and 44 hours. R. Fox & J. SwAZEY, supra
note 224, at 159-60. Dr. Cooley publicly suggested that other animal experiments had
been conducted by his team, Schmeck, Dr. Cooley Defends His Use of ArtificialHeart to
Save Patient, N.Y. Times, Apr. 11, 1969, at 31, col. 4, but he never published the resuits.
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laborators to conclude that use of the heart device in humans
was premature.

230

The lack of candor to which Mr. Karp was treated may
only reflect the secrecy with which the entire production was
shrouded by the principal actors; with the exception of Dr.
Liotta, none of the persons who aided Dr. Cooley were informed decisionmakers. 23 1 Behind the secrecy lay Denton
Cooley's apparent desire to achieve another "first, ' 232 which

was complicated by the tangled question of the "authorship"
of the artificial heart. 233 These factors may also explain why, in
violation of HEW rules, the protocol was not reviewed. In addition to the usual displeasure with the delay inherent in such review which is expressed by researchers who are "racing to establish priority of discovery or those who feel that some case or
'23 4
situation presents them with 'now or never' opportunities,
Dr. Cooley may have feared that if the project had become
known it would not have been permitted to continue. 235 Thus,

the rules for informed consent would in all likelihood have
had the indirect effect, had they been honored, of preventing
the implantation, because the review procedure, intended in
part to approve the format of consent, would have lifted the
veil of concealment from the plans.
Just as it illustrates the need for informed consent, Karp v.
Cooley also makes apparent the difficulties which will be faced
by the participants in the decisionmaking process, particularly
230

See DeBakey & Hall, supra note 13, at 142; Letter from Dr. Michael DeBakey

to Dr. Harold Brown, July 1969 (quoted in R. Fox & J. SWAzEY, supra note 224, at 175).
231 See note 66 supra & accompanying text.
232 See, e.g., H. MINETREE, COOLEY: THE CAREER OF A GREAT HEART SURGEON 2125 (1973).
233 Professors Fox and Swazey provide a particularly illuminating analysis of this
question. See R. Fox & J. SWAZEY, supra note 224, at 167-70.
234 BARBER, supra note 35, at 150.
235 Dr. DeBakey was not only unaware of the implantation in advance; it was conducted on a day that he was away from Houston. T. THOMPSON, HEARTS: OF SURGEONS

AND

TRANSPLANTS,

MIRACLES

AND

DISASTERS

ALONG THE CARDIAC

FRONTIER

212 (1971). Dr. Cooley has offered an unabashed defense of his conduct, based on the
belief
that he had not only the right, but in a sense the obligation to bypass his
"seniors," the Baylor Committee on Research Involving Human Beings and a
"government agency," as he did in conducting the implantation without informing any of them. He has argued that his status at the summit of cardiac
surgery permitted this and that the nature of the situation required such
bold and secretive action.
R. Fox & J. SWAZEY, supra note 224, at 194.
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in cases of catastrophic illness. First, there are the problems
of the emotional bonds created by the physician-patient relationship. Haskell Karp, after years of suffering, 2 36 flew to Houston to be treated by a world-famous surgeon after his own
medical advisors felt there was nothing more they could do. It
is not difficult to imagine the hopes which he attached to his
medical odyssey, and he felt Dr. Cooley to be the force which
was driving him onward.2 37 The transference process ran the
other way as well: The surgeon, rushing ahead with his urgent
plans, perceived the impatience not in himself but in Mr.
Karp. 23 8 Each may have been able to allay his own anxiety by

attributing greater sureness to the other than he actually possessed-although Mr. Karp's lack of knowledge plainly tinged
with uncertainty any assurance he derived from Dr. Cooley's
inspiration.
A second difficulty is closely related to the first. Even had
Mr. Karp been better informed, could he have decided against
the operation? For patients suffering and near death, 3 9 is there
a real chance of turning away from any measure which offers
the possibility of recovery? Perhaps the answer to the question is moot-so long as choices have to be made in desperate
medical straits (and they do), the coercion inherent in the situation may have to be overlooked even though it denies the patient the freedom to say "no." Yet the Houston case suggests
that such a pessimistic verdict is not justified. Indeed, in the
face of death, Haskell Karp continued to insist for weeks that
all he wanted was the ventricular resection, not the more radi236 Mrs. Karp is said to have told Dr. Cooley, "My husband had already died a
thousand times," H. MINETREE, supra note 232 at 8, which reflects both his pain and his
desperation.
237 Such, at least, was Mrs. Karp's recollection. See Karp v. Cooley, 493 F.2d 408,
413 (5th Cir. 1974).
238
Id. at 414. Dr. Cooley may also have been sensitive to any signs of impatience
on the Karps' part because he was aware that the delay in the operation was due in part
to the time needed to prepare for the artificial heart maneuver. See R. Fox "& J.
SWAZEY, supra note 224, at 161-64, 166-67.
239 Karp, for example, "had incurred four heart attacks, thirteen cardiac hospitalizations and considerable medical care culminating in the insertion of an electronic
pacemaker in May, 1968. Subsequent hospitalizations in September and October,
1968 occurred," Karp v. Cooley, 493 F.2d 408, 412 (5th Cir. 1974), during which "his
pacemaker rate was increased to 72 beats per minute" and diagnostic procedures revealed "three vessel disease, occluded right coronary [artery], and ... anterior descending and circumflex branches [which] were occluded somewhat distally." Karp v.
Cooley, 349 F. Supp. 827, 829 (S.D. Tex. 1972), aff'd, 493 F.2d 408 (5th Cir. 1974).
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cal transplant pressed on him by Dr. Cooley. There is every
reason to suppose that for every patient who seeks out the
daring medical innovator, there is at least one other patient
who is satisfied with conventional (if less promising) treatment
or with no treatment at all.
Finally, the possibility of achieving informed consent is
reduced by the difficulties in communication made apparent
by the artificial heart case. Dr. Cooley is an extremely busy cardiac surgeon. He had four other open-heart operations on the
same day as Karp's, and he had to expedite the previous surgery
when the anesthesiologist sent word that the operation should
not be delayed because Mr. Karp was in poor shape.2 40 Due to
the press of his cases, and perhaps to a reluctance to confront
his own fears and uncertainties over what he planned to do ,241
Dr. Cooley had seen Mr. Karp only occasionally, and then at
hours as late as 10:30 p.m. Moreover, the delicacy of the matter
of the heart pump's origin and ownership doubtless contributed to the ambiguous way in which Dr. Cooley conveyed to
Mr. Karp the nature of his own involvement and experience
24 2
with the device.
In light of the apparent needs for informed consent and
for a creative attempt to overcome the limitations that inhere
in decisionmaking about medical innovation, the judicial decisions in Karp v. Cooley are particularly disappointing. Neither
the district nor the appellate court went as far as what Circuit
Judge Bell termed the "minority" Canterbury rule, 243 to say
nothing of the further refinements developed above. Although
the decisions can be explained in large measure as resulting
from the "well-settled and stringent" 244 Texas case law, 2 45 which
requires expert testimony on the reasonableness of disclosure,
they must also be ascribed to the courts' weighing of the evidence 246 and especially to their exclusion of some evidence
241 See 493 F.2d at 416.
241 See Katz, supra note 71, at 787.
242 Beyond this ambiguity, Mrs. Karp's testimony adds another. According to her,

the artificial heart was explained to her husband and herself as just a "newer model"
of the regular heart-lung bypass machine used during open-heart surgery. Karp v.
Cooley,
493 F.2d 408, 413 (5th Cir. 1974).
43
ld. at 419 n.ll.
24 4
Id.at 419.
245 See Wilson v. Scott, 412 S.W.2d 299 (Tex. 1967).
246 See notes 4-5 supra & accompanying text.
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which might well have provided the factual predicate required
2 47
by Texas law.
Beyond the question whether the case was correctly decided (which would require examination of issues other than
informed consent vel non), the Karp case is also valuable for the
light it sheds on the importance of the rules about disclosure,
comprehension, and causation which have been urged here as
the proper aims of the developing law of informed consent.
The courts found the plaintiffs' evidence of inadequate
disclosure not to be supported by the necessary expert testimony. A more dramatic demonstration of the vagaries and
injustice of the expert testimony requirement is difficult to
imagine. As the district judge observed, "[t]he only testimony
247 Of the three pieces of evidence excluded, the testimony of Dr. DeBakey was
probably most central to plaintiffs' case. Professors Fox and Swazey nicely summarize
the lay disbelief that the exclusion of evidence is proper when it seems to serve "more
as a deterrent than as an aid to the truth's being fully known ...."
The judge's holding that DeBakey's testimony was not "evidence of any
probative value to present to the jury" is hard to understand or justify.
DeBakey surely was a singularly important expert witness. Personally and
professionally, he had intimate and perhaps unique knowledge of many
facets of the case. Furthermore, the brief on appeal filed by the plaintiff contains extensive verbatim materials from DeBakey's "excluded testimony" that
seem highly relevant to what Mrs. Karp's lawyer was attempting to argue, and
appropriate for a jury's impartial determination:
Dr. Michael DeBakey's excluded testimony indicates that "the
pump was not ready for use in human beings" because in reasonable
medical probability its use "will jeopardize the life of the individual,"
and on that basis it was not acceptable medical practice in April of
1969 to use a mechanical heart of this kind in a patient. As of date of
trial, he "still would not recommend it on the basis of our experimental observations." His review of the Karp surgery indicated a deterioration of renal functions and "this is a pattern of part of the
picture of the terminal events that take place in animals" from their
experiences with the mechanical heart.
On deposition, Dr. DeBakey stated Dr. Cooley was subject to the
rule requiring prior approval of the Human Research Committee of
the College, and that if he did not have approval of this committee
he would violate this rule in using the heart device.

One might ask why a physician-because he has an "international
reputation," and because a potentially "inflammatory situation" exists between him and a fellow physician who is the defendant in a case-should be
granted the option of refusing to testify in open court. This would not have
happened with any ordinary citizen, or probably even any ordinary physician. Perhaps under the glare of a public courtroom hearing, DeBakey
might have been reluctant to assert that privilege ....
The interplay of factors that led Judge Singleton to make the decision
he did could well constitute a study in itself.
R. Fox &J. SWAZEY, supra note 224, at 208, 210 (footnote omitted).

UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA

LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 123:340

presented by doctors from this community in the same or
similar school, on the information given to patients about their
surgeries in this community" was "that each doctor must use his
own medical judgment. 21 48 Yet this amounts to no standard at
all. Moreover, the emphasis on local standards rings particularly oddly when one is dealing with physicians who draw
their patients from around the nation. The potential for the
medical profession, under the "expert" requirement, to prevent
justice from being done is starkly displayed in Michael DeBakey's refusal to testify, in which he was upheld by the courts.
There is no question of DeBakey's disapproval of what Denton Cooley had done; he was angered at what he believed to be
the piracy of a medical invention from his laboratory, embarrassed at being surprised in front of his peers by the surgery of
which he had been kept ignorant, and concerned that the National Heart Institute, which had funded the Baylor-Rice artificial heart program, might withdraw its support. A number
of investigations were launched, and "DeBakey built a careful
case against Cooley. ''2 49 But, having achieved quick "vengeance"
within the privacy of the medical fraternity and of his own medical school, 250 DeBakey apparently felt that "'the need to punish
Cooley for what he had done' ",251 had been fulfilled. Citing
the very intensity of his distress over Dr. Cooley's acts, Dr. DeBakey persuaded the court that the "friction between [himself]
and Dr. Cooley would be highly inflammatory and [his appearance would] serve no purpose except to introduce issues into
the case before the jury that were not properly before the
court. 12 52 Dr. DeBakey's feelings were obviously very genuine
and strongly felt; he probably had no desire to deprive Mrs.
Karp of her day in court. But his behavior, aided by the courts'
rulings, demonstrates again how the medical profession regards disciplining of physician-investigators for overreaching
their patient-subjects as its own province and so "resentfully
'253
clams up when one of its members is attacked.
248 Karp v. Cooley, 349 F. Supp. 827, 834 (S.D. Tex. 1972), affd, 493 F.2d 408
(5th Cir. 1974).
249 T. THOMPSON, supra note 235, at 216.
250 Dr. Liotta was fired from Baylor and Dr. Cooley resigned.
2-1 T. THOMPSON, supra note 235, at 217, quoting a person who observed DeBakey's "possession" with the need to punish Cooley during the hearings.
22 349 F. Supp. at 836.
2
11 Jaffe, Law as a System of Control, 98 DAEDALUS 406, 408 (1969).

INFORMED CONSENT

Given the nature of Mr. Karp's consenting process, the case
not surprisingly has little to say on the matter of comprehension. But it is perhaps noteworthy that Dr. Cooley himself
clearly regarded this as an important factor. He testified, in
Judge Bell's words, that he had "assured himself that Mr. Karp
understood the gravity of his personal situation and the nature
of the operation to be performed. 2 5 4
Finally, the issue of causation played an important role in
Karp v. Codley. On this point, each side to the lawsuit was pushed
to the extreme positions often brought about by litigation. In
Mrs. Karp's version, her husband was "as normal as any man in
the courtroom," from the time he entered the hospital to the
morning of surgery. 25 5 The defendants' position, which was
accepted by the courts, was that Mr. Karp was near death as
the moment of the operation approached. 2 56 Two conclusions

followed from this: first, that whatever the doctors did cannot
have harmed him, and alternatively, that his condition was so
bad that it was the ventriculoplasty which brought about his
death, not the subsequent steps. At this point the problem of
establishing causation became technical; the courts agreed with
the defendants that the causes of death were pneumonia and,
secondarily, renal failure, and these were known consequences
of major surgery and only "possibly" caused by the mechanical
heart. 257 The plaintiffs would have had the court conclude that

the heart device was a probable "cause of the cause" of the
death. 25 8 Although Mrs. Karp did "not complain of the informed
consent" for the ventriculoplasty, 25 9 that would matter little
under the view taken of causation in the informed consent
model, since the operations were, in the physicians' own terms,
an integrated three-step process. The lack of information about
the risks of renal failure, as shown in the calf experiments,
would certainly seem to point to an adequate causal nexus when
that very complication arose following the procedure.
254493 F. 2d at 415.
255
Id. at 412-13.
256
Id. at 414-15, 422.
257
Id. at 422.
258This argument was based on the expressed views of Dr. DeBakey that the physiological changes experienced by Mr. Karp "resemble those observed in the animal
experiments" conducted with the artificial heart and that all his complications "were
secondary to the problem of inadequate perfusion, due to the effects of the implanted
pump." R. Fox & J. SWAZEY, supra note 224, at 174-75 (quoting M. DeBakey).
2.9493 F.2d at 422.
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The Karp-Cooley episode, which provides what is perhaps
the most stunning example of advanced and highly technological research and treatment in the catastrophic disease field,
thus adds little to the substantive law of informed consent. Yet
it illustrates well the need for further evolution of the law if patient-subjects are to be adequately protected as informed decisionmakers about their own medical procedures.

